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IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
There are no question legitimately presented before this court for the 
determination. The question that Petitioner is asking this court to decide is in essence the 
following: 
Must an Appellate court take jurisdiction to consider a Motion to 
"Recall the Mandate" in a case in which the Appellate court did 
not issue any mandate, but merely affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court; and when the motion is based solely on affidavits that 
are not part of the record which criticize the Appellate courts 
decision, but do not provide any newly discovered information, or 
reveal misconduct, or fraud on the court, or give the court any 
compelling reason to resume jurisdiction; and after the moving 
party's petition for rehearing and for certiorari have been 
previously considered and denied? 
V. REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORTS 
The Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in this case (Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.. 
Inc.) is reported at 781 P.2d, 445 (Utah App. 1989). 
VI. GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
Although this court has discretionary authority to grant certiorari pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2, and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
jurisdiction is improper in this case. The Court has already denied the first Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari filed in this case. The present Petition is merely an attempt by the petitioner to 
circumvent the doctrine of res judicata and the appellate process. 
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VH. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a collision between a car and semi-truck which was parked on 
the shoulder of an interstate highway. A jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff 
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court verdict. 
Plaintiff now seeks for a second time a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
Vm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. This case involves a collision between a car and a semi-truck which was 
parked on the shoulder of an interstate highway. 
2. At trial a jury found for Defendants and Plaintiff appealed. 
3. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court on 
September 8, 1989. (See Exhibit A attached hereto) 
4. Mr. DeBry, counsel for Plaintiff, filed a Petition for Reconsideration of 
the appeal on September 21, 1989. Attached to the Petition for Reconsideration was the 
Affidavit of Patricia Hanna, chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of 
Utah. The thesis of this Affidavit was that the opinion of the Court of Appeals "reflects a break 
down in the decision making process". (See paragraph 6, page 2 of Affidavit, Exhibit B 
attached hereto) Ms. Hanna also said "that the opinion was the equivalent of failing graduate 
work." (See paragraph 6, page 2 of Affidavit) 
5. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Reconsideration on October 
18, 1989. (See Exhibit C) 
6. Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 15, 1989. 
(See Exhibit D attached hereto) 
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7. Seven days later Mr. DeBry filed a substitute Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. (See Exhibit E attached hereto) 
8. Defendants filed a Brief in Opposition to the Substitute Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari on January 15, 1990. (See Exhibit F attached hereto) 
9. Mr. DeBry filed a Reply to Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari on 
January 25th, 1990. (Incorrectly denominated "Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari". See 
Exhibit G attached hereto) 
10. Mr. DeBry again included the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna in the Petition 
and Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
11. Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the above mentioned Affidavit and 
presented oral argument to the Utah Supreme Court on February 5, 1990. (See Exhibit H, 
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna, attached hereto. Attached as Exhibit J is a 
certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion to Strike the Affidavit). 
12. The Utah Supreme Court granted the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Patricia Hanna on February 5, 1990. (See Order attached to Exhibit I.) 
13. The Utah Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 
March 6, 1990. (See Exhibit K, attached hereto) 
14. Defendants through counsel filed a Motion to Impose Sanctions against 
Robert DeBry, with the trial court on January 4, 1991. On February 21, 1991 the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
issued an order indicating that such sanctions should be addressed to the Utah Court of Appeals 
and allowing Defendants/Respondents filed a Motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure 33, to impose sanctions. (Order of the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, dated 
February 21, 1991 attached hereto as Exhibit L) 
15. Defendants then applied to the Court of Appeals to impose sanctions on 
Mr. DeBry pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33(a); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
11 and UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1989). (See Petition for Sanctions Against Robert J. 
DeBry in his capacity as counsel for Plaintiff Ralph Ostler, Exhibit M, attached hereto) 
16. On June 21, 1991 counsel Robert DeBry filed in the Utah Court of Appeals 
a "Motion to Recall the Mandate and to Correct the Opinion," attempting to consolidate such 
Motion with the pending Petition for Sanctions against Robert DeBry. (See Exhibit N attached 
hereto) The Motion was based on the Affidavits of Samuel D. Thurman, Carl S. Hawkins and 
Michael Goldsmith. These Affidavits were all outside of the Trial and Appellate Court records. 
The Affidavits were provided by former Law School Deans and Law Professors in an attempt 
to demonstrate the supposed merit of Robert DeBry's filing of the Petition for Rehearing. The 
affiants attempt to accomplish this purpose by criticizing the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (See Exhibit O attached hereto) 
17. On August 5, 1991 the Utah Court of Appeals denied Defendants' Petition 
for Sanctions against Robert DeBry for lack of jurisdiction. (See Exhibit P attached hereto) 
18. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the Motion to Recall the Mandate in 
its Memorandum Opinion dismissing the Petition for Sanctions Against Robert DeBry on August 
5, 1991. (See Exhibit P attached hereto) 
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19. On September 3, 1991, Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Mandamus to the Utah Court of Appeals (See Exhibit Q attached hereto)(Now pending before 
this Court). 
20. On September 3, 1991 Mr. DeBry also filed the present Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari in this Court on the same issue presented in the Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 
(See Exhibit R attached hereto) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court Should Deny The Petition For Writ of Certiorari 
A. Introduction 
Petitioner would have this court review and condemn the Utah Court of Appeals 
disposition of a "Motion to Recall the Mandate." However, "Review by a Writ of Certiorari 
is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion and will be granted only for special and 
important reasons." Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46. 
In light of the factual and procedural background in this case, petitioner's 
contentions are not only neither special nor important, but in fact are wholly without merit. In 
the first place, the Appellate Court did not issue any "mandate" that it could recall. The 
Appellate Court merely affirmed the trial court's decision without issuing any "mandate" or 
further instructions to the trial court. 
Petitioner based the Motion to Recall the Mandate on the Affidavits of two former 
law school deans and a law professor (see Exhibit N). These affidavits were all outside of the 
trial and appellate records. The affidavits criticized the Appellate Court's decision, but did not 
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provide any newly discovered information, did not reveal any misconduct or fraud, and did not 
give the court any compelling reason to resume jurisdiction (see Exhibit O). 
Furthermore, even if Mr. DeBry would have the Court overlook these facial 
defects, it would appear from Mr. DeBry's contentions in the present Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, that the Petition is in substance a new petition for rehearing. Mr. DeBry was merely 
attempting once again to persuade the Court of Appeals to abandon its decision on the merits. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 35 expressly prohibits consecutive petitions for 
rehearing. Subsection d reads "Petitions for rehearing that are not timely presented under this 
rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing will not be received by the clerk." Rule 35(d) 
Accordingly the Court of Appeals appropriately dismissed Mr. DeBry's Motion for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
In Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 384, 386, this Court noted: 
In the present appeal plaintiffs' seek to resurrect the issues that 
were raised on the first appeal. The assignments of error in 
plaintiffs brief are directed towards the original judgements, the 
same judgement from which Plaintiffs appealed [previously] ... 
The express ruling by this Court on all issues raised by the prior 
appeals is binding upon the parties, the trial court and this Court. 
The court's holding is readily applicable to the case at hand. The Court of Appeals has already 
expressly ruled on all the issues now raised by Mr. DeBry. The Court of Appeals is bound by 
its' prior express ruling and hence appropriately dismissed the Motion to Recall the Mandate for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
By filing the present petition, Mr. DeBry makes a mockery of the doctrine of res 
judicata. After the Trial Court entered its judgment based upon a jury verdict in Defendant's 
favor, the Utah Court of Appeals fully reviewed the Plaintiffs case and affirmed the Trial 
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Court's decision. Mr. DeBry then filed a Petition for Rehearing, based on the "Hanna 
Affidavit" which this court later deemed as "bordering on contempt" (See exhibit J). After the 
Court of Appeals denied the Petition, Mr. DeBry filed the first Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
to this court. This court struck the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna and denied the Petition. Then 
Mr. Debry responded to a motion for sanctions against him by filing a Motion to Recall the 
Mandate based on the Affidavits of three law professors. The Affidavits were all outside of the 
record and each criticized the opinion of the Court of Appeals (exhibit O). The Court of 
Appeals dismissed the Motion for Sanctions against Mr. DeBry on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction. In the same Memorandum opinion the Appellate Court also dismissed Mr. Debry's 
Motion to Recall the Mandate "on the same basis" (see Exhibit P). 
Mr. DeBry has responded to the ruling of the Appellate Court by filing two 
additional Petitions in this Court, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the present Petition for Writ of Certiorari. These latest Petitions are further 
examples of Mr. DeBry's relentless disposition for filing inappropriate and meritless claims in 
this case. 
Despite the foregoing Mr. DeBry attempts to create "a special or important" 
reason why the court should grant certiorari to review this case by reference to each possible 
basis for certiorari in sub-parts a-d of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46. In each 
instance however, Mr. DeBry's contentions are unfounded. 
B. Petitioner has not presented an adequate basis for the Court's Certiorari 
Jurisdiction. 
1. Mr. DeBry first asserts that the Court of Appeals ruling in this case is "in 
conflict with prior decisions of this court" (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, page 5, exhibit R). 
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In an attempt to create this conflict, DeBry first cites Fenton v. Salt Lake County. 4 Utah 116 
(1885) a case which was decided over 100 years ago and has not been cited by the courts since 
its appeal on the merits in 1885. Fenton is clearly distinguishable on its facts from the case at 
bar. In Fenton, the Supreme Court merely allowed the Plaintiff to Appeal from a final 
judgement dismissing his case after the Defendant had effectively taken an interlocutory appeal 
of the trial court's ruling against his demurrer. The Fenton Court implicitly held that the 
resolution of a prior interlocutory appeal by the defendant did not affect the plaintiffs statutory 
right to appeal from the trial court's judgment. Unlike Fenton, Ostler has not only received the 
opportunity of a full trial and an appeal on the merits, but has also had the opportunity to 
petition the Court of Appeals for rehearing, and to petition this Court for Certiorari. Both 
petitions have already been denied. 
Mr. Debry next cites Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 24 P.2d 380 (1950) for the 
proposition that an Appellate Court can recall a remittitur if it was "issued improperly or to 
correct an irregularity or error in the issuance of the remittitur." However, Mr. DeBry has 
distorted the Court's holding in the case, by omitting the dominant clause of the holding. In 
Miller the Supreme Court acknowledged that "we are without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur, 
except upon a showing that the remittitur was issued through fraud, or inadvertence, or was 
issued prematurely, or otherwise improperly or to correct an irregularity of error in issuance of 
the remittitur." Miller. 24 P.2d at 381 (Utah 1933) (Emphasis added). (This is not the direct 
holding of the court, but rather the court held so indirectly by asserting in the following 
paragraph "in the absence of a statute or rule of court to the contrary the great weight of judicial 
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authority as to the first proposition [i.e. the one quoted above] is as contended by the 
respondant." Miller) 
The Supreme Court's reference in Miller is clearly to its own jurisdiction, not to 
that of other appellate courts, as Mr. DeBry has asserted. Furthermore, the court clearly states 
that it is without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur except upon a showing of inadvertence, 
fraud, prematurity, or to correct an irregularity, or other impropriety. Hence, even if this rule 
applies by analogy to the jurisdiction of appellate courts, the Utah Court of Appeals was indeed 
without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur issued in this case absent the required showing. 
Because the Motion to Recall was based solely on affidavits that were not part of the record and 
in any event, failed to provide any showing of fraud, inadvertence, prematurity, impropriety, 
etc. the court was correct in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction. 
2. Mr. DeBry next asserts that "the Court of Appeals ruling conflicts with 
another decision of the Court of Appeals" (Petition for Writ of Certiorari page 5, Exhibit R 
attached hereto). To support this contention he cites Baker v. Western Surety Co.. 757 P.2d 
878 (Utah App. 1988). Again the supposed "conflict" is an illusory one. In Baker the Court 
of Appeals merely reiterated the provision contained in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
providing that a trial court may consider a motion for relief from a judgment even while an 
appeal is pending in the Court of Appeals. Baker is simply not applicable to the case at bar. 
Rule 60(b) applies only to trial courts and is supported by notions of judicial economy. Judicial 
economy can be served if, in the discretion of the trial court and upon a showing of good cause, 
the trial court can correct its own errors, hence obviating the necessity of appellate review in 
some cases. In the case at bar the Court of Appeals has no rule or statutory authority that would 
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permit it to recall its decision. Furthermore, judicial economy would not be served because 
Ostler's petitions have been heard prior to the Motion to Recall twice by the Court of Appeals 
and once by the Utah Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals should not be forced to entertain 
Petitioner's motion after so much judicial time has been wasted by Mr. DeBry's repeated and 
meritless petitions and motions. Neither should this court waste any more of its time in 
considering this illusory "conflict of authority" created by Mr. DeBry. 
3. Mr. DeBry goes on to assert that the present petition raises an "important 
question of state law, which should be settled by the Supreme Court" (Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Exhibit Q attached hereto). In an attempt to support the assertion, Mr. DeBry cites 
several cases from other jurisdictions. Again Mr. DeBry has mis-characterized the law in these 
cases in an effort to create "illusory conflicts." He cites eight cases for the proposition that 
appellate courts have "inherent power or jurisdiction to recall and review their own judgements, 
mandates, and orders," however, not one of these cases is an appellate court decision. Each is 
a supreme court (either State of Federal) decision referring to the supreme court's discretionary 
powers to correct its decisions. These cases do not make reference to any supposed power or 
jurisdiction of appellate courts in recalling their decisions. 
A Tenth Circuit Court case, Coleman v. Turpen. 827 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1987) 
does refer to appellate court power to set aside a mandate. However, Mr. DeBry has failed to 
provide a full citation of the pertinent passage of the opinion that he quotes. The Tenth Circuit 
Court notes: 
While a mandate once issued by our court will not be recalled 
except for good cause shown, an appellate court has power to set 
aside at any time a mandate that was procured by fraud, or act to 
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prevent an injustice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
process. 
Coleman. 827 F.2d at 671 (10th Circuit 1987) (Citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. 
FCC. 463 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir 1971)). (emphasis added) 
Clearly the General Rule among federal appellate courts is that a mandate once 
issued will not be recalled. Only under exceptional circumstances "for good cause shown" can 
it be recalled. In the present case the Affidavits of Samuel Thurman, Carl Hawkins, and 
Michael Goldsmith, all extraneous to the record, did not and could not have presented any 
"exceptional circumstance" to the Court of Appeals. 
Mr. DeBry also quotes from Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.. 322 
U.S. 238 (1944). However, in that case the Circuit Court's judgement had been procured by 
fraud, hence the Supreme Court Ordered the Circuit Court to vacate its judgment and to give 
instructions to the trial Court accordingly. 
Opposing counsel cites Boudar v. E.G.G. Inc.. 742 P.2d 491 (N.M. 1987), for 
the proposition that "[Appellate decisions] must be final because they are right and not right 
because they are final ...." Boudar at 443. However, Mr. DeBry has again mis-characterized 
the Court's decision. In giving its opinion the Supreme Court of New Mexico referred to its 
own decisions and not to the decisions of other appellate courts. 
Counsel for Petitioner also cites Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC. 463 
F.2d. 267 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In that case the D. C. Circuit refused to recall its mandate even 
though new "prejudicial information" had been discovered after the Circuit Court's decision. 
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The court concluded: 
We assume doctrines deeply rooted in equity jurisprudence permit 
a recall of an appellate mandate of affirmance to avoid an 
unconscionable injustice growing out of misconduct undercutting 
the integrity of the administrative or judicial process. But there is 
no claim of such misconduct. 
Greater Boston at 291. 
The court noted further that: 
The power to recall mandates should be exercised sparingly and is 
not to be availed of freely as a basis for granting rehearings out of 
time for the purpose of changing decisions, even assuming the 
court becomes doubtful of the wisdom of the decision that has been 
entered and become final. 
Greater Boston at 277. (Citing Estate of Iverson v. Comm'r. 257 F.2d 408, 409 (8th Cir. 1958). 
The D. C. Court also cited Legate v. Malony. 348 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1965): "If we were in 
error . . . we believe it would be far greater error to permit reconsideration now after denial of 
Petitions for Rehearing and Certiorari. There must be an end to dispute." Legate at 166. The 
Court continued: "There must be special reason, 'exceptional circumstances', in order to 
override the strong policy of repose that there be an end to litigation". Legate at 278. 
The D. C. Circuit in Greater Boston also provides an excellent summary of the 
circumstances that might be deemed "exceptional." These are: to set aside a mandate procured 
by fraud; to correct clerical mistakes, or make the judgment consistent with the opinion; to 
clarify an outstanding mandate; to irradiate the fraud or misconduct of a party that would 
undercut the integrity of the judicial process; to avoid differences of result for cases pending at 
the same time; to give co-defendants the benefit of the same principle; to provide uniformity in 
companion cases; and to avoid inter-circuit conflict; to revise unintended or inadvertent 
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instructions of the appellate court. (See Greater Boston at 278-280). Mr. Debry presented no 
such "exceptional" circumstances to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
4. In a final attempt to provide a basis for the present petition, Mr. DeBry 
apparently relies on the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 46(c). This subsection provides for 
certiorari "when a panel of the court of appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has sanctioned such a departure 
by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the supreme courts power of supervision" 
(emphasis added). However, in Mr. DeBry's attempt to demonstrate the Courts supposed 
departure, he cites the substantive contents of the Affidavits of Thurman, Hawkins, and 
Goldsmith, (See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Page 10, Exhibit R). As has been noted all three 
affidavits are outside of the record, and cannot serve as a basis for any argument advanced 
before this court. Furthermore, even if such affidavits were legitimately before this court, they 
are entirely inapplicable to Petitioner's argument for Certiorari. The affidavits criticize the 
original opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in which the court affirmed the trial court's 
judgement. The affiants offer no opinion regarding the supposed impropriety of the Court's 
disposition of the Motion to Recall, presently at issue in this Petition. The Court should not be 
mislead by Mr. DeBry's confusion of the merits of the original appeal with those of the present 
petition. 
In short every point raised by Mr. DeBry in his argument for Certiorari in this 
case, is either false illusory or misleading. The present Petition for Writ of Certiorari like all 
of the other post appeal petitions and motions filed by Mr. DeBry, is merely another attempt to 
circumvent the doctrine of res judicata and the appellate process. Mr. DeBry's present petition 
13 
like his other post appeal petitions and motions in this case, is meatless, frivolous, and 
inappropriate. 
POINT n 
Sanctions Are Appropriate Pursuant To 
Rule 33 Of The Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure 
And Rule 11 Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, 
Generally, attorney's fees may be recovered in Utah if provided for by statute 
or contract. Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). Moreover, pursuant to 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33, attorney and/or double costs are awarded in cases of 
frivolous appeals. 
Rule 33 states in relevant part: 
If the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award . . . 
single or double costs. . . and/or reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party. 
Sanctions for frivolous appeals have been applied in egregious cases, such as when 
an appeal was filed in order to "take unconscionable advantage" of the other party and therefore 
failing to meet the standards of good faith. Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah App. 
1987). "Egregious cases may include those obviously without merit, with no reasonable 
likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment" (emphasis added). 
Maughan. 770 P.2d at 162. See also, Porco v. Porco. 759 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988) (Appeal 
filed to harass defendant). 
Moreover, sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate when a pleading or motion is 
filed without reasonable inquiry as to whether it is "well grounded in fact" or "warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
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law," and is brought for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay 
or needless increase in the cost of litigation" (emphasis added). See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 
770 P.2d at 171, 172 (Utah App. 1989). 
The standard to be employed under Rule 11 is an objective one: did the attorney 
act reasonable, under the circumstances. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 
App. 1989). The Court said in Taylor that this objective standard "allows sanctions to be 
imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the pre-amendment, subjective 'bad faith' 
standard." Taylor at 170. The Court also stated that whether specific conduct violates Rule 11 
is a question of law. If this rule is violated, based on an objective standard, it is mandatory to 
impose sanctions. It is within the Court's discretion to tailor the sanction to the circumstance 
but usually is based on costs and attorney's fees. 
Attached as Exhibit J is a certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion 
to Strike the Affidavit before the Supreme Court. On page 8, line 6, Justice Stewart suggests 
that the Affidavit "borders on contempt". Justice Durham states, beginning line 25 of page 8: 
"It boggles the mind, the potential for this kind of a collateral attack on the inherent logic of an 
appellate court." 
The Affidavit was not part of the record on appeal and was an attempted criticism 
of the thought processes of the appellate panel to persuade them, first, to reconsider the appeal 
and, secondly, to provide that as a basis for the requested Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Counsel for the Appellant in arguing the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia 
Hanna characterized it as a "once in a lifetime motion". Exhibit J, page 7, lines 14-17. Justice 
Durham readily saw that allowing an affidavit outside the record as a basis for a Petition for 
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Certiorari could be abused and would be a whole new concept in an attack on a lost appeal. 
(Transcript Exhibit J, page 8, lines 170-25). Justice Durham also characterized this particular 
Affidavit as a Mspecific critique and attack upon the work of an appellate court". (Transcript, 
Exhibit J. page 9, lines 20 and 21.) An examination of the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna clearly 
demonstrates that it is nothing more than a criticism of the court and judges of the court "with 
no reasonable likelihood of success". Though previously stricken by this Court, Petitioner again 
has the audacity to resubmit to the Court the Hanna affidavit. 
There can be little doubt that the Justices of the Supreme Court hearing this 
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna were exercised at the audacity of Plaintiffs 
counsel in submitting such an attack on the court as a basis for a Writ of Certiorari. Such 
recognition by Plaintiffs counsel was shown by his own statement on page 10 of the transcript, 
Exhibit J, wherein Mr. DeBry said, "Now* I'd like to follow with Justice Stewart's question, 
because you're looking at me very sternly, when I say this is a once-in-a-lifetime motion and 
you say it borders on contempt". 
While counsel tried to urge the court that it was a matter of the gravest concern, 
an examination of the Affidavit itself shows how direct the attack was on the logic and analysis 
process of the Court of Appeals. Referring the court directly to the parts of the Affidavit, Page 
2, paragraph 6: 
In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision 
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have 
given it a grade of 4D'; from a graduate student, it would have 
counted as failing work. 
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The last sentence of paragraph 7: 
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single 
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis 
which they deserved and required. 
The first two sentences of the last paragraph on page 3: 
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment 
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the 
interrelated nature of the arguments in the appeal; . . . 
The third sentence of the last paragraph on page 3: 
Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no appreciation of 
the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a bearing on 
more than one aspect of the case. 
The last sentence of the top paragraph on page 4: 
I can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a 
serious breakdown in the present case. 
The middle of the first paragraph on page 4: 
. . . indicate how and where the Court of Appeals' decision to 
reject the appeal fails to take account of or to address the points 
raised by Ostler's counsel. 
The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 6: 
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic 
of Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the 
Court of Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. 
The next to the last sentence on page 9: 
The Court of Appeals' decision shows absolutely no appreciation 
of this fact, and in no sense addresses it. 
The last sentence on page 11: 
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. . . this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's case 
it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to 
comprehend the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did 
to Ostler's case. 
The last sentence under point 1 on page 12: 
Therefore, the Court of Appeal's decision that Ostler does not 
prove a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to 
me to show a failure to read the briefs carefully. 
The last sentence on age 13: 
The Court of Appeals . . . says that taken in context, the remark 
caused no harm. This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects 
the Court of Appeal's failure to take the misstatement and its 
correction in context, viz. the larger context of the legal issues 
involved in the jury's deliberations and the fact that their 
instructions on these matters were unclear and confusing. 
The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 15: 
Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal. 
The first sentence in the first paragraph on page 17: 
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. 
The first sentence on page 20: 
The Court of Appeal's grounds for their decision to reject the 
appeal are confusing. 
The last sentence in the second paragraph on page 20: 
In short, the entire section on p. 10 stands as an enigma in the 
Court of Appeals' reasoning. 
The conclusion of the affiant, Ms. Hanna shows the thrust of the Affidavit: 
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion 
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude 
that in reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take 
into account many important aspects of the arguments made in the 
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appeal; at several points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is 
beside the point and fails to address the arguments made in the 
appeal. Due to time pressures or misunderstandings, a single 
individual might fail to grasp the points at issue and the structure 
of the plaintiffs arguments; however, it seems highly unlikely that 
three individuals could all have made the same errors in analysis. 
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single 
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis 
which they deserved and required. 
In the present case, all pleadings filed by Mr. DeBry after the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court jury verdict, including the two present petitions before this Court, are 
predicated upon affidavits outside the record which attack the fundamental process of judicial 
review and challenge the integrity of the judges who sat in review of the trial court. 
Accordingly, Mr. DeBry has inappropriately created "needless increase in the cost of litigation." 
Every motion filed by Mr. DeBry after the appellate decision came down has been 
denied. The affidavit of Patricia Hanna, attached as Exhibit B, was improperly submitted to the 
Court and had no basis for admittance under existing law. Mr. DeBry has submitted the 
Affidavit on four separate occasions, once to the Court of Appeals, and now three times to this 
Court. Likewise, the Affidavits of Samuel Thurman, Carl Hawkins and Michael Goldsmith have 
been improperly submitted to both the Court of Appeals and to this Court, especially to the 
extent that they are advanced affirmatively in support of the Motion to Recall. (Contrary to Mr. 
DeBry's representations, the Affidavits have not merely been advanced defensively.) 
Appellant's counsel did not present any valid argument why the law should be 
extended to allow the filing of such disparaging affidavits. Certiorari was denied Mr. DeBry 
after a Petition and a Substitute Petition to the Utah Supreme Court. Clearly, after the Court 
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of Appeals affirmed, the subsequent pleadings were "without merit." Utah Courts have 
interpreted "without merit" to mean an appeal "without a reasonable legal or factual basis." 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309, (Utah App. 1987). 
Moreover, even if Mr. DeBry contends that he has submitted the 5 meritless 
pleadings in good faith, subjective good faith is not a defense to Rule 11 or Rule 33 sanctions. 
If pleadings are not well-grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing law or create needless 
litigation, a sanction is mandatory under Rule 11. Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank. 804 F.2d 588 
(10th Cir. 1986); Taylor. Supra. 
In Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.. the answer to every pleading filed after the 
appellate decision was in keeping with the trial court's and Court of Appeals' decision. Mr. 
DeBry filed Petitions that were supported by an affidavit he himself saw as a "once-in-a-lifetime 
shot". See Exhibit J. page 7, line 23. The Court stated it shouldn't even happen "once-in-a-
lifetime". Id. Now, Mr. DeBry has further demonstrated his audacity by seeking three 
additional opportunities after his "once-in-a-lifetime shot" was appropriately denied by the court. 
In sum, Mr. DeBry after having been denied rehearing and certiorari has filed 
three additional meritless pleadings. The first was a Petition to Recall the Mandate based solely 
on affidavits that further disparage the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals. In Mr. DeBry's 
last two petitions to this Court, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, he has again included the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna which this court struck from 
the record. He has also included the extraneous Affidavits of Mr. Thurman, Mr. Hawkins and 
Mr. Goldsmith. The Petition now pending in this court is meritless and should be denied. It 
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is yet another example of Mr. DeBry's relentless disposition for filing inappropriate and 
meritless claims. 
Defendants have incurred in excess of $14,000 in attorney's fees (see affidavit of 
counsel attached as Exhibit S) subsequent to the Appellate Court's decision affirming the trial 
court's judgment. Defendants are entitled to reimbursement in the form of sanctions against Mr. 
Debry for having to respond to and defend against five meritless motions and petitions. (Six, 
counting the Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
Mr. DeBry, not his client Ralph Ostler, should be sanctioned. "If there is a 
frivolous appeal and the fault lies with the attorney, that is where the sanction will lie." Braley 
v. Campbell. 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987). 
Defendants hereby pray that the Court find Mr. DeBry's post-appeal pleadings 
without merit and thus warranting an award to Defendants of reasonable attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied and sanctions should be 
imposed on Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Ralph Ostler. 
Sanctions are proper pursuant to Rule 11, as Mr. DeBry created needless litigation, Rule 33 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1989) as Mr. DeBry's post appeal pleadings have all 
been without merit and have not been brought in good faith. Defendants hereby pray for 
sanctions of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and any additional amount the Court deems 
appropriate. 
Dated and signed MsSO ^oay of September, 1991 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
November 21, 1989 
Ralph Ostler, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 
Stanley E. Wheeler, and F & R 
Roe, Inc., 
Defendants, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
Ostler, 
Ostler, 
B. Ostler, 
Wanda Ostler, Stephen K, 
Gary W. Ostler, Vyron R« 
Dale F. Ostler, Donnell 
Sonda Mae Ostler, Ralph 0. Ostler, 
Brian L. Ostler, Carlyle E. Ostler, 
Margaret Ostler, and Nathan J. 
Ostler, as heirs of Stephen Ostler, 
Gary Ostler, Dale Ostler, and 
Eugene Ostler, d/b/a Go Cars, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
REMITTITUR 
Case No, 880228-CA 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, 
and the Court being sufficiently advised in the 
premises, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
the judgment of the trial court herein be, and the same 
is, affirmed. 
Opinion of the Court by Judge Russell W. Bench; 
Judge Pamela T. Greenwood and Judge Norman H. Jackson 
concur. 
Issued: September 8, 1989 
Record: 11 VOLS and 1 ENV 
EXHIBIT- ft 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of November, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was deposited in 
the United States mail. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Robert J. Debry 
Dale Gardiner 
Attorneys for Appellant 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Attorney for Respondents 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
DATED this 21st day of November, 1989 
By y?^77^f///, //s&S. 
/ /Deputy Clerk y 
Exhibit B 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. ] 
OF &R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. ' 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) PATRICIA HANNA 
} Case No. 88-00228-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Patricia Hanna. I give the following testimony under 
oath: 
1. I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati. 
2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah. 
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3. I am not a lawyer nor am I 'trained in law. However, I am trained 
in logic and argumentation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large 
measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic 
reasoning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well 
as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry. My 
curriculum vita is attached. 
4. I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Albina. et al. I have been asked to 
render an opinion of that Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, I have not 
been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have 
been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes 
issues raised in the briefs. 
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking. 
6. In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision 
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have given it a 
grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing 
work. 
7. In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could 
have been endorsed by three judges. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems, 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
8. My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows: 
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General Structure of Appeal 
There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9 
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III, 
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the 
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In 
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the 
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the 
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full 
force. 
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this. 
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler 
(hereafter, Wheeler)ef al. cannot be resolved without a decision on the 
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and 
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion 
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or 
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear 
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such 
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have 
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only 
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability. 
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment 
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated 
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually 
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the 
plaintiff's case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no 
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a 
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the 
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable 
1
 The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no 
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission 
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the 
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48. 
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures 
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one 
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for 
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect 
on the matter. This does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I 
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious 
breakdown in the present case. 
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and 
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeals 
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals' 
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the 
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 points 
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points. 
Assumptions 
There is no dispute on the following: Wheeler negligently parked his 
semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson, 
Utah. He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of 
his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father 
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran into 
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I will take these as. given. 
Point I 
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of the 
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that although a 
major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause, 
almost all of the evidence proffered by Ostler was rejected by the trial 
court. As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict againsi 
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of 
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury 
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this 
decision. 
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit, 
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive 
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fairness. In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no 
indication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was 
that the evidence was entirely without merit.2 Instead, the evidence is 
rejected on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be 
irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that 
it would confuse the jurors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors 
already were fully aware of the phenomena. The appeal argues that these 
grounds are all inadequate.3 
1. The "moth-phenomenon". Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices. 
and denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in 
emergency lane 
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory, 
which is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether 
flashing or not, have a tendency to "lure" sleepy drivers towards them, 
much as a moth is drawn to a light. Thus, if father Ostler was awake at 
the time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this 
"luring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's 
truck. 
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler 
was not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such 
devices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided. 
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact 
location, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck 
had not been present in the- emergency lane, it was most likely that the 
Ostler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field. 
At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to 
testify on the matter of the so-called "moth-phenomenon;N however, it is clear from the 
transcript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's 
decision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245). 
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections. 
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In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it 
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether father 
Ostler was awake or asleep. Taking each point in isolation, might give 
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlooks 
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be 
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to 
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time 
of the accident. 
2. Was father Ostler awake? 
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern 
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the 
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the 
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to 
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable 
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter. 
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisive 
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate. 
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his 
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a 
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says that 
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment 
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jury 
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, the 
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the 
evidence was not conclusive. It strikes me that if indeed this were the 
standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all 
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable 
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear 
would be directed verdicts. 
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic o 
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the Court of 
Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. What attention 
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does give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying 
only that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive 
way to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the 
accident" (Opinion, p. 4). In light of Ostler's point, this statement is 
simply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context. 
3. Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules 
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in 
violation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck 
drivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that 
Wheeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane. The 
relevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold. One, it contributes to his 
negligence; the decision to rule it out because negligence was not 
relevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable. 
However, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability. 
Exhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's 
position and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would 
affect whether and to what extent he should be held liable. Further, if 
Wheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and 
needed to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an 
attempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability. The 
Court of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes 
to the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by 
directed verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R.
 Evid. 402 
("evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6). 
4. The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabilitv of possibility of 
such an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a 
possibility 
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues 
to show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the 
intended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless 
there was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to 
provide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within, 
showing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would 
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occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane), 
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen. 
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this 
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the grounds 
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were 
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling. 
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of 
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in this 
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence a M to proximate 
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common 
knowledge. 
Admissibility of this evidence 
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case arid 
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to 
understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in 
order to support his contention that Wheeler was negligent, one of the 
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable. 
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a well-
understood and valid form of argument.4 
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the 
accident. 
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect on 
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or 
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the 
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is 
therefore liable for the accident. 
4
 According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of Logic (London: 1962), 
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D., 
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178). 
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3. If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there 
was no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane 
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes 
of the accident. Had the truck not been there, there would have been no 
accident. Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes. 
4. Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or 
asleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a 
proximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least 
partially liable for the accident.5 
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful 
to the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it 
prevented Ostler's constructing this argument; further.to argue that each 
piece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and 
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of 
events. Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of 
our lives. For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant 
(pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make 
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our 
atmosphere and light's reaction to it. So too, the fact that all the 
evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto render it 
ineligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of 
proximate cause. This is especially so given the fact that the issue of 
proximate cause was the key to the decision. The Court of Appeals' 
decision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense 
addresses it. Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion 
clearly demonstrates this. 
5
 A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or 
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency 
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most 
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would 
have alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the 
accident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the 
time of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate 
causes of the accident. 
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the 
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall, 
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc. Ostler 
presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant, 
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge misapplied 
the law-and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard. The Court of 
Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion of 
Ostler's arguments against this decision. 
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded if 
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the 
jury. Under this standard, since'we all can understand the use of 
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) and 
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to 
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them. 
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, this 
requirement is relaxed. It is now no longer necessary to show that the 
expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary 
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and 
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case. 
Rule 702 states 
If scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will ass is t the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.) 
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if 
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of 
fact in understanding evidence that is simply 
diff icult [though] not beyond ordinary 
understanding. 
United States v. Downing 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd 
Cir. 1985) (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18). 
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of 
understanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have 
that evidence placed clearly before them. Specifically: 1) Members of 
the jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not 
entail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so 
as to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might 
think possible only for driver who was in fact asleep. 2) There is no 
reason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions 
caused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights, blinking tail-lights, and 
flares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like 
that at issue. 3) It is unclear that the average driver actually 
understands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal 
observation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not). 4) 
Nor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the 
slightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to 
significantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers. 
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand, not only did the 
jury need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is 
overwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as 
the higher common law standard requires). Not knowing these facts has a 
clear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part, 
and on a judgment of Wheeler's liability. 
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that 
no expertise was needed to understand it. The Court of Appeals argues 
that in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was 
substantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial 
judge's ruling. It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide 
discretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision 
without exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this 
discretion. 
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's 
case it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend 
the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case. 
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could 
take: each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself 
make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is 
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying 
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of the 
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to 
make an essentially comparative judgment. 
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or 
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimum 
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with 
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative 
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing 
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its 
decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no 
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story 
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what 
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is, 
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been 
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new 
deliberation (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different 
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove 
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a 
failure to read the briefs carefully. 
Point II and Point III 
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to 
urinate 
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations MO- 15-. and 70- hour rules) 
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act 
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The 
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it 
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler's claim is 
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that this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and 
liability. The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back 
once again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is 
appropriately excluded. There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals 
appreciates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony. 
Point IV 
Misstatements during closing defendant's closing statement 
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue 
was not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some 
time run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have 
foreseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his 
truck at just that time. 
[T]he foreseeabiiity question is: How was Stan 
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise 
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances 
that it would happen right at that particular time-
quoted in Opinion, p. 8). 
This clearly is not the standard to foreseeabiiity; if it were, no one would 
ever be able to foresee anything. 
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to 
direct the juror's to their instructions. He did not rule on the objection, 
clearly leaving the misstatement uncorrected . In some cases this might 
have caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it 
causes harm. The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to 
the instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear, 
complicated and difficult to understand. This will be discussed in more 
detail under Point X below. 
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together 
with Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its 
instructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm. 
This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals' 
failure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the 
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations and 
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and 
confusing. 
Point V 
Who Pavs 
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading 
statement made during closing. Here there is only an implication that the 
defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less 
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformation 
was clearly stated. The Court of Appeals' ruling on this point seems well 
taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with 
this, the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV. 
Point VII 
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or 
triangles 
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C.C. 
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury. 
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of 
a highway from any cause other than necessary 
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible, 
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning 
devices [flares or reflective triangles] (I.C.C. rule, 
quoted in Appeal, p. 41). 
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the 
devices. However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so. 
Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be 
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer ox if parked 
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances. 
However if you find that defendant Wheeler was 
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to 
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determine whether or not Wheeler should 
nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles 
under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42). 
This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the 
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the 
driver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even 
if substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to 
negligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal. 
Ostler's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that 
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g., 
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the 
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were 
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to 
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the 
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler 
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary 
drivers. 
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning 
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is 
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have 
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals' 
judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation 
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply 
left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly relevant 
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict. 
Point IX 
Video tape demonstration 
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide 
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause. Since 
these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the 
"cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not 
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth 
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case). The 
idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act; 
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or 
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?" 
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see 
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have 
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the 
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful. 
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the 
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not simila 
enough to the incident to count, as a re-enactment. Second, that it was 
just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury. 
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to 
call for a through-going revision of legal standards. In deciding these 
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the 
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then 
there would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing 
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be 
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the 
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing. 
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact 
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues 
that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an 
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual 
accident. In such a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be 
taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case. 
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that coulc 
nol have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the 
point of the video is illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on 
the issue of proximate cause. 
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong 
test: relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video 
failed the first two. It then considered the argument that the video was 
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not a re-enactment, but an illustration; and upheld the trial court's ruling 
on the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or 
that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. The very nature 
of decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by 
its nature confusing. In view of the vast body of evidence already denied 
the jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim 
that showing them the video would be confusing. At this stage of the trial 
the video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that 
Wheeler's truck was not simply something for father Ostler's truck to hit 
(as though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been 
there), but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident 
of the sort that occurred. The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries 
are not causally overdetermined,6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary 
causal factor. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see 
this point. 
Point X 
Court's instructions on intervening causes was incorrect. 
Ostler objected on several points: 
1. "Intervening independent cause" was undefined. 
2. Foreseeability was not the only test of causation 
3. Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to 
be the standard of foreseeability. 
4. The instructions were confusing. 
6
 If something is causally overdetermined, it will occur whether or not one of the causes 
occurs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you 
fatally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting 
constant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot 
me, I die. 
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the 
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as 
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were 
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof 
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion. 
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of some 
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in which 
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury. The 
jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear 
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I). Taken in this context, Ostler's 
case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision 
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instructions 
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates. 
Point XI 
Directed verdict on causation 
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked to 
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were 
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the 
judge were unclear and confusing. In view of this it seems at least 
unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however, i 
the case at hand the error runs even deeper. 
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds that 
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a similar 
verdict on causation. The defendant's response claims that if this were 
allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and 
causation; this is simply not so. Ostler argues only that in this case is 
there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply 
that there is such an implication in every case. 
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild 
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running into 
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked 
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next to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any 
case. The case at hand is not of this sort. Here the negligence implies 
causation. This is shown by asking what it was that made the act of 
parking in the emergency lane negligent. The answer is two-fold: 1) risk 
to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2) subjecting Ostler to 
the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60). 
Thus, causation is implied by negligence. 
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's 
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the 
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury. The standards cited 
by Ostler clearly support this contention.7 
Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the standard for a directed 
verdict is met: reasonable minds cannot disagree. They cannot disagree 
because the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict. In the 
Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 62, Ostler makes this clear: " The fact 
that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated 
by the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with 
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are 
apparent." Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree; 
otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic. If we 
are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even 
though we are reasonable 
The present case is of this unfortunate sort. The jurors were led to 
draw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but 
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw 
the correct conclusion. They were neither allowed to judge the issue of 
causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the 
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to 
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed. 
7
 The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially 
clear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief. AnnpnriiY T onw ~~ >.«..> 
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal 
are confusing. First it is stated that generally proximate causation is 
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be 
true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case. 
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to 
relevant evidence and could not make the determination. The Court of 
Appeals' decision does not address this argument. 
Second the Court of Appeals states that "'proximate cause' is one of 
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10). This 
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence. 
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason 
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals 
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally 
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of 
Ostler's arguments or contentions. In short, the entire section on p. 10 
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning. 
Conclusions 
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion 
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude that in 
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account 
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several 
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to 
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
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ii. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPERFICIAL TREATMENT OF THIS CASE 
IS A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE 
This is not Robert DeBry's case. Nor is this Dayle 
Jeff's case. Nor is this Judge Bench's case. No lawyer or 
judge should have a false pride in winning the case; or in 
losing the case; or in writing an opinion; or in changing an 
opinion. Presumably, the attorneys on both sides, as well as 
the entire panel of judges, have a joint goal of seeking jus-
tice. 
This is Ralph Ostler's case. Ralph Ostler lost half 
his body — from the waist down. He deserves a thoughtful, 
informed, reasoned analysis by each judge. Unfortunately, that 
is not what he got. What Ralph Ostler got was a superficial 
Opinion that did not even touch on the core issues, Ralph will 
spend his lifetime in a wheelchair. Surely his case merits a 
few extra hours of time by the judges. 
Because of the superficial treatment of issues in this 
case, Ostler has employed an expert to determine whether the 
decision making process has broken down in this case. The 
experts opinion is attached as Exhibit A. 
1 
Ostler's expert is chairperson of the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Utah. Plaintiff's expert has 
rated the quality of this Court's Opinion as a D or E grade. 
This is not intended to criticize or embarrass the Court. 
Rather, this is an attempt to assist the Court from committing 
a grave injustice. Hopefully the Court will be inclined to 
thank counsel, rather than to retaliate. 
POINT II 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT 
FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING AND RECENT PRECEDENT 
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
A major issue in the case was that Ostler's expert was 
not permitted to testify on the "moth phenomenon." The trial 
court reasoned that such testimony was not admissible until a 
foundation could be laid that father Ostler was awake just 
prior to the accident. (See Brief of Appellant at p. 6.) This 
court echoed the trial court's reasoning: 
[T]he theory was premised on the fact that a 
driver must be awake in order to be so "lured" 
. . . without this foundation, the Court deter-
mined that the expert testimony would not be 
helpful to the jury . . . 
Slip Opinion, at p. 4. 
However, this Court overlooked the recent case of 
Huddles ton v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1496; 99 L.Ed 2d 771 
(1988): 
2 
In determining whether the government has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 
104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibi-
lity nor makes a finding that the government 
has proved the conditional fact by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The court simply ex-
amines all the evidence and decides whether the 
jury could reasonably find the conditional 
fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(Compare, Brief of Appellant at p. 6 & 7.) 
In this case, there was abundant evidence from which 
the jury could have concluded that father Ostler was awake. 
(See, Brief of Appellant at p. 4 & 5.) Contrary to Huddleston, 
the trial court did not permit the evidence of the preliminary 
fact issue to go to the jury. Nor did the trial court apply 
the Huddleston analysis. (viz, whether the jury could reason-
ably find from the evidence that father Ostler was awake.) 
This is not a matter of discretion. Huddleston must be applied 
to the facts of this case. 
POINT III 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT FAILED 
TO FOLLOW BINDING RECENT PRECEDENT FROM 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
A second major issue in the case was that defendant 
Wheeler had misstated the law in his closing argument. (See 
generally, Brief of Appellant at p. 33.) This Court's Opinion 
holds that any error was cured by the following comments of the 
judge: 
The jury is directed to look at the instruc-
tions. They set forth the law in that regard. 
Statement of counsel is to be disregarded 
except a: it is accurate. 
Slip Pp..I i li 01 i, «*' <. 
Howevei. his Court's Opinion was absolutely silent on 
the issue of whether such a statement was sufficient to cure 
the error. Strangely, this Court's P:-. 2--:i^ s uoon Halford 
v. Yandellf 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App. 1977 However, Halford, 
s (j u a i' e I y \ i o J < J s t A i a f: s t I c I i c o m m e n i .* • * ' •' •«.: * • n o t s u f f i -
cient to cure the error. 
*!.•>< • jortantly, tl Lis court's opinion totally ignores 
the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) (See discussion at Brief of Appellant at 
ps 3 5 & 36.) A proper application \ the Shickles case should 
have led to a reversal. 
POINT IV 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT 
HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THREE SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS 
IN THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Ostler challenged the Court's instruction ori indepen-
dent intervening cause on four grounds: first, failure to 
define the term intervening independent cause; second, that 
foreseeability is only one test (not the sole test) to deter-
mine causation; third, that only a generalized risk of harm 
4 
need be foreseeable; and fourth, confusion. (See generally, 
Brief of Appellant at p. 56-58.) 
r
.
 : -. . . \ JHd, • v, * • : mirth issue: 
viz. confusion. Rehearing is necessary to analyze the other 
three defects i n t lit- \\\\ ) » nst met .ions „ ^ 
With respect to the fourth issue, this Court ruled that 
the confusion was not "substantial prejudicial". In Harris 
v. Utah Transit Authority, > . .-' (Utah 1983), the Su-
preme Court reversed, in part, upon HIP confusion of an in-
s t r i i c t i o i i o i i s u p e i: c e d i n g c a i i s e It i; •« oh' / • Utah 
Supreme Court regards confusion regarding superceding cause to 
be serious enough for reversal. 
POINT V 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT" S OPINION 
FAILED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF LIABILITY 
There were two theories of liability: 
First, that Wheeler was i n llaw fu 1 1 y parked < in i the side 
<"•: the road I n violation of §4 1-6-103 ( I) ( I j . As this Court has 
pointed out, that theory was conceded by the defense, and the 
It is tr UL L ;..-.:. Liie Court did instruct the jury on 
concurrent negligence, (Slip opinion p. 9.) However, concur-
rent negligence does not "fill the gap." The instruction on 
concurrent negligence does not inform the jury of the dividing 
line between concurrent cause and intervening cause. 
5 
Court directed a verdict on liability (but reserved on proxi-
mate cause). 
The second theory of liability was that Wheeler was 
parked on a controlled access highway for more than 10 minutes. 
This theory was not conceded. 
However, this Court has f.-;;Led to appreciate that the 
< hain of. «. ausat, 11 »n is different <j. «-i iing upon wh i < h tdiieory of 
liability applies. Thus, a truck parked for less than 10 min-
utes must simply tun i on blinking lights'. F-..' - \ arked 
for more than 10 minutes must additionally i\> flares or 
triangles. (See generally, B r1e t o f Appe11an t at p. 12.) 
Ostler's expert exclaimed that flares and triangles offer an 
additional measure of protection for the passing motorist and 
that the accident could have 'been ave».ided if this additional 
warning had been in place. (Transcript, 232-233, 284.) In 
short, the absence of flares is an additional basis for proxi-
mate cause. This Court's Opinion simply overlooked this 
second theory of liability. 
POINT V 1 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT 
HAS OVERLOOKED RESTATEMENT 442 AND 447 
This Court glossed over the claim for a directed ver-
dict by saying that it was a jury issue. However, our Supreme 
6 
Court has adopted Section *1? n! the Restatement2 If this 
Court also accept a Sec U on • • III*1 Restatement, tl lere i s i u : 
jury issue. The result must follow as a matter of logic, Ln-
dee< - • ' S'v:t 1 TI 'I ,ii .' / the Restatement is 
very similar to this case: 
A loads his truck so carelessly that 
jolt might cause its heavy contents * 
from it. He parks it in a street where to ' 
knowledge small boys congregate for play. B, 
one of the boys, tries to climb on the truck. 
In so doing, he disturbs the load as he causes 
a heavy article to fall upon and hurt Cr a 
comrade standing close by, Bfs act is not a 
superseding cause of C's harm,, 
Reply Bi'iM-l ».f Appo I I ahi ni r.i »poii,i i :\ I'wn . 
To dispose of Ostler's motion for a directed verdict 
without analyzing the interplay between Section 442 and 447 of 
the Restatement is grossly superficial. 
DATED this o*L/ day of £f^C^S^-- i98y. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
^ ' RO&gRT"jV /DEBRY '/ 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority * 219 
(Utah 1983). 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
refused to follow binding precedence of this court-
2. Certiorari is proper because of the unusual 
course of proceedings in the Court of Appeals. 
3. Certiorari is proper because this court has 
already granted certiorari on an identical issue. 
4. Certiorari is proper because the Utah Court of 
Appeals refused to consider an alternate theory of liability. 
5. Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
refused to consider Ostler's expert testimony. 
6. Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
did not give adequate consideration to defects in jury 
instructions. 
V. 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
This case is reported at 117 Utah Adv. Rep. P. 2d 14 
(Utah 1989). (See Appendix.) 
VI. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals Opinion was filed on September 8, 
1989. On October 18, 1989, rehearing was denied. 
On October 26, 1989, this court granted enlargement of 
time for filing a petition for certiorari to December 15, 1989. 
This court has power to grant certiorari pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Rules 42-48 of the Supreme Court. 
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semitrailer on the shoulder of a controlled 
access highway in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-103(1)(i) (1988). The court reserved 
the issue of whether Wheeler's negligence was 
a "proximate cause" of the accident. The 
jury eventually concluded that Stephen 
Ostler's negligence was the "intervening and 
sole proximate cause" of the plaintiff's 
injuries, and rendered a special verdict for 
defendants. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
REFUSED TO FOLLOW BINDING PRECEDENCE OF THIS COURT 
It is clear that the rule of superceding causation set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 (1965) has been 
adopted. Harris v. Utah Transit Authority 671 P. 2d 217 (Utah 
1983). In Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 
1984) this court held: 
An intervening negligent act does not 
automatically become a superceding cause that 
relieves the original actor of liability. 
The earlier actor is charged with the 
foreseeable negligent acts of others. 
Therefore, if the intervening negligence is 
foreseeable, the earlier negligent act is a 
concurring cause. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra, holds that 
once the negligence of one stopping (parking) a vehicle is 
established, the negligence of a subsequent driver is not a 
superceding cause unless it is "so extraordinary as to be 
unforeseeable." 671 P.2d at 220. Harris having adopted the 
Restatement position on superceding cause, further states that 
the focus of the trial should be on a comparison of the relative 
3 
lane. . An errant (sleepy or distracted) driver drifted into the 
emergency lane and hit the truck. 
This scenario triggers the application not only of 
Section 447 of the Restatement, but also Sections 442A and 442B1. 
The risk of an errant driver striking a truck parked on 
the shoulder of the interstate is a foreseeable risk which the 
statute was intended to remedy. Under Restatement Sections 
442A, 442B and 447, the occurrence of the very event the statute 
was designed to prevent precludes a finding that the negligence 
of Father Ostler was an intervening cause. The focus of Harris, 
supra, is a comparison of the relative fault of the two negligent 
parties under the comparative negligence statute instead of (as 
allowed by the trial court in this case) a defense based upon the 
fact that the negligent truck driver did not foresee the specific 
negligence of Father Ostler. Harris, supra, at 222. The defense 
at trial effectively overruled the principles of the Restatement 
Sections (442A, 442B & 447) as well as the principles set out by 
this court in Harris and Godesky, supra. If allowed to stand, 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case effectively 
overrules the-principles of Restatement Sections 442A, 442B, and 
447 and is a distinct departure from the principles set out in 
Harris and Godesky. 
As a matter of law, it was not "highly extraordinary" 
to suspect that an errant driver might drift onto the emergency 
•'•Given the adoption by this court of Section 447 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), this court should also 
specifically adopt and follow Sections 442A and 442B. 
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It would appear proper for this court to grant 
certiorari for the purpose of resolving the following: 
a) Why the Court of Appeals ignored the provisions of 
Restatement § 442A, 442B & 447 as well as the 
precedents set in Godesky, supra; and Harris. 
b) Whether it is appropriate for a trial court to 
direct a verdict on the issues of superceding 
cause and/or proximate cause in cases where 
negligence resulting from violation of a statute 
is admitted and the asserted superceding cause is 
an act clearly intended to be protected by the 
statute. 
c) What type of jury instruction should be given to 
allow the issues raised by Sections 442A, 442B and 
447 of the Restatement to be properly presented to 
the jury? 
The trial court should also have allowed full 
development of plaintiff's second theory of negligence and 
proximate cause, i.e. that the failure of the truck driver to 
place warning devices was negligence and a proximate cause of the 
injury. Failure to allow this alternative theory to be developed 
was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals, but was not 
adequately covered in the Opinion. See, Point IV, infra. 
This clearly appears to depart from Harris where the 
court held that a plaintiff is entitled to present all of his 
theories to the jury. It is reversible error to preclude 
7 
POINT II 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL COURSE 
OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
states that certiorari is appropriate where the Court of Appeals 
has "• * .departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedingso" This case involves such a departure. 
A part of the record of the Court of Appeals is an 
affidavit by Ms. Patricia Hannah, Ph.D. (See Appendix.) Dr. 
Hannah is Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Utah. This affidavit was filed in support of 
Ostler's Petition for Reconsideration in the Utah Court of 
Appeals^. In substance, the affidavit is a 21 page analysis of 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The affidavit states in 
part: 
I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. 
However, I am trained in logic and argumen-
tation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is 
in large measure devoted to the study of 
arguments and the process of analytic 
reasoning. I have taught classes in 
deductive and inductive logic, as well as in 
J
 Basic considerations of due process demand that a 
litigant be given an opportunity to be heard on all pertinent 
issues raised by his case at both the trial and appellate level. 
In every instance the litigant is entitled by due process to have 
the court consider and deal with all issues fairly raised. It is 
clearly an unusual step to have the head of the Dept. of 
Philosophy at the University of Utah comment on a Court Opinion. 
Certainly that should not be an every day tool of the trial 
advocate. Nor was that step taken lightly. However, it is a 
serious matter when a Court Opinion cannot muster a passing grade 
on a college level. Hopefully, the Court will not criticize 
counsel for this unusual step. Hopefully, the court will value 
this input, as it undertakes the serious task of supervising the 
inferior courts of this state. 
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presented to an appeals court. A real question exists in the 
present case as to whether such was done in the present case. 
POINT III 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THIS COURT 
HAS ALREADY GRANTED CERTIORARI ON AN IDENTICAL 
ISSUE IN ANOTHER PENDING CASE 
In the trial court, Ostler submitted evidence of a 
recent advertising campaign by insurance companies designed to 
scare the public about jury awards. (R. 1255-1273.) The 
capstone to this advertising program was a letter by Farmers 
Insurance Group. The letter was sent to all policy holders 
shortly prior to this trial. The letter states in part: "You 
pay for plaintiff's lawyers." (See Appendix.) 
Ostler submitted various voir dire questions inquiring 
about jury attitudes regarding this "tort reform" publicity. In 
particular, Ostler asked which of the prospective jurors were 
covered by Farmers Insurance*^. 
The trial court refused to give Ostler's requested voir 
dire questions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In so doing, 
the Court of Appeals relied on its reasoning in Doe v. Hafen, 772 
P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1989) the court stated: 
In their totality, and in context with the 
remainder of voir dire, their questions are 
substantially responsive to plaintiff's 
concerns and appear sufficient to reveal 
"tort reform" bias in the manner discussed in 
Doe. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. 
3Each juror covered by Farmers would have received Exhibit 
B shortly before the trial. Farmers was also the insurance 
carrier defending the case on behalf of defendant. 
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Appeals addressed the issue of negligence for failure to put out 
flares and triangles. On each occasion, the Court of Appeals 
refused to even consider the issue. 
We last address plaintiff's claim of error 
regarding the exclusion of evidence on 
federal motor carrier regulations. . . . 
[This] evidence goes to the issue of 
Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously 
decided by directed verdict, and may be 
excluded as irrelevant. 117 Utah Adv.Rep. at 
16. 
• * * 
Plaintiff argues that the court's refusal to 
permit him to show that Wheeler had been 
parked on the shoulder of the highway for as 
long as 30 minutes unduly restricted cross-
examination. . . . 
It is unnecessary to resolve this argument 
when the alternate basis for the court's 
ruling is considered, namely that the 
questions of how long Wheeler had been parked 
ultimately goes to the issue of Wheeler's 
negligence. Since that issue has been 
resolved by directed verdict. The excluded 
testimony was irrelevant. Id. 
• • • 
Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury 
instructions. The first instruction involves 
the placement of emergency warning devices 
behind Wheeler's parked truck. We agree that 
the given instruction significantly differs 
from plaintiff's requested instruction. 
However, the instruction concerned the issue 
of Wheeler's negligence. We have already 
established that this issue had been taken 
from the jury. Any error could not have 
affected the substantial rights of plaintiff 
and was therefore, harmless. 117 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 17. 
However, there was an a serious flaw in that reasoning. 
The chain of causation for negligent parking is different from 
13 
truck. A central issue is why. The defense argued that he was 
asleep. Plaintiff's expert proffered testimony that he was 
"lured" off the road by the illegally parked truck. This 
scientific phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the "moth 
effect"6. 
The trial court refused to receive evidence of the 
"moth effect". The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of 
Appeals stated: 
Even if such a theory is admissible under the 
threshold requirement of inherent reliability 
[citation omitted]. The theory is premised 
on the fact that a driver must be awake to be 
lured. 117 Utah Adv.Rep. at p. 15. 
Thus, a foundation issue was whether Stephen Ostler 
(father) was awake or had his eyes open7 so he could be lured8. 
On this issue Ostler relied upon Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of 
bFor example, California Highway Patrol cars are struck 
approximately 15 times per month while parked with flashing 
lights. Upon the advise of Ostler's expert, the California 
Highway Patrol has done away with off and on flashers. (Tr. 
231.) Indeed, the Federal Department of Transportation has 
recently recognized the "moth effect" as an industry wide 
problem. (Tr. 284.) 
defendants offered a series of night-time photos of the 
parked truck. The foundation for the night-time photos was that 
Ostler's eyes were open. Ostler thereupon proffered evidence on 
the "moth effect" as rebuttal testimony. Thus, the foundation 
for defendants photos and plaintiff's moth effect theory was 
identical, viz. that Ostler's eyes were open. The Court of 
Appeals, likewise, ignored this crucial issue. (See Exhibit F.) 
8Ostler's experts gave five reasons to conclude that 
Stephen Ostler was awake (so that he could be lured). The 
reasons are summarized at Exhibit G. The trial court rejected 
all of this proffered testimony. 
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in this case is superficial. No attempt was made to discuss 
Huddleston or Harris and no reasoned explanation was given as to 
why the evidence should not have been allowed. 
POINT VI 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
DID NOT GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO DEFECTS 
IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The core issue in this case is whether the trucker's 
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Or, was 
Stephen Ostler's^ negligence the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. 
The law on this issue was purportedly presented by the 
trial court's Instruction No- 27. (See Appendix.) 
In the trial court, Ostler challenged Instruction No. 
2 7 on four grounds: 
a) failure of the jury instruction to define the term 
independent intervening cause; 
b) foreseeability is only one test (not the sole 
test) to determine causation; 
c) only a generalized risk of harm need be 
foreseeable; 
d) confusion. 
The Court of Appeals only dealt with confusion. The 
other three issues are serious matters supported by abundant 
10Stephen Ostler was the father of plaintiff Ralph Ostler. 
Stephen Ostler was driving. Ralph Ostler was asleep. 
17 
The jury returned a verdict for defendant. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed. 
The head of the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah (Dr. Patricia Hannah) made a 21 page analysis 
of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals. (See Appendix.) Ms. 
Hannah testified that she was not a lawyer; and thus she could 
not comment on the correctness of the opinion. However, Ms. 
Hannah testified that she has considerable expertise in and 
teaches logic and argumentation. Ms. Hannah summarized that if 
the opinion were written by an undergraduate student, she would 
give a "D" grade for the analysis. A graduate student would get 
a failing grade. 
Among other things, the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals: 
a) Ignores the position of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts on independent intervening cause. 
b) Almost totally ignores the central issue of 
whether the jury was properly instructed on 
independent intervening cause. 
c) Ignores the Utah Rules of Evidence and recent 
precedent from the United States Supreme Court 
with respect to foundation of expert testimony. 
d) Failed to follow binding precedent of this court 
on the sufficiency of curative instructions and to 
apply Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447. 
e) Ignored an alternative theory of liability. 
19 
Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
states that certiorari may be proper where the lower court, M. 
. -has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings." 
Ralph Ostler will be tied to his wheelchair for a 
lifetime. He will ponder for his lifetime why the Court of 
Appeals did not even consider his arguments on appeal. He will 
wonder for his lifetime whether he got true justice when the 
head of the Department of Philosophy gave the Opinion a failing 
grade. 
Certiorari should be granted where the Court of Appeals 
in rendering its opinion in this case has failed to follow 
established precedent and has made such a radical departure from 
the traditional high standards of the Bench in Utah. 
DATED this /5~"^ day of jJ-^jL^^-t<^/ , 1989. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
0566-128\jn 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (Ostler v. Albina, 
et al.) was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this /y day of 
JjLtJUn*xA^*-^-
 f 1989, to the following 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Edward T. Wells, attorney for appellant Ralph 
Ostler, certifies that the foregoing Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is filed in good faith, and not for purposes of 
delay. 
DATED this / *? day of 1989 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
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APPENDIX 
STATUTES 
41-G-103. Standing or parking vehicles — Re-
strictions and exceptions. 
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other 
traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of 
a police officer or official traffic-control device, no per-
son shall 
(1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle 
(a) on the roadway side of any vehicle 
stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a 
street, 
(b) on a sidewalk, 
(c) vwthin an intersection, 
(d) on a crosswalk, 
(e) between a safety zone and the adjacent 
curb or within 30 feet of points on the curb 
immediately opposite the ends of a safety 
zone, unless a different length is indicated bv 
signs or markings, 
(0 alongside or opposite any street excava-
tion or obstruction when stopping, standing, 
or parking would obstruct traffic, 
(g) upon any bridge or other elevated 
structure upon a highway or within a high-
way tunnel, 
(h) on any railroad tracks, 
(i) on any controlled access highway, 
(j) in the area between roadways of a di-
vided highway, including crossovers, 
(k) any place where official traffic-control 
devices prohibit stopping 
(2) Stand or park a vehicle, whether occupied 
or not, except momentarily to pick up or dis-
charge a passenger or passengers 
(a) in front of a public or private driveway; 
(b) within 15 feet of a fire hydrant, 
(c) within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an in-
tersection, 
(d) within 30 feet upon the approach to 
any flashing signal, stop sign, yield sign or 
traffic-control signal located at the side of a 
roadway, 
(e) within 20 feet of the driveway entrance 
to anv fire station and on the side of a street 
opposite the entrance to any fire station 
within 75 feet of said entrance when prop-
erly signposted, 
(0 at any place where official traffic-con 
trol devices prohibit standing 
(3) Park a vehicle, whether occupied or not, 
except temporarily for the purpose of and w.hile 
actually engaged in loading or unloading prop-
erty or passengers 
(a) within 50 feet of the nearest rail of a 
railroad crossing, 
(b) at any place where official traffic-con 
trol devices prohibit parking 
(4) No person shall move a vehicle not lawfull> 
under such persons control into any prohibited 
area or an unlau ful distance from the curb 1978 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawyers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission, 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with 
d) the Public Service Commission, 
(u) the State Tax Commission, 
(in) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry, 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, or 
(v) the state engineer, 
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e), 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution, 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony, 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests, 
(c) reapportionment of election districts, 
(d) retention or removal of public officers, 
(e) general water adjudication, 
(0 taxation and revenue, and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) 
through (0 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b) 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re 
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings 1^9 
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TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments , orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari . 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a 
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall 
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in 
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case. 
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Jo in t and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
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(c) Cross -pe t i t ion of r e s p o n d e n t Counsel for a respondent wishing to file 
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 45(d), pay the certio-
rari docketing fee and file, with proof of service as prescribed by Rule 21, ten 
copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari which shall comply in all 
respects with Rule 46 The cross-petition will then be placed on the certiorari 
docket Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve four copies of the cioss-
petition on counsel for each party separately lepiesented It shall be the duty 
of counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all parties in the case of the date of 
the filing and of the cert iorau docket number of the case Service and notice 
shall be given as requned by Rule 21 A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari 
may not be joined with any other filing, the clerk shall not accept any filing so 
joined 
(d) P a r t i e s . All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be 
deemed parties in this court, unless the petitioner notifies the clerk of this 
court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the parties below 
have no interest in the outcome of the petition A copy of such notice shall be 
served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party noted as no longer 
interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with service on the 
other parties, tha t the party has an interest in the petition 
(e) Mot ion for cer t i f ica t ion a n d t r a n s m i s s i o n of r eco rd . A party in-
tending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petJJtiflji-Qr at any 
time prior to action by thus court on the petition, ma}' file a motion for an 
order to have the clerk of the Court of Appeals certify the record,, or any par t 
of it, and provide for its transmission to this court Motions to certify the 
recordpnor to action on the petition by the court should rarely be made, only 
when the record is essential to this court's proper understanding of the peti-
tion or the brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived from 
the contents of the petition or the brief in opposition, including the appendix 
(See Rule 46(a)(10) ) If a motion is appropriate, it shall be made to this court 
after the filing of a petition but prior to action by this court on the petition, or 
in the case of a stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, such a 
motion may be made before the filing of the petition Thereafter, the clerk of 
this court or any party to the case may request that additional parts of the 
record be certified and transmitted to this court Copies of all motions for 
certification and transmission shall be sent to the parties to the proceeding 
All motions and orders hereunder shall comply with and be subject to the 
requirements of Rule 23 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 ) 
Rule 45. Time for petitioning. 
(a) T imel iness of pe t i t ion . A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
with the clerk of this court within 30 days after the entry of the decision by 
the Court of Appeals 
(b) Refusal of pe t i t ion . The clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a 
writ of certiorari which is junsdictionally out of time 
(c) Effect of pe t i t ion for r e h e a r i n g . The time for filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari runs from the date the decision is entered by the Court of 
Appeals, not from the date of the issuance of the remitt i tur If, however, a 
petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for filing the 
petition for a writ of certiorari for all parties (whether or not they requested 
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rehearing or joined in the petition for rehearing) runs from the date of the 
denial of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered upon the 
rehearing. 
(d) Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of this 
rule; or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to Paragraph (d)(1)(B) of 
this rule will not be granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certio-
rari of another party to the case is granted. 
(e) Extension of time. This court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause, may extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition for a 
writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration 
of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, whichever is appli-
cable. Any such motion which is filed before expiration of the prescribed time 
may be ex parte, unless the court otherwise requires. Notice of any such 
motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to 
the other parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time 
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 46, Petition for writ of certiorari, 
(a) Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
here indicated: 
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in this court 
contains the names of all parties. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the petition wrhere they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement 
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumenta-
tive or repetitious. General conclusory statements, such as "the decision 
of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not 
acceptable. The statement of a question presented will be deemed to com-
prise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the ques-
tions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered 
by the court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions 
issued by the Court of Appeals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this 
court is invoked, showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and 
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of 
time within which to petition for certiorari; 
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(C) reliance upon Rule 44(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, s ta t ing the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on this court jurisdic-
tion to review the decision in question by a writ of certiorari. 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and 
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving 
the appropriate citation therefor. If the controlling provisions involved 
are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their perti-
nent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in Subparagraph 
(10) of this paragraph. 
(8) A s ta tement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in 
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record before 
and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argu-
ment for the issuance of the writ. (See Rule 43.) 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order: 
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered 
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be re-
viewed; 
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
orders, judgments , or decrees that were rendered in the case or in 
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by 
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions pre-
sented (each of those documents shall include the caption showing 
the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the 
case, and the date of its entry); and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are 
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case 
that is the subject of the petition. 
If the material tha t is required by Subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this para-
graph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented. 
(b) F o r m of pe t i t ion . The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with 
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except tha t the cover of the 
petition shall be white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and 
if a petition is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and this 
paragraph, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
(c) No s e p a r a t e brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in Subpara-
graph (a) (9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a 
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief. 
(d) P a g e l imi ta t ion . The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as 
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table 
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Subparagraph (a)(7) of 
this rule, and the appendix. 
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(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
and adequate undeistanding of the points requiring consideration will be a 
sufficient reason for denying the petition 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 ) 
Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae. 
(a) Brief in opposit ion. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless en-
larged by the couit pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which 
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any mattei or ground why the 
case should not be reviewed by this court Such brief shall comply with the 
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as 
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except tha t the cover of the brief shall be orange 
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in 
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be 
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared Four copies of the brief 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each paity separately 
represented 
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and 
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the 
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and 
the appendix 
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received Objections to the junsdict ion 
of the court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in 
opposition 
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, 
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the cierk to the court 
for consideration However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been 
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a w rit of certiorari will be 
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file 
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the 
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under 
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief 
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages Such 
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(1) (3), 
except that the cover of the brief shall be yellow The clerk shall examine all 
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned 
to be properly prepared Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each part} separately 
represented 
(0 Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus cur lae may be filed only if 
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on 
motion, or a t the request of the court A motion for leave shall identify the 
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae is desirable Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae 
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shall file its brief within the time allowed the party whose position it will 
support, unless the court for cause shown shall grant leave for later filing, in 
which event it shall specify within what period an opposing paity may an-
swer Such brief shall comply with the requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, 
and comply with the form of briefs as specified in Rule 27(a), with the cover of 
the brief being green The brief may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the sub-
ject index, the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 
46(a)(7), and the appendix Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four 
copies shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party 
separately represented 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 ) 
Rule 48. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Order after consideration. After consideration of the documents dis-
tributed pursuant to Rule 47, the court will enter an order denying the peti 
tion or granting the petition in whole or in part The order shall be decided 
summarily, shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a deci-
sion on the merits 
(b) Grant of petition. Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is entered, the clerk forthwith shall notify the clerk of the Court of 
Appeals and counsel of record. The case then will stand for briefing and oral 
argument If the record has not previously been filed, the clerk of this court 
shall request the clerk of the Court of Appeals to certify it and transmit it to 
this court. A formal writ shall not issue unless specially directed 
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a writ of certioraii is de-
nied, an order to that effect will be entered, and the clerk forthwith will notify 
the Court of Appeals and counsel of record 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987 ) 
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§ 4 4 2 A , Intervening: Force Risked by Actor's Conduct 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or in-
creases the foreseeable risk of harm through the inter-
vention of another force, and is a substantial factor in 
causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding 
Comment: 
a. The rule stated in this Section applies to any interven-
ing force, whether it be a force of nature, or the act of a human 
being, or of an animal. 
b. Where the negligence of the actor has created the risk 
of harm to another because of the likelihood of such intervention, 
the actor is not relieved of responsibility merely because the 
risk which he has created has in fact been fulfilled. The same 
is true where there is already some existing risk or possibility 
of the intervention, but the negligence of the actor has increased 
the risk of such intervention, or of harm if it occurs. 
I l lustrat ion: 
1. In the month of December A voluntarily ships 
potatoes in an unheated car of B Railroad through the s ta te 
of New York. B Railroad negligently delays the shipment 
for three days, thereby increasing the already existing risk 
tha t the potatoes will be damaged by cold. During the extra 
three days severe cold weather sets in, and damages the 
potatoes. B Railroad is subject to liability to A. 
§ 4 4 2 B , Intervening Force Causing Same Harm as That 
Risked by Actor's Conduct 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or in-
creases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial 
factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is 
brought about through the intervention of another force 
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the 
harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is 
not within the scope of the risk created by the actor 's 
conduct. 
See Reporter 's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. The rule stated in this Section is a special application 
of the principle stated in § 435 (1) , tha t the fact tha t the actor 
neither foresaw nor could have foreseen the manner in which 
a particular harm is brought about does not prevent his lia-
bility where the other conditions necessary to it exist. Compare 
Illustration 1 under tha t Section. 
b. If the actor's conduct has created or increased the risk 
tha t a particular harm to the plaintiff will occur, and has been 
a substantial factor in causing that harm, it is immaterial to the 
actor 's liability that the harm is brought about in a manner 
which no one in his position could possibly have been expected 
to foresee or anticipate. This is true not only where the result 
is produced by the direct operation of the actor 's conduct upon 
conditions or circumstances existing at the time, but also where 
it is brought about through the intervention of other forces 
which the actor could not have expected, whether they be forces 
of nature, or the actions of animals, or those of third persons 
which are not intentionally tortious or criminal. This is to say 
t ha t any harm which is in itself foreseeable, as to which the actor 
has created or increased the recognizable risk, is always "prox-
imate, " no matter how it is brought about, except where there 
is such intentionally tortious or criminal intervention, and it is 
not within the scope of the risk created by the original negligent 
conduct. 
I l lustrat ions: 
1. A negligently fails to clean petroleum residue out 
of his oil barge moored at a dock, thus creating the risk 
of harm to others in the vicinity through fire or explosion 
of gasoline vapor. The barge is struck by lightning and 
explodes, injuring B, a workman on the dock. A is subject 
to liability to B. 
2. A negligently leaves an obstruction in the public 
highway, creating the risk that those using the highway 
will be injured by collision with it. B's horse runs away 
with him and charges into the obstruction, and B is injured. 
A is subject to liability to B. 
3. The A Telephone Company negligently allows its 
telephone pole, adjoining the public sidewalk but several feet 
from the street, to become riddled with termites, thus cre-
at ing the risk that the pole will fall or be knocked over and 
so injure some person using the sidewalk. An automobile 
negligently driven by B at excessive speed leaves the high-
way, comes up on the sidewalk, and knocks the pole over. 
I t falls up C, a pedestrian on the sidewalk, and injures him. 
A is subject to liability to C. 
4. The same facts as in Illustration 3, except that the 
pole is knocked over by a cow's bumping into it. The same 
result. 
5. A negligently leaves an excavation in a public side-
walk, creating the risk that a traveler on the sidewalk will 
fall into it. B, passing C on the sidewalk, negligently bumps 
into him, and knocks him into the excavation. A is subject 
to liability to C. 
0>. The A Railroad negligently derails a tank car full 
of gasoline and damages it, so tha t gasoline runs into the 
public street. The risk is thus created tha t persons using 
the street will be injured by fire or explosion. B, a bystander, 
negligently str ikes a match to light his cigar. The gasoline 
c. Intentionally tortious or criminal acts. The rule stated 
in this Section docs not apply where the harm of which the risk 
has been created or increased by the actor 's conduct is brought 
about by the intervening act of a third person which is inten-
tionally tortious or criminal, and is not within the scope of the 
risk created by the original negligence. Such tortious or criminal 
acts may in themselves be foreseeable, and so within the scope 
of the created risk, jn which case the actor may still be liable 
for the harm, under the rules stated in §§ 448 and 449. But if 
they are not, the actor is relieved of responsibility by the inter-
vention of the third person. The reason usually given by the 
courts is tha t in such a case the third person has deliberately 
assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the 
consequences of his act is shifted to him. (Compare § 452 (2).) 
I l lustrations: 
7. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that B 
deliberately kicks C into the excavation. A is not liable to 
C. 
8. The same facts as in Illustration 6, except tha t B 
deliberately sets fire to the gasoline to see what will happen. 
A Railroad is not liable to C. 
9. The employees of the A Theatre Company negli-
gently leave a chair on the railing of the balcony, creating 
the risk that it may accidentally or negligently be knocked 
off of the railing in the dark, and will injure some person 
below. Without any reason whatever on the par t of the 
Theatre Company to anticipate such conduct, B, a boy 
at tending the theat re , deliberately throws the chair off 
of the railing, and it falls upon C and injures him. A Theatre 
is not liable to C. 
10. A, the owner of an office building, negligently leaves 
the door of the elevator shaft open and unguarded. As C 
is leaving the building B, impersonating an elevator boy, 
politely invites C to step into the shaft. C does so, falls, 
and is injured. A is not liable to C. 
§ 4 4 7 , Negligence of Intervening Acts 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is 
negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does 
not make it a superseding cause of harm to another 
which the actor 's negligent conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct 
should have realized tha t a third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing 
when the act of the third person was done would not re-
gard it as highly extraordinary that the third person 
had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a 
situation created by the actor 's conduct and the manner 
in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. 
Comment on Clause ( a ) : 
a. The s tatement in Clause (a) applies where there is a 
realizable likelihood of such an act but the likelihood is not 
enough in itself to make the actor's conduct negligent, the con-
duct being negligent because of other and greater risks which 
it entails. If the realizable likelihood tha t a third person will 
act in the negligent manner in which a particular third person 
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the risks which 
make the actor 's conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore 
negligent, the case is governed by the rule stated in § 449. 
Illustration: 
1. A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight jolt 
might cause its heavy contents to fall from it. He parks 
it in a s t reet where to his knowledge small boys congregate 
for play. B, one of these boys, tries to climb on the truck. 
In so doing he so disturbs the load as to cause a heavy article 
to fall upon and hur t C, a comrade standing close by. B's 
act is not a superseding cause of C's harm. 
Comment on Clause ( b ) : 
b. The actor a t the time of his negligence may have no 
reason to realize tha t a third person might act in the particular 
negligent manner in which the particular third person acts, 
because his mind is not centered upon the sequence of events 
which may result from his act and therefore he has no reason 
to realize tha t it will create the situation which the third person's 
intervening act makes harmful. However, when the situation 
is known to exist, the likelihood tha t some negligent act may 
make it dangerous may be easily realizable or even obvious. 
Illustration: 
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except tha t A 
does not intentionally park his car in the street frequented 
by the boys, but his car through no fault of his is blocked 
in a traffic congestion at this point. B's act in meddling 
with the truck is not a superseding cause of C's harm. 
Comment on Clause ( c ) : 
c. The word "normal" is used in the sense stated in § 443, 
Comment b. It, therefore, denotes tha t the court or jury looking 
at the mat ter after the event and knowing the situation which 
existed when the act was done, including the character of the 
person subjected to the stimulus of the situation, would not 
regard it as extraordinary that such an act, though negligent, 
should have been done. 
d. The words "situation created by the actor's negligence" 
are used in the sense stated in § 442, Comment d. 
e. The words "extraordinarily negligent" denote the fact 
tha t men of ordinary experience and reasonable judgment, look-
ing at the mat te r after the event and taking into account the 
prevalence of tha t "occasional negligence, which is one of the 
incidents of human life," would not regard it as extraordinary 
that the third person's intervening act should have been done 
in the negligent manner in which it was done. Since the third 
person's action is a product of the actor's negligent conduct, 
there is good reason for holding him responsible for its cflfects, 
even though it be done in a negligent manner, unless the nature 
or extent of the negligence is altogether unusual. 
/ . The s ta tement in Clause (c) applies to any negligent 
act which is a normal consequence of a situation which the actor's 
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in creating (see §§ 443-
44G). 
g. While the fact tha t such an intervening act of a third 
person is negligent does not prevent the actor's negligent conduct 
from being a legal cause of the harm resulting therefrom to 
another, the negligence of the act may be so great or the third 
person's conduct so reckless as to make it appear an extraor-
dinary response to the situation created by the actor and there-
fore a superseding cause of the other 's harm. 
h. The rule stated in this Section applies to acts done either 
by the person who is harmed or by a third person. If the act 
is done by the injured person and is done in a negligent manner, 
it does not prevent the actor's negligence from being a legal 
cause of his harm, but it constitutes contributory fault which 
precludes him from recovering from the negligent actor (see 
§ 467). If it is done by a third person, he, as well as the actor 
whose negligence has created the situation, is liable to another 
injured by it. 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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EXHIBIT B 
YOU Pay for Plaintiffs' Lawyers 
Plaintiffs' attorneys, who file lawsuits on behalf of injured 
persons, often call the contingency 
fee they charge the key to the 
courthouse door. A contingency 
fee is an amount of money a 
person agrees to pay an attorney 
for services in conducting a 
lawsuit and is usually a percentage of the amount 
recovered. Plaintiffs' attorneys say the contingency fee 
allows everyone access to the courts—no matter how 
poor they are—because the plaintiff does not need 
money to file a suit. The fee is based on an attorney 
winning an award for the clicnL If the client loses, the 
attorney receives no pay. 
Contigency system-spawns suits — 
Now with plaintiffs' attorneys claiming up to one-half 
of the damages awarded to their clients, the 
contingency fee is under attack. Many believe the 
contingency fee system is a prime reason for the 
increase in both the size and number of lawsuits filed 
in recent years. They claim it is in the lawyer's own 
interest to build the case to gain the biggest possible 
settlement. Others say the victim gets too little of the 
award money. 
The attorney's fee is only one deduction from the 
money awarded to the victim. Also taken out are the 
expenses of the lawsuit itself. When the two items are 
added together, you can understand why so many 
victims complained when they received less of the 
award than their attorneys. 
The money received by plaintiffs involved in asbestos 
injury lawsuits in the last 10 years provides an example 
of the problems associated with contingency fees. Of 
each dollar of damages awarded, 41 cents typically 
went to attorneys for their fees or expenses. 
Who really pays the fees? 
Who pays the plannffs' attorneys' contingency fees? It 
would be easy to say it is insurance companies and 
leave it at that. But uiumatelv it's vou—the 
consumer—who pays. It's your insurance premiums 
that arc the source of the payments to these attorneys. 
Thus, these attorneys' fees cost you money daily. 
Some states have acted to correct the situation by 
putting a cap or maximum limit on the fee that a 
plain tiffs attorney can charge an accident victim. In 
other states, attorneys are required to file detailed 
statements showing how their settlements are spent— 
how much is needed to cover necessary expenses, how 
much to pay the attorney's fee, and how much to 
satisfy the victim's damages. 
Many state legislatures are considering other 
alternatives, as well. One such alternative is a sliding 
fee scale, with the percentage of the serdement that 
goes to the victim increasing as the setdement itself 
increases. Another idea is to make sure that customers 
of legal services have adequate information available to 
them when they shop for lawyers. For example, 
lawyers might be required to use a standard form 
itemizing the fee agreement. 
More ideas to consider 
Other measures deserving consideradon include fines 
for filing frivolous lawsuits that are cosdy to defend, 
clog the courts, and require taxpayers to foot the bill 
for additional courtrooms, judges, and support 
personnel. Another possibility is awards for defense 
costs to people who successfully defend themselves and 
prevail in suits, so they and their insurance companies 
don't have to pay for being proved innocent. 
We commend all efforts to bring legal costs into 
line and believe that it will serve all aspects of the 
public to do so. 
Leo E. Denlea Jr. 
Chairman of the Board and 
Chief Executive Officer 
Farmers Group, Inc. 
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EXHIBIT C 
OcC - A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo——-
1 1989 
Regular October Term, 1989 November 29, 1989 
Jane Doe, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v • 
Shirlene Hafen, as personal 
representative ad litem of 
the Estate of Melvin Reeves, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 890331 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered 
that a petition for Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as 
prayed. 
EXHIBIT D 
The Court's Instruction No. 27 reads as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27. If an injury arises 
from two distinct causes, consideration 
then must be given to the question 
whether the causal connection between the 
conduct of the party responsible for the 
first cause and the injury was broken by 
the intervention of a new, independent 
cause. 
If so, the person responsible for 
the first cause would not be liable for 
the injury. If, however, the intervening 
cause or the likelihood of an occurrence 
of the same general nature was foreseen 
or should reasonably have been foreseen 
by the person responsible for the first 
cause, then such person's conduct would 
be the proximate cause of the injury, 
notwithstanding the intervening cause, 
and he would be liable therefor. 
Thus, if you find the collision of 
the vehicle driven by Stephen Ostler with 
a tractor-trailer of Albina Transfer 
Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of 
the highway, or the likelihood of an 
occurrence of the same general nature, 
was within the natural and continuous 
sequence of events which might reasonably 
be foreseen to follow the actions of 
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that 
the actions of Stanley Wheeler were a 
concurring proximate cause of the 
collision, even thought the later 
negligent act of Stephen Ostler co-
operated to cause the accident. 
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler 
in causing the collision were of such 
character as not reasonably to be 
foreseen in the natural and continuous 
sequence of events started by Stanley 
Wheeler, then the acts of Stephen Ostler 
are the independent intervening cause 
and, therefore, the sole proximate cause 
of the injury. 
EXHIBIT E 
The major flaw m Instruction No 27 is that the 
term intervening independent cause (as introduced m the 
first paragraph of Instruction No 25) is not defined for th< 
] u r y The Restatement Torts, 2d includes 13 sections defmirv 
that concept (See Restatement §440-453 ) Of course, all ot 
those sections are not relevant to this case; however, §447 
is relevant (For complete discussion of §447, see pages 13-
15, above ) Other sections are also relevant (See Point 
XI, below ) In the absence of a fair definition, the jury 
was left to flounder 
Second, Instruction No. 25 assumes that 'foreseea-
bility" is the only test which is important in determining 
causation in this case. That is simply wrong. A textual 
description would be as follows: 
The Restatement, Torts
 r 2d contains a 
detailed, definitional discussion of an 
intervening force—which by its active 
operation, may or may not prevent an 
actor's antecedent negligence from being 
a 'legal cause in bringing about harm to 
another person. . .The Restatement, 
Torts,2d, stresses some six elements as 
the important considerations in determin-
ing whether an intervening force is a 
superceding cause of harm to another, 
thus breaking the chain of causation 
Speiser, The American Law of Torts, Vol. 3, §11 9 (1983) 
(emphasis added) 
Third, the instruction says that, 'if the actions 
of Stephen Ostler in causing the collision were. . .not 
reasonably to be foreseen , the chain of causation was 
broken. This is saying that the precise or specific manner 
of harm or accident ( the actions of Stephen Ostler ) 
must be foreseeable. Instead, only a generalized risk of 
harm need be foreseeable; the specific sequence of events 
need not be foreseeable. Rees v. Albertsons, supra.; 
Restatement of Torts,2d §435, "Foreseeabillty of Harm or Its 
Manner of Occurrence. 
Finally, Instruction No. 25 is hopelessly confus-
ing. It is likely that the judges of this Court W L 1 1 have to 
read that instruction two, three or four times to understand 
it. It is simply impossible for a lay person without three 
years of law school to have any idea of the meaning of that 
language. 
The object of jury instructions is to 
enlighten the jury on their problems. 
Instructions should fit the facts shown, 
making them as clear in meaning and 
concise as possible in lay people's 
language without belaboring definitions. 
Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Ut.2d 186, 398 P.2d 24 
(1965). When instructions tend to confuse the jury, reversal 
is proper. Burton v. Fisher Controls, 713 P.2d 113 7, on 
rehearing 723 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1986). 
EXHIBIT F 
POINT FOUR 
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAILS TO EXPLAIN 
WHY THE "MOTH PHENOMENON" EVIDENCE 
SHOULD NOT ILAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 
As explained in Points One, Two and Three, testimony on 
the "moth phenomenon" was not received during Ostler's case-in-
chief. The court reasoned that the "moth phenomenon" only works 
if the driver is awake to see the lights of the parked truck. 
The judge further ruled there was no showing that father Ostler 
was awake: 
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for 
a determination on his part that there was a 
man that was either, that was not asleep or 
that the was merely Somewhat impaired in his 
appreciation of things around him. 
(R. 2226.) 
However, the defense offered several photographs into 
evidence showing how a parked truck would have appeared to father 
Ostler at various distances. (Exs. 53 through 68.) Ostler's 
brief explained that those photographs rest on exactly the same 
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon." Specifically, the 
photographs of the parked truck are not material if father 
Ostler's eyes were not open to see the truck. (See Brief of 
Appellant, at p. 19.) But likewise, testimony on the "moth 
phenomenon" is not material if father Ostler's eyes were not 
open to "lure" him toward the lights. 
In short, the trial court should have admitted both 
defendants' nighttime photos of the truck and Ostler's rebuttal 
testimony on the "moth phenomenon"; or the trial court should 
have rejected both pieces of testimony. However, it was 
logically inconsistent to receive Wheeler's evidence (nighttime 
phenomenon." Both pieces of evidence were based on the 
foundation that father Ostler's eyes were open to see the parked 
truck. . 
Again, 0 3 11 c r l -s brief was entirely silent on this 
critical issue! 
EXHIBIT G 
Ralph Ostler's experts testified that father 
Ostler was not asleep; but rather in a reduced state of 
awareness (sometimes called highway hypnosis) The basis for 
that testimony was as follows: First, Wheeler testified, by 
offer of proof, that father Ostler appeared as if he were 
awake: 
MR. WHEELER: "Well, it appeared to me as 
if the guy was driving in a daze. He 
cut over like he went, opps(sic), I'm off 
the road, and cut over figuring this 
truck was on the road, and just pulled 
right directly in behind me. And there 
was nothing I could do, just sit there 
and hold on." 
QUESTION: 'Was it a sudden cut or did he 
sort of gradually veer off9" 
ANSWER: "No, it was like he was changing 
lanes, like you change lanes going down 
the freeway." 
QUESTION: "Now prior to the time he made 
this fairly sudden lane change, what lane 
had he been in?" 
ANSWER: "I couldn't tell you that. I 
really couldn't. It looked, I just don't 
know, but you know it was very apparent 
that he was pulling, trying to get in 
behind me, that's the way I'm looki_nq at 
it any way It looked 1jke he thought to 
himself, 'I'm off the road and that 
truck's on the road, and I'd better get 
in behind him.'"^ 
(Tr. 256.) 
Second, the shallow angle of impact indicates to a 
reconstructionist that the driver was awake. If a driver 
fell asleep, the car would probably make a more sudden turn. 
(Tr. 249-250.) Ostler's expert was able to monitor this 
phenomenon in his sleep laboratory. (Tr. 251.) 
JWheeler's observations were made through his rear view 
mirror. However, Ostler's expert has done special research 
Third, there was testimony that father Ostler had 
stated he was not tired at the previous road stop. (Tr. 
250. ) 
Fourth, there was a curve in the roadway just prior 
to th^ accident scene. If father Ostler had been asleep, he 
would have run straight off the road at the curve. (Tr. 
252. ) 
Fifth, there was testimony that a sleeping truck 
driver would relax to such an extent that he would not keep 
his foot on the gas. (Tr. 283.) In this case, the Ostler 
vehicle was travelling at approximately 48 miles per hour at 
impact. (R. 1029.) The inference is that father Ostler was 
not asleep or the Ostler vehicle would have slowed down more. 
(Tr. 2 8 3.) 
The court rejected all of this evidence. Thus, the 
court stated: 
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis 
for a determination on his part that 
there was a man that was either, that was 
not asleep, or that he was merely 
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of 
things around him. 
(Tr. 2 45.) 
This issue is controlled by Rule 104(b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
Preliminary Questions. When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, 
the introduction of evidence sufficient 
to support a finding of the fulfillment 
of the condition. 
EXHIBIT H 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, ) 
Pla int i f f , ] 
vs. ] 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. ; 
OF& RROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF 
) PATRICIA HANNA 
) Case No. 88-00228-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Patricia Hanna. I give the following testimony under 
oath: 
1. I hold a Ph.D in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati. 
2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah. 
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3. I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. However, I am trained 
in logic and argumentation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large 
measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic 
reasoning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well 
as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry. My 
curriculum vita is attached. 
4. I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Albina. et al. I have been asked to 
render an opinion of that Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, I have not 
been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have 
been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes 
issues raised in the briefs. 
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking. 
6. In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision 
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course,-! would have given it a 
grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing 
work. 
7. In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could 
have been endorsed by three judges. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, "a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
8. My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows: 
airiaavit or ra tnc ia uina rage J 
General Structure of Appeal 
There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9 
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III, 
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the 
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In 
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the 
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the 
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full 
force. 
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this. 
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler 
(hereafter, Wheeler)e? a/, cannot be resolved without a decision on the 
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and 
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion 
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or 
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear 
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such 
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have 
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only 
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability. 
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment 
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated 
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually 
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the 
plaintiff's case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no 
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a 
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the 
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable 
1
 The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no 
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission 
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the 
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48. 
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures 
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one 
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for 
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect 
on the matter. This does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I 
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious 
breakdown in the present case. 
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and 
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeal 
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals 
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the 
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 points 
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points. 
Assumptions 
There is no dispute on the following: Wheeler negligently parked h 
semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson 
Utah. He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of 
his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father 
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran intc 
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I will take these as. given. 
Point I 
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of It 
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that although a 
major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause, 
almost all of the evidence proffered by Ostler was rejected by the trial 
court. As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict agair 
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of 
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury 
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this 
decision. 
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit, 
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive 
G c l V I l u i ( a m ^ i a I I C M I U V A 
ness. In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no 
ication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was 
t the evidence was entirely without merit.2 Instead, the evidence is 
?cted on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be 
jlevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that 
/vould confuse the jurors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors 
eady were fully aware of the phenomena. The appeal argues that these 
)unds are all inadequate.3 
The "moth-phenomenon", Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices, 
d denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in 
lergencv lane 
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory, 
l ich is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether 
ishing or not, have a tendency to l u re " sleepy drivers towards them, 
uch as a moth is drawn to a light. Thus, if father Ostler was awake at 
e time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this 
uring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's 
uck. 
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler 
'as not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such 
evices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided. 
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact 
^cation, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck 
lad not been present in the emergency lane, it was most likely that the 
Dstler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field. 
- At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to 
testify on the matter of the so-called Mmoth-phenomenon;M however, it is clear from the 
transcript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's 
decision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245). 
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections. 
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In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it 
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether fathe. 
Ostler was awake or asleep. Taking each point in isolation, might give 
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlook 
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be 
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to 
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time 
of the accident. 
2. Was father Ostler awake? 
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern 
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the 
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the 
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to 
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable 
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter. 
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisiv 
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate. 
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his 
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a 
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says tha 
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment 
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jur\ 
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, the 
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the 
evidence was not conc lus ive . It strikes me that if indeed this were the 
standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all 
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable 
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear 
would be directed verdicts. 
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic < 
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the Court of 
Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. What attention 
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oes give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying 
nly that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive 
ay to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the 
Dcidenf (Opinion, p. 4). In light of Ostler's point, this statement is 
mply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context. 
. Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules 
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in 
olation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck 
rivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that 
meeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane. The 
ilevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold. One, it contributes to his 
egligence; the decision to rule it out because negligence was not 
ilevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable, 
owever, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability, 
xhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's 
Dsition and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would 
ffect whether and to what extent he should be held liable. Further, if 
fheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and 
seded to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an 
.tempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability. The 
ourt of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes 
the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by 
rected verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R. Evid. 402 
evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6). 
The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabilitv of possibility of 
jch an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a 
j s s i b i l i t v 
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues 
show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the 
tended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless 
ere was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to 
ovide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within, 
lowing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would 
r d y e e 
occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane), 
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen. 
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this 
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the groui 
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were 
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's rulin 
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of 
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in thi: 
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence and to proximate 
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common 
knowledge. 
Admissibility of this evidence 
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case and 
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to 
understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in 
order to support his contention that Wheeler was negligent, one of the 
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable. 
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a w 
understood and valid form of argument.4 
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the 
accident. 
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect oi 
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or 
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the 
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is 
therefore liable for the accident. 
4
 According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Ionic (London: 1962 
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D., 
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178). 
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3. If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there 
vas no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane 
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes 
)l the accident. Had the truck not been there, there would have been no 
Kxident. Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes. 
4. Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or 
*sfeep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a 
Koximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least 
martially liable for the accident.5 
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful 
0 the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it 
nevented Ostler's constructing this argument; further,to argue that each 
nece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and 
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of 
wents. Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of 
war lives. For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant 
pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make 
1 irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our 
atmosphere and light's reaction to it. So too, the fact that all the 
evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto render it 
rreligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of 
wrcwcimate cause. This is especially so given the fact that the issue of 
araximate cause was the key to the decision. The Court of Appeals' 
tecision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense 
addresses it. Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion 
rlearly demonstrates this. 
:
 A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or 
sleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency 
5evices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most 
Rely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would 
awe alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the 
ccident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the 
me of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate 
anses of the accident. 
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the 
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall, 
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc. Ostler 
presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant, 
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge misapplied 
the law and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard. The Court of 
Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion c 
Ostler's arguments against this decision. 
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded 
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the 
jury. Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of 
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) an 
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to 
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them. 
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, thk 
requirement is relaxed. It is now no longer necessary to show that the 
expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary 
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and 
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case. 
Rule 702 states 
If scientific, technical or other special ized 
knowledge wil l a s s i s t the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.) 
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if 
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of 
fact in understanding evidence that is simply 
di f f icul t [ though] not beyond ord inary 
understanding. 
United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd 
Cir. 1985) (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18). 
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of 
mderstanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have 
hat evidence placed clearly before them. Specifically: 1) Members of 
he jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not 
>ntail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so 
is to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might 
l ink possible only for driver who was in fact asleep. 2) There is no 
eason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions 
aused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights, blinking tail-lights, and 
ares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like 
lat at issue. 3) It is unclear that the average driver actually 
nderstands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal 
bservation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not). 4) 
lor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the 
lightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to 
ignificantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers. 
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand, not only did the 
jry need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is 
verwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as 
le higher common law standard requires). Not knowing these facts has a 
lear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part, 
nd on a judgment of Wheeler's liability. 
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that 
o expertise was needed to understand it. The Court of Appeals argues 
lat in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was 
jbstantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial 
dge's ruling. It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide 
scretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision 
ithout exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this 
iscret ion. 
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's 
ase it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend 
e nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case. 
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could 
take: each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself 
make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is 
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying 
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of th 
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to 
make an essentially comparative judgment. 
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or 
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimur 
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with 
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative 
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing 
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its 
decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no 
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story 
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what 
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is, 
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been 
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new 
del iberat ion (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different 
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove 
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a 
failure to read the.br iefs carefully. 
Point II and Point III 
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to 
ur inate 
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations M0-. 15-. and 70- hour rules) 
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act 
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The 
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it 
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler's claim i 
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at this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and 
bility. The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back 
ice again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is 
>propriately excluded. There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals 
'predates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony. 
)int IV 
sstatements during closing-defendant's closing statement 
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue 
is not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some 
le run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have 
eseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his 
>ck at just that time. 
[T]he foreseeability question is: How was Stan 
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise 
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances 
that it would happen right at that particular time— 
(Quoted in Opinion, p. 8). 
is clearly is not the standard to foreseeability; if it were, no one would 
er be able to foresee anything. 
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to 
ect the juror's to their instructions. He did not rule on the objection, 
iarly leaving the misstatement uncorrected . In some cases this might 
ve caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it 
uses harm. The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to 
* instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear, 
mplicated and difficult to understand. This will be discussed in more 
tail under Point X below. 
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together 
h Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its 
tructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm, 
is decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals' 
lure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the 
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations anc 
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and 
confusing. 
Point V 
Who Pavs 
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading 
statement made during closing. Here there is only an implication that th 
defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less 
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformatioi 
was clearly stated. The Court of Appeals1 ruling on this point seems we 
taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with 
this, the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV. 
Point VII 
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or 
t r iang les 
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C. 
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury. 
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of 
a highway from any cause other than necessary 
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible, 
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning 
devices [flares or reflective triangles] (I.C.C. rule, 
quoted in Appeal, p. 41). 
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the 
devices. However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so. 
Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be 
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer Q I , if parkt 
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances. 
However if you find that defendant Wheeler was 
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to 
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de te rmine whether or not Wheeler should 
nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles 
under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42). 
This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the 
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the 
driver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even 
if substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to 
negligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal. 
Ostler's point is that the LC.C. regulation makes it clear that 
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g., 
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the 
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were 
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to 
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the 
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler 
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary 
dr ivers . 
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning 
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is 
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have 
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals' 
ludgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation 
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply 
left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly relevant 
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict. 
Point IX 
^/ideo tape demonstration 
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide 
he issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause Since 
hese decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the 
'cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not 
)een there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth 
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case). The 
idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act; 
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or 
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?" 
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see 
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have 
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the 
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful. 
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the 
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not simila 
enough to the incident to count as a re-enactment. Second, that it was 
just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury. 
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to 
call for a through-going revision of legal standards. In deciding these 
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the 
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then 
there would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing 
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be 
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the 
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing. 
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact 
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues 
that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an 
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual 
accident. In such a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be 
taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case. 
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that coulc 
m i l have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the 
point of the video is illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on 
the issue of proximate cause. 
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong 
test: relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video 
failed the first two. It then considered the argument that the video was 
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ot a re-enactment, but an illustration; and upheld the trial court's ruling 
n the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or 
lat the trial court abused its discretion. 
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. The very nature 
f decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by 
s nature confusing. In view of the vast body of evidence already denied 
le jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim 
lat showing them the video would be confusing. At this stage of the trial 
le video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that 
/heeler's truck was not simply something for father Ostler's truck to hit 
*s though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been 
iere), but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident 
f the sort that occurred. The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries 
re not causally overdetermined,6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary 
ausal factor. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see 
lis point. 
pint X 
ourfs instructions on intervening causes was incorrect. 
Ostler objected on several points: 
1. "Intervening independent cause" was undefined. 
2. Foreseeability was not the only test of causation 
3. Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to 
be the standard of foreseeability. 
4. The instructions were confusing. 
If something is causally overdetermined, it will occur whether or not one of the causes 
:curs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you 
tally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting 
mstant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot 
e, I die. 
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the 
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as 
given, that the. contested instructions concern negligence and were 
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof 
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion. 
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of son 
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in whii 
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury. The 
jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear 
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I). Taken in this context, Ostler's 
case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision 
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instruction 
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates. 
Point XI 
Directed verdict on causation 
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked 
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were 
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the 
judge were unclear and confusing. In view of this it seems at least 
unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however 
the case at hand the error runs even deeper. 
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds th. 
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a simila-
verdict on causation. The defendant's response claims that if this were 
allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and 
causation; this is simply not so. Ostler argues only that in this case is 
there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply 
that there is such an implication in every case. 
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild 
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running int. 
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked 
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next to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any 
case. The case at hand is not of this sort. Here the negligence implies 
causation. This is shown by asking what it was that made the act of 
parking in the emergency lane negligent. The answer is two-fold: 1) risk 
to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2) subjecting Ostler to 
the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60). 
Thus, causation is implied by negligence. 
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's 
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the 
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury. The standards cited 
by Ostler clearly support this contention.7 
Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the standard for a directed 
verdict is met: reasonable minds cannot disagree. They cannot disagree 
Decause the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict. In the 
Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 62, Ostler makes this clear: " The fact 
:hat reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated 
Dy the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with 
massing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are 
apparent." Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree; 
otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic. If we 
are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even 
hough we are reasonable 
The present case is of this unfortunate sort. The jurors were led to 
jraw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but 
Decause they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw 
he correct conclusion. They were neither allowed to judge the issue of 
causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the 
elevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to 
hem that as a matter of logic the case was closed. 
The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially 
lear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44.) 
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal 
are confusing. First it is stated that generally proximate causation is 
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be 
true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case. 
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to 
relevant evidence and could not make the determination. The Court of 
Appeals' decision does not address this argument. 
Second the Court of Appeals states that "proximate cause' is one of 
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10). This 
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence. 
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason 
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals 
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally 
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of 
Ostler's arguments or contentions. In short, the entire section on p. 10 
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning. 
Conclusions 
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion 
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude that in 
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account 
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several 
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to 
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
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waist down. This case does not include any claims by Father 
Ostler. 
During a jury trial, plaintiff admitted that Father 
Ostler (the driver of the car) was negligent and partly at 
fault in causing the accident (for drifting onto the emergency 
lane where the truck was illegally parked). The Court directed 
a verdict against the trucker for negligent parking. The 
central issue at trial was proximate cause. Was the trucker's 
negligence in parking illegally in the emergency lane, or in 
failing to put out warning devices as required by Federal law, 
a proximate cause of the accident?1 
The jury returned a verdict for defendant. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed. 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The head of the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah (Dr. Patricia Hannah) made a 21 page analy-
sis of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals. (See Appendix, Ex. 
lf,The law does not necessarily recognize only one proxi-
mate cause of an injury. . . To the contrary, the acts of two 
or more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of 
the injury, and in such case, each of the participating acts or 
omissions is regarded in law as a proximate cause and both may 
be held responsible. 
J.I.F.U. §15.7 
3 
A part of the record of the Court of Appeals is an 
affidavit by Ms- Patricia Hannah, Ph.D. (See Exhibit B.) Dr. 
Hannah is Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, Univer-
sity of Utah, This affidavit was filed in support of Ostler's 
Petition for Reconsideration in the Utah Court of Appeals^. in 
substance, the affidavit is a 21 page analysis of the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals. The affidavit states in part: 
I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. 
However, I am trained in logic and argumen-
tation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is 
in large measure devoted to the study of 
arguments and the process of analytic 
reasoning. I have taught classes in deduc-
tive and inductive logic, as well as in 
epistemology (theory of knowledge) and 
scientific inquiry. . . . (p. 2 paragraph 
3.) 
I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to 
read the Opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Ostler v. Albina, et al. I have 
been asked to render an opinion of that 
Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, I 
have not been asked to determine if the 
Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have 
been asked to determine the extent to which 
the Opinion fairly analyzes issues raised 
in the briefs, (p.2, paragraph 4.) 
^It is clearly an unusual step to have the head of the Dept. of 
Philosophy at the University of Utah comment on a Court Opini-
on. Certainly that should not be an every day tool of the 
trial advocate. Nor was that step taken lightly. However, it 
is a serious matter when a Court Opinion cannot muster a pass-
ing grade on a undergraduate level. Hopefully, the Court will 
not criticize counsel for this unusual step. Hopefully, the 
court will value this input, as it undertakes the serious task 
of supervising the inferior courts of this state. 
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the interstate. Plaintiff was severely injured. He is para-
lyzed from the waist down. Plaintiff sued the owners and driver 
of the semi-trailer, 
Utah Code Ann, §41-6-103(1)(i) states: 
No person shall: stop, stand or park a ve-
hicle.,.on any controlled access highway. 
The trial court relied on this statute and directed a 
verdict on negligence. The court reserved the issue of proxi-
mate cause for the injury. 
The defense claimed that driving into the parked 
semi-truck was a superceding cause of the accident. At trial, 
the defense argued that it was not foreseeable that Father 
Ostler would stray onto the emergency lane and hit the parked 
semi-trailer. The jury found for the defendant. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
B. Legal Analysis of Superceding Cause. 
The rule of superceding causation has been estab-
lished by two leading cases of this Court. Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) and Godesky v. 
Provo City Corp. , 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984). In Godesky, 
supra, this Court held that: 
An intervening negligent act does not 
automatically become a superceding cause 
that relieves the original actor of liabil-
ity. The earlier actor is charged with the 
foreseeable negligent acts of others. 
7 
Ostler offered evidence that the purpose of this 
statute was to safeguard errant (sleepy or sleeping or dis-
tracted) drivers. For example: 
Parked tractor trailers on shoulders of our 
high speed highways introduce unnecessary 
obstacles in the clear recovery area. (R. 
1359) 
Ultimately, if the parked vehicle had not 
been there, an accident might not have 
occurred. (R. 1368.) 
Compare Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co., 267 So. 2d 
714, 718 (La. 1972): 
. . . [T]his statute [parking on the high-
way] is designed to protect against the 
risk that a driver, whether cautious or 
inattentive, would collide with a station-
ary vehicle. Id. 
In summary, the legislature passed a law to protect 
errant drivers who stray onto the emergency lane. It was 
not "extraordinary" or "unforeseeable" that Father Ostler would 
negligently drift onto the emergency lane. Since this event 
was "foreseeable", it could not be a superceding cause. Godes-
ky v. Provo City Corp., supra; Harris v. Utah Transit Author-
it- y, supra, Restatement (second) of Torts §442A, 442B and 447 
(1965) . 
The trial court erred by refusing to direct a verdict 
on causation. 
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The Court of Appeals only dealt with the confusion 
issue^. The other three issues are serious matters supported 
by abundant authority7. The Court of Appeals departed from 
acceptable judicial standards by refusing to even consider 
these crucial issues. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS REFUSED TO FOLLOW 
BINDING PRECEDENT WITH RESPECT TO CLOSING 
ARGUMENT. 
In closing argument, defendant's attorney argued: 
Foreseeability has to do with whether he [Wheeler] 
could perceive, that in his drive, Stephen Ostler 
would at that precise moment become inattentive and 
go off the road . . . But in that, the foreseeability 
questions fsic] is: How was Stan Wheeler expected to 
foresee that at that precise time if, as Mr. DeBry 
said, one in a billion chances that it would happen 
right at that particular time? 
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, at p. 19-20.) 
^The sole issue treated by the Court of Appeals was con-
fusion. The Court of Appeals concluded the instruction was not 
confusing. However, it was absurd to conclude that Instruction 
No. 27 was understandable to a lay person. (See Exhibit C.) 
7See Restatement of Torts 2d. §442A and 442B; see also 
Harris and Godesky, supra. 
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The jury is directed to look at the in-
structions. They set forth the law in that 
regard. Statement of counsel is to be dis-
regarded except as it is accurate. (Ab-
stract of Tr. at 20.) 
To plaintiff's assignment of error on appeal, the 
Court of Appeals stated: 
Even if counsel's remarks misstated the 
law, any prejudicial impact appears to be 
negated by the Court's admonishment. 117 
Ut. Adv. Rep. at 17. 
This totally ignores State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 
(Utah 1980). In Shickles, this court held that if the trial 
court failed to act to dispel erroneous statements of counsel 
by (1) ruling on the objection when made, and (2) instructing 
the jury with positive correction of the misstatement, reversal 
is required. 760 P.2d at 299-300. 
This Court stated in Shickles that where the mis-
statements are made in closing argument and can have a mislead-
ing impact on the jury, the error is clearly prejudicial. 760 
P.2d at 300. See also Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 
1977) . 
Certiorari should be granted where the Court of 
Appeals refuses to follow binding (and recent) precedent. 
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In their totality, and in context with the 
remainder of voir dire, their questions are 
substantially responsive to plaintiff's 
concerns and appear sufficient to reveal 
"tort reform" bias in the manner discussed 
in Doe, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. 
However, this court has recently granted certiorari 
in Doe v. Hafen. (See Exhibit E.) Since this case and Doe v. 
Hafen involve identical threshold issues (viz. jury voir dire) 
and since this court has already granted certiorari to review 
Doe v. Hafenf it would be a matter of judicial economy for this 
court to consider both cases together^. It would seem unjust 
for Ostler to lose his case based, in part, upon the reliance 
by the Court of Appeals on the case of Doe v. Hafen if Doe were 
to be subsequently overturned by this Court. 
POINT VI 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT 
OF APPEALS REFUSED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATE 
THEORY OF LIABILITY, 
Plaintiff's first claim of negligence was based on 
the illegal parking of the semi-trailer. Plaintiff also 
claimed a second basis for liability. The second theory was 
based upon the failure of defendant driver to set out flares or 
10The influence of "tort reform" publicity on jury voir 
dire raises serious constitutional issues and is of intense 
interest in other courts. See Exhibit F. 
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tions of how long Wheeler had been parked 
ultimately goes to the issue of Wheeler's 
negligence. Since that issue has been re-
solved by directed verdict. The excluded 
testimony was irrelevant. Id. 
• • * 
Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury 
instructions. The first instruction in-
volves the placement of emergency warning 
devices behind Wheeler's parked truck. We 
agree that the given instruction signifi-
cantly differs from plaintiff's' requested 
instruction. However, the instruction 
concerned the issue of Wheeler's negli-
gence. We have already established that 
this issue had been taken from the jury. 
Any error could not have affected the 
substantial rights of plaintiff and was 
therefore, harmless. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
17. 
However, there was an a serious flaw in that reason-
ing. The chain of causation for negligent parking is different 
from the chain of causation for failure to put out warning 
flares. If the defendant did not cause the accident by parking 
illegally, he may well have caused the accident by failing to 
put out emergency flares. For example, if Stephen Ostler was 
awake, the flares or triangles may have guided him around the 
danger area. If Ostler was asleep, driving over the triangles 
would have caused a noise awakening the driver. (Tr. 232-34, 
2824.) Thus, a completely independent act of negligence and a 
separate chain of causation was kept from the jury by the trial 
court's rulings. 
17 
The trial court refused to receive evidence of the 
"moth effect". The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of 
Appeals stated: 
Even if such a theory is admissible under 
the threshold requirement of inherent 
reliability [citation omitted]. The theory 
is premised on the fact that a driver must 
be awake to be lured. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at p. 15. 
Thus, a foundation issue was whether Stephen Ostler 
(father) was awake or had his eyes open1-^ so he could be 
lured1^. On this issue Ostler relied upon Rule 104(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence ^ and Huddleston v. United States, 
U.S. , 108 S.CT. 1496, 99 L.ed. 2d 771 (1988). 
iJDefendants offered a series of night-time photos of the 
parked truck. The foundation for the night-time photos was 
that Ostler's eyes were open. Ostler thereupon proffered 
evidence on the "moth effect" as rebuttal testimony. Thus, the 
foundation for defendants photos and plaintiff's moth effect 
theory was identical, viz. that Ostler's eyes were open. The 
Court of Appeals, likewise, ignored this crucial issue. (See 
Exhibit G.) 
14Ostler's experts gave five reasons to conclude that Ste-
phen Ostler was awake (so that he could be lured). The reasons 
are summarized at Exhibit H. The trial court rejected all of 
this proffered testimony. 
15
"When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the ful-
fillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, 
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." 
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Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and 
Jackson. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict against 
him in a negligence action. We affirm. 
On the night of April 18, 1984, plaintiff 
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father 
Stephen home to Utah from a business trip to 
California. At approximately 3:00 a.m., the 
Ostler's compact pickup was northbound on 
Interstate 15, a few miles south of Payson, 
Utah. Stephen Ostler was driving. For 
unknown reasons, the pickup left the lane of 
traffic and struck the rear of a truck and 
semitrailer unit parked on the paved shoulder 
of the roadway. Stephen Ostler was killed 
instantly. Plaintiff, who had been sleeping on 
the bed of the pickup, was thrown onto the 
roadway and critically injured. 
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist down 
as a result of his injuries. He brought a pers-
onal injury action in the district court against 
the driver of the semitrailer (defendant Stanley 
E. Wheeler), the driver's employer (defendant 
Albina Transfer Co., Inc.), and the semitrailer 
•the five-day trial, plaintiff conceded that 
Stephen Ostler was negligent and partially at 
fault for the accident. Early in the trial, the 
court determined that Wheeler was also negl-
igent and directed a verdict of negligence 
against him. The basis for this ruling was that 
Wheeler had parked his semitrailer on the 
shoulder of a controlled access highway in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
103(1)0) (1988). The court reserved the issue 
of whether Wheeler's negligence was a 
I "proximate cause" of the accident. The jury 
eventually concluded that Stephen Ostler's 
negligence was the "intervening and sole pro-
ximate cause" of plaintiffs injuries, and 
rendered a special verdict for defendants. 
Plaintiff appeals from the verdict, alleging 
numerous errors. 
VOIR DIRE 
We first address plaintiff's claim that jury 
voir dire was inadequate to reveal bias related 
to a "tort reform" advertising campaign con-
ducted by a national insurance company. It is 
obvious from the trial transcript that the gist 
of plaintiffs questions went to the issue of 
potential juror bias against large monetary 
awards. 
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure requires the court to permit the parties 
to supplement voir dire with questions that are 
material and proper. However, the court has 
considerable discretion to "contain voir dire 
within reasonable limits." Hornsby v. Corpo-
ration of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 
932-33 (Utah Ct. App. J 988). Whether that 
discretion has been abused is determined from 
the totality of the questioning. Doe v. Hafen, 
772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In lieu of plaintiffs proposed questions, the 
judge informed the venire that plaintiffs 
claim may exceed a million dollars and asked 
if any would object to an award of that 
magnitude. None did. The judge also asked if 
any of the prospective jurors believed that 
people Should not resort to the courts to settle 
disputes or recover damages for injuries. 
Again, none did. The judge followed with a 
question asking whether any believed they 
were incapable of rendering a fair and true 
verdict based on the evidence. None responded 
affirmatively. In their totality, and in context 
with the remainder of voir dire, these quest-
ions are substantively responsive to plaintiffs 
concerns and appear sufficient to reveal "tort 
reform" bias in the manner discussed in Doe, 
772 P.2d at 458-59. Plaintiff, therefore, has 
not shown an abuse of discretion in the 
court's voir dire of prospective jurors. 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court impro-
perly rejected his evidence on the issue of 
proximate cause, resulting in prejudicial error. 
All of this evidence was in the form of prof-
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fered testimony from two experts. The excl-
uded evidence covered a variety of topics, 
including a scientific theory referred to as the 
"moth phenomenon/ certain federal motor 
carrier regulations, road safety and design, 
and a videotape prepared for plaintiff that 
purported to show what Would have happened 
if the semitrailer had riot been unlawfully 
parked. 
The general rule regarding the admission or 
exclusion of evidence is that the trial court's 
decision will not be overturned in the absence 
of an abuse of discretion. Pearce v. Wistlsen, 
701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). Witnesses 
qualified as experts may testify if "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evid- I 
ence or to determine a fact in issue/ Utah R. ! 
Evid. 702. However, "(i]t is within the discr-
etion of the trial court to determine the suit-
ability of expert testimony in a case and the 
qualifications of the proposed expert/ State v. 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982) 
(decided under former rule). Although such 
testimony may be relevant, it may be excluded 
if the court determines "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence/ Utah R. 
Evid. 403. The probative value of evidence is 
determined on the basis of need and "its 
ability to make the existence of a consequen-
tial fact either more or less probable." State v. 
Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (1989) 
(quoting State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 
1370 (Utah 1989)). 
We have examined the record and can find 
no abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
decision to exclude the testimony of two of 
plaintiffs seven experts. It is quite clear that 
the reason or reasons why Stephen Ostler's 
vehicle slammed into the rear of Wheeler's 
semitrailer could not be established. Plaintiffs 
case relied significantly on scientific evidence 
of the "moth phenomenon," a theory that 
motorists are "lured" at night to the lights of 
parked vehicles. Even if such a theory is 
admissible under the threshhold requirement 
of inherent reliability, see State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d 388, 398-99 (Utah 1989), the theory 
is premised on the fart that a driver must be 
awake in order to be so "lured." Plaintiffs 
own expert admitted that there was no concl-
usive way to determine Stephen Ostler's state 
of consciousness prior to the accident. Nor 
does the theory necessarily establish causation 
because plaintiffs expert conceded that there 
was no evidence of the factors triggering the 
moth phenomenon. Without this foundation, 
the court determined that the expert testimony 
on the moth phenomenon would not be 
helpful to the jury, and furthermore, that it 
would be prejudicial to present an opinion 
based on such pure conjecture. 
This is consistent with the principle that 
"any expert evidence, scientifically based or 
otherwise" must, on balance, "be helpful to 
the trier of fact." Id. at 398 n.8. Such evid-
ence must be scrutinized carefully to avoid the 
"tendency of the finder of fact to abandon its 
responsibility to decide the critical issues and 
simply adopt the judgment of the expert 
despite an inability to accurately appraise the 
validity of the underlying science/ Id. at 396. 
Whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect is a determination within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Johnson, 
115 Utah Adv. Rep, at 9. Under rules 403 and 
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we conc-
lude that the trial judge was within his discr-
etion to exclude the testimony. 
Similarly, the trial court concluded that 
plaintiffs videotaped demonstration was more 
apt to be confusing to the jury than helpful. 
The videotape depicted a compact pickup 
truck driving off the roadway at the actual 
accident location. It purported to show that 
no mishap would have occurred had 
Wheeler's truck not been parked on the road 
shoulder. Plaintiff first argues that the vide-
otape was for illustrative purposes and was 
proper under Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita 
Hour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1958) 
and other cases. It is obvious, however, that 
the film did not illustrate the accident, but 
rather portrayed plaintiffs prediction of 
events under a different set of facts. As such, 
the potential for unfair prejudice as illustrative 
evidence was significant, and the trial court 
was within its discretion to exclude it. 
Plaintiff alternatively argues that the vide-
I otape was admissible as evidence. Plaintiff 
cites DiRosario v. Havens, 196 Cal. App. 3d 
1243, 242 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1987) for 
the proposition that experimental evidence is 
admissible provided it is conducted under 
substantially similar conditions as that of the 
actual incident. "The standard that must be 
met in determining whether the proponent of 
the experiment has met the burden of proof of 
establishing the preliminary fact essential to 
the admissibility of the experimental evidence 
is whether the conditions were substantially 
identical, not absolutely identical." Id. at 426 
(quoting Culpepper v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 521, 109 
Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973)). DiRosario imposes two 
other requirements- that the experimental 
evidence be relevant and not consume undue 
time, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. Id. 
at 426. 
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales 
Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the Culpepper 
three-prong test in determining the admissi-
bility of motor vehicle crash test films. The 
court upheld the admission of the films into 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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evidence and held that certain discrepancies 
between the films and the actual accident went 
to weight, rather than admissibility. The circ-
umstances of the accident were known and 
and the films were offered to show the hand-
ling characteristics of similar vehicles. 
In this case, application of the Whitehead 
test supports exclusion of the evidence. Plai-
ntiff admits that the videotape differed from 
the actual accident in that the videotape was 
produced during daylight conditions and 
employed an alert, professional stunt driver. 
He further argues that even with these discr-
epancies, the demonstration was substantially 
similar. It appears, however, that the condit-
ions of the film's production were far from 
similar to the actual accident. The differences 
in lighting and driver alertness and skill were 
crucial. The literal controversy of this lawsuit 
is the inexplicable departure of a vehicle from 
the lane of traffic. The videotape does not, 
and cannot, depict the conditions that caused 
that departure. Any other depiction is, as the 
trial court concluded, not reconstruction, but 
speculation. In contrast to Whitehead, the 
circumstances of this accident are not known, 
and there is no indication that the design 
characteristics of vehicles were responsible. 
The discrepancies between the film and plai-
ntiffs accident seem to go beyond weight. 
Since trie film would not "make the existence 
of any fact ... of consequence ... more prob-
able than not" under Utah R. Evid. 401, we 
are not convinced plaintiff has satisfied the 
first two prongs of similarity and relevance 
under the Whitehead test. 
Even giving plaintiff the benefit of our 
doubt as to the film's relevance and similarity, 
we conclude that, in any event, the trial court 
properly excluded the videotape as substantive 
evidence on the grounds of potential confu-
sion. See Utah R. Evid. 403. Under White-
head's third prong, such evidence may be 
excluded in the court's discretion even if it is 
relevant, when a determination is made that it 
may confuse or mislead. 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 31 (trial court upheld although unclear 
whether court excluded evidence under rule 
401 or 403, either theory of exclusion being 
proper). Since plaintiff has not demonstrated 
that the finding of potential confusion was an 
abuse of the court's discretion, we hold that 
the videotape was properly excluded. 
We last address plaintiffs claim of error 
regarding the exclusion of evidence on federal 
motor carrier regulations and road safety and 
design. Plaintiff argues that this evidence was 
relevant to the issue of foreseeability under his 
theory of concurrent negligence. Plaintiff 
quotes Codesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 
P.2d 541, 545-46 (Utah 1984): 
The law does not necessarily reco-
gnize only one proximate cause of 
an injury, consisting of only one 
factor, one act, or the conduct of 
only one person. To the contrary, 
the acts and omissions of two or 
more persons may work concurre-
ntly as the efficient cause of an 
injury, and in such a case, each of 
the participating acts or omissions is 
regarded in law as a proximate 
cause and both may be held respo-
nsible. 
We have examined the record and agree that 
some of this evidence may be relevant to the 
issue of foreseeability. Other evidence goes to 
the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter 
previously decided by directed verdict, and 
may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R. 
Evid. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible."). The court excluded the rel-
evant portions of the expert's proffered test-
imony on the grounds that such evidence 
would not be particularly helpful to the jury. 
The court believed that the jury was as 
capable as the expert to make the determina-
tion of foreseeability. In any event, plaintiff 
has failed to carry his burden of showing that 
the claimed error was substantial and prejud-
icial. SeeAshton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 
(Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 61. In the 
absence of such a showing, we consider plai-
ntiffs claim to be without merit. 
IMPEACHMENT 
Plaintiff argues that the court's refusal to 
permit him to show that Wheeler may have 
been parked on the shoulder of the highway 
for as long as thirty minutes unduly restricted 
cross-examination. Although plaintiff conc-
edes that the trial judge has broad discretion 
in regulating the scope of such testimony, see, 
e.g., Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, he 
claims that the court abused its discretion by 
misapplying the law. Plaintiff claims that he 
was attempting to show consistency with prior 
deposition testimony, and the court ruled that 
only prior inconsistent statements may be 
compared. 
It is unnecessary to resolve this argument 
when the alternate basis for the court's ruling 
is considered, namely, that the question of 
how long Wheeler had been parked ultimately 
went to the issue of Wheeler's negligence. 
Since that issue had been resolved by directed 
verdict, the excluded testimony was irrelevant. 
Similarly, plaintiff claims that he was not 
permitted to impeach Wheeler with Wheeler's 
"prior bad acts," specifically, Wheeler's viol-
ation of federal motor carrier regulations. 
These acts also concerned the issue of 
Wheeler's negligence and were properly excl-
uded. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff complains of statements made by 
defense counsel during closing argument. 
Defense counsel made the following remark: 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
C O D E • C O 
Provo. Utah 
Ustler v, Albina Transfer Co. 
117 Utah Adv Rep. 14 17 
This case is to decide whether 
Wheeler, ... F & R Roe and Albina 
are to pay for the injuries to Ralph, 
when Wheeler's actions were not 
the cause of the accident. 
Plaintiff timely reserved an objection out of 
the presence of the jury. He now argues that 
the statement was improper, prejudicial, and 
untrue for the reason that "any recovery 
would come from the insurance carrier," and 
that the remark unfairly implies that defend-
ants would personally pay any damage award. 
We are not convinced that there is any 
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it 
reflects the fact that judgment would be ren-
dered against the various defendants under 
joint and several liability, and does not indi-
cate the source of funds to pay such a judg-
ment. It does not inappropriately state that 
insurance would or would not pay any judg-
ment, see Utah R. Evid. 411, thus improperly 
eliciting sympathy or tempering the size of any 
award. Cf. Pricl v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 
65 (N.D. 1986) ("We are talking about money 
that my client will have to pay out of his own 
pocket." (emphasis added)). We conclude that 
the remark was not unfairly prejudicial. 
Plaintiff also objected to the following 
portion of defendants' closing argument: 
[T]he foreseeability question is: 
How was Stan Wheeler expected to 
foresee that at that precise time if, 
as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion 
chances that it would happen right 
at that particular time-
Plaintiff argues that this was a misstatement 
of the law because "foreseeability relates to 
whether accidents of this general nature might 
happen." He further asserts that the statement 
was prejudicial and that "(t]he only explana-
tion for [the] verdict is that the jury was 
confused by [defense counsel's] misstatements 
of the law." 
We disagree. Even if counsel's remarks 
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact 
appears to be negated by the court's admon-
ishment: 
The Jury is directed to look at the 
Instructions. They set forth the law 
in that regard. Statement of counsel 
is to be disregarded except as it is 
accurate. 
See Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error 
shown where court admonished jury following 
remarks during closing argument). When 
considered in the context of the entire closing 
argument, plaintiff's objection, and the 
court's admonition, we conclude there was no 
unfair prejudice. See generally Halford v. 
Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 411-12 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1977). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury 
instructions. The first instmaion involved the 
placement of emergency warning devices 
behind Wheeler's parked truck. We agree that 
the given instruction significantly differed 
from plaintiff's requested instruction. 
However, the instruction concerned the issue 
of Wheeler's negligence. We have already 
established that this issue had been taken from 
the jury. Any error could not have affected 
the substantial rights of plaintiff, and was, 
therefore, harmless. 
Plaintiff also objects to the trial court's 
instruction on the issue of causation, claiming 
that the language is confusing and incomplete. 
Plaintiff sought to further define and expand 
the given instruction. While it is true, as pla-
intiff argues, that jury instructions should be 
"clear in meaning and concise as possible in 
lay people's language without belaboring 
definitions," Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse 
Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25 (1965), 
the adoption of plaintiffs suggestions would 
have run counter to this rule. Although we 
cannot ascertain from the record the rationale 
behind the trial court's overruling of plain-
tiffs objections, any expansion of the given 
instruction would have likely hindered, rather 
than enhanced,. the jury's comprehension of 
the issue. 
The challenged instruction must also be 
considered in the context of the instructions as 
a whole. Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 
1092 (Utah 1985); State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 
1185, 1187 (Utah 1981). Other instructions 
propose plaintiffs theory of the case, i.e., 
"concurrent negligence," and add meaning to 
the instmaion at issue. Although plaintiff 
contends that the jury believed that causation 
meant "fault," he fails to support this suppo-
sition. We cannot delve into the jury's reas-
oning process, and cannot speculate what 
"cause" the jury assigned to the accident. 
However, it is just as reasonable to presume, 
as in Waiters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 
(Utah 1981), that the jury determined that the 
degree of Stephen Ostler's inattentiveness was 
not foreseeable. Thus, "he failed to observe 
the situation he should have ... [and] this later 
negligent aa became the sole proximate cause 
of the collision." Id. Since plaintiff has failed 
to show that any alleged confusion was subs-
tantial and prejudicial, we reject plaintiffs 
claim of error. 
DIRECTED VERDICT ON CAUSATION 
We last address plaintiffs argument that 
the trial court erred in not directing a verdict 
of proximate cause as a matter of law. Our 
review of a challenge to the denial of a motion 
for a directed verdict is governed by the sta-
ndard described in Penrod v. Carter, 111 P.2d 
199,200 (Utah 1987): 
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A motion for a directed verdict 
requires the trial court to consider 
the evidence in the light most fav-
orable to the party against whom it 
is directed. The case should not be 
taken from the jury where there is 
substantial dispute in the evidence 
.... On appeal, this Court applies 
the same rules. 
(Citation omitted.) See also Cook Assocs., 
Inc. v. Wamick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 
1983). 
The trial court reserved the issue of 
"proximate cause" after directing a verdict 
that Wheeler was negligent. "Proximate cause" 
is one of the essential elements of a negligence 
action, see Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 
726 (Utah 1985), and is specifically "that cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), 
produces the injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred." Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 
1985). Proximate causation is generally a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury. 
Watters, 626 P.2d at 457-58. 
The trial court denied plaintiffs motions 
for a directed verdict on the issue of causa-
tion. Under the applicable standard of review, 
we are required to view the evidence in defe-
ndants' favor. That evidence, tending to est-
ablish that proximate cause was not only in 
substantial dispute, but was the very essence 
of the controversy between the parties, indic-
ates that the trial court properly declined to 
remove the issue from the jury. We find no 
error in the ruling below. 
In conclusion, none of plaintiffs claims 
constitute reversible error. We have reviewed 
other issues raised by plaintiff and find them 
to be without merit. The judgment is affi-
rmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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OPINION 
CROFT, Judge: 
D.B. seeks judicial review of an Order of 
Review entered April 26, 1988 by the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing of 
the Department of Business Regulation 
("Division") revoking D.B.'s license to prac-
tice as a clinical and certified social worker. 
D.B. was brought before the Division by a 
petition charging him with "unprofessional 
conduct" in violation of specific Division 
rules. A hearing was held before an adminis-
trative law judge ("A.L.J.") and Board of 
Social Work Examiners ("Board"). Based 
thereon, the Board made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and recommended revoc-
ation of D.B.'s license. The Board's findings 
and conclusions were adopted by the Division, 
and its order of revocation was entered. A 
request for review by D.B. followed. Without 
further hearing, the Division affirmed its prior 
order. This judicial review followed. 
D.B. contends that his rights under the 
federal and state constitutions were violated by 
the A.L.J., who failed to provide him with an 
opportunity to cross-examine the Division's 
witnesses at the hearing. "It is the function of 
a court called on to review an order of an 
administrative agency to determine whether 
there has been due process of law(.]" 73A 
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Proc-
edure 229 (1983); see Vance v. Fordham, 671 
P.2d 124 (Utah 1983); Athay v. State Dep't of 
Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 965 (Utah 
1981); In re License of Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
(UtahApp. 1988). 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
EXHIBIT B 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, ) 
Pla int i f f , ) 
vs. ] 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
OF &R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF 
| PATRICIA HANNA 
) Case No. 88-00228-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Patricia Hanna. I give the following testimony under 
oath: 
1. I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati. 
2. I am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah. 
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3. I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. However, I am trained 
in logic and argumentation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large 
measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of analytic 
reasoning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well 
as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry. My 
curriculum vita is attached. 
4. I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read the Opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Ostler v, Albina. et al. I have been asked to 
render an opinion of that Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, 1 have not 
been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have 
been asked to determine the extent to which the Opinion fairly analyzes 
issues raised in the briefs. 
5. I have read the briefs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts available for cross-checking. 
6. In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision 
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course,-! would have given it a 
grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing 
work. 
7. In my opinion, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could 
have been endorsed by three judges. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiffs arguments; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
8. My detailed analysis of the Court's Opinion follows: 
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General Structure of Aooeal 
There is an underlying argument in the appeal which ties together 9 
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III, 
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the 
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In 
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the 
above mentioned 9 points.1 Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the 
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full 
force. 
In the very roughest terms, the underlying argument comes to this. 
The case of Ralph Ostler (hereafter, Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler 
(hereafter, Wheeler)er al. cannot be resolved without a decision on the 
issues of proximate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and 
division of liability. In order for the jury to reach a reasoned conclusion 
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or 
scientifically or factually based theories, and to be given a clear 
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such 
access, either the jury could not fulfill its responsibility or it should have 
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only 
to determine the extent of Wheeler's liability. 
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment 
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated 
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually 
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the 
plaintiffs case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no 
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a 
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the 
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable 
The Appellate Court makes no ruling on this aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no 
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of the appeal. This seems a significant omission 
given that the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the 
Reply Brief on pp. 45-48. 
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that the trial judge, under the various time constraints and pressures 
imposed by an on-going trial, might fail to appreciate this point, one 
would suppose that the appeals process is in part intended to correct for 
this by allowing three judges who have more time and distance to reflect 
on the matter. This does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I 
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a serious 
breakdown in the present case. 
In what follows, I shall indicate how this argument is made and 
sustained throughout the documentation presented to the Court of Appeal 
on Ralph Ostler's behalf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeals 
decision to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the 
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 points 
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on these points. 
Assumptions 
There is no dispute on the following: Wheeler negligently parked h 
semi-truck in the emergency lane on 1-15 between Santaquin and Payson 
Utah. He failed to set out flashers or triangles marking the presence of 
his truck, and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P.S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter father 
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran intc 
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I will take these as. given. 
Point I 
This contains the clearest statement of the general argument of tr 
appeal, and sets the stage for what follows. It is argued that although £ 
major portion of the trial revolved around the issue of proximate cause, 
almost all of the evidence proffered by Ostler was rejected by the trial 
court. As a result, when the trial court refused to direct a verdict agait 
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds that it is a matter of 
fact which should properly be determined by the jury (Point XI), the jury 
had seen none of the evidence which Ostler considered relevant this 
decision. 
In the absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit, 
this creates a serious problem for both procedural and substantive 
irness. In rejecting Ostler's evidence, the trial court gives either no 
jication that the reason for denying the jury access to the evidence was 
at the evidence was entirely without merit.2 Instead, the evidence is 
jected on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be 
elevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that 
would confuse the jurors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors 
ready were fully aware of the phenomena. The appeal argues that these 
ounds are all inadequate.3 
The "moth-phenomenon". Wheeler's failure to use emergency devices. 
id denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without truck in 
neraencv lane 
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory, 
lich is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail-lights, whether 
ishing or not, have a tendency to "lure" sleepy drivers towards them, 
uch as a moth is drawn to a light. Thus, if father Ostler was awake at 
e time of the accident, Wheeler's tail-lights might have exerted this 
jring" effect on him, causing him to drive into the back of Wheeler's 
jck . 
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triangles, Ostler 
as not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such 
wices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided. 
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the accident at the exact 
nation, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck 
id not been present in the emergency lane, it was most likely that the 
stler pick-up would have rolled unharmed into a field. 
At one point counsel for the defense raises a question about the qualifications of Mr. Hulbert to 
itify on the matter of the so-called "moth-phenomenon;" however, it is clear from the 
nscript of the trial that any alleged lack of expertise had nothing to do with the trial judge's 
cision to reject the evidence (Transcript of Trial, p. 245). 
I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their logical connections 
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In all three cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it 
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether fathe. 
Ostler was awake or asleep. Taking each point in isolation, might give 
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolation overlook 
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will be 
explained below, and that Ostler also proposed introducing evidence to 
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time 
of the accident. 
2. Was father Ostler awake? 
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern 
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of the 
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the 
pertinence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to 
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonable 
to allow the jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter. 
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisiv 
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate. 
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his 
claim that this ruling was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a 
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says tha 
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie support to a judgment 
that something is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jur\ 
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, thi 
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that the. 
evidence was not conclusive. It strikes me that if indeed this were the 
standard, there would be precious little for a jury ever to deliberate; all 
the evidence they would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable 
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear 
would be directed verdicts. 
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic 
Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the Court of 
Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. What attention 
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es give falls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, saying 
ly that "Plaintiff's own expert admitted that there was no conclusive 
ty to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the 
cidentM (Opinion, p 4) In light of Ostler's point, this statement is 
nply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context. 
Wheeler's violation of the 10-. 15- and 70- hour rules 
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in 
)lation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck 
ivers, in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that 
heeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane The 
levance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold. One, it contributes to his 
>gligence, the decision to rule it out because negligence was not 
levant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable. 
Dwever, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability 
chaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's 
>sition and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would 
feet whether and to what extent he should be held liable. Further, if 
heeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and 
*eded to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an 
tempt to stay awake, this would have a bearing on his culpability. The 
ourt of Appeals comments only that this (like all the other issues) "goes 
the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by 
rected verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant. See Utah R. Evid 402 
evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.")" (Opinion, p. 6). 
The purpose of the emergency lane, foreseeabihtv of possibility of 
jch an incident in designing highways, and Wheeler's foreseen such a 
oss ib i l i t v 
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues 
i show that, as an interstate truck driver. Wheeler was 1) aware of the 
tended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless 
lere was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to 
rovide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within, 
lowing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would 
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occasionally leave the road surface and stray into the emergency lane), 
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen. 
Insofar as foreseeability is relevant to proximate cause, this 
evidence clearly is related to that issue. It was disallowed on the grout 
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were 
"common knowledge." The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's rulin 
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fails to take account of 
the fact that one circumstance may relate to more than one issue,in thi: 
case the circumstances are relevant both to negligence and to proximatf 
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common 
knowledge. 
Admissibility of this evidence 
Ostler argues that all this evidence was relevant to the case and 
should have been admitted. In order to see that this is so, one needs to 
•understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appeals in 
order to support his contention that Wheeler-was negligent, one of the 
proximate causes of his injury and, therefore, liable. 
This type of argument is called a constructive dilemma; it is a w 
understood and valid form of argument.4 
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the 
accident. 
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a luring effect oi 
him, causing him to veer off the road; in the absence of flashers or 
triangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of the 
accident (father Ostler's driving itself being the other), and Wheeler is 
therefore liable for the accident. 
According to William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of I onic (London- 1962 
dilemma has been recognized as a valid mode of argumentation since the second century A.D., 
when it appears in the writings of Hermogenes (p. 178). 
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3. If, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, then while there 
ras no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane 
without flashers or triangles still remains as one of the proximate causes 
f the accident. Had the truck not been there, there would have been no 
ccident. Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes. 
4. Therefore, regardless of whether father Ostler was awake or 
isleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emergency lane stands as a 
)roximate cause of the accident, and consequently Wheeler is at least 
>artially liable for the accident.5 
To argue that taken piece-by-piece the evidence would not be helpful 
o the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it 
Drevented Ostler's constructing this argument; further,to argue that each 
Diece of evidence is disallowed because it relates to negligence and 
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of 
events. Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of 
Dur lives. For example, the fact that the sky is blue is surely relevant 
[pertains) to the artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make 
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying to explain the nature of our 
atmosphere and light's reaction to it. So too, the fact that all the 
evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto render it 
ineligible for consideration by the jury in connection with the issue of 
proximate cause. This is especially so given the fact that the issue of 
proximate cause was the key to the decision. The Court of Appeals' 
decision shows absolutely no appreciation of this fact, and in no sense 
addresses it. Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion 
clearly demonstrates this. 
b
 A similar argument can be constructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or 
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency 
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most 
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; had he not been asleep, the devices would 
have alerted him to the truck and allowed him to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the 
accident would have been avoidable; therefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the 
time of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate 
causes of the accident. 
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Further, in several instances the evidence was ruled out on the 
grounds that the jury already knew everything being discussed; afterall, 
they had driven of interstate highways, driven at night, etc. Ostler 
presents strong evidence that under one, and perhaps the most relevant, 
standard of admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge misapplied 
the law and held Ostler's witnesses to too high a standard. The Court of 
Appeals simply endorses the trial court's ruling, and had no discussion o* 
Ostler's arguments against this decision. 
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded 
it concerns information which in within the common knowledge of the 
jury. Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of 
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) an 
since we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to 
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them. 
However, under Rule 702 which supersedes the common law standard, thi. 
requirement is relaxed. It is now no longer necessary to show that the 
expert knows something that the jury doesn't know, all that is necessary 
is that the expert be able to make the facts perspicuous to the jury and 
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case. 
Rule 702 states 
If scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will ass is t the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge,
 skill, experience, training or 
education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added.) 
Under Rule 702, an expert can be employed if 
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of 
fact in understanding evidence that is simply 
difficult [though] not beyond ordinary 
understanding. 
United States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd 
Cir. 1985) (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18). 
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues that the jury was fully capable of 
derstanding all the excluded evidence, but that it was essential to have 
it evidence placed clearly before them. Specifically: 1) Members of 
) jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not 
tail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so 
to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might 
nk possible only for driver who was in fact asleep. 2) There is no 
ason to suppose that the jurors knew about the different reactions 
used in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights, blinking tail-lights, and 
res: or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like 
at at issue. 3) It is unclear that the average driver actually 
iderstands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal 
iservation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not). 4) 
Dr is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the 
ightest idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to 
gnificantly higher standards than are ordinary drivers. 
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand, not only did the 
ry need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is 
/erwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as 
te higher common law standard requires). Not knowing these facts has a 
ear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part, 
nd on a judgment of Wheeler's liability. 
Yet the trial judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that 
o expertise was needed to understand it. The Court of Appeals argues 
lat in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was 
ubstantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial 
jdge's ruling. It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide 
iscretion in such matters; and that to overrule the trial judge's decision 
/ithout exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of this 
l i scre t ion. 
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's 
;ase it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend 
he nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's case. 
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The Court of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could 
take: each and every piece of evidence taken in isolation would by itself 
make or break the case. However, as indicated above, Ostler's argument is 
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying 
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell his side of th 
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to 
make an essentially comparative judgment. 
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or 
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimur 
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with 
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative 
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only one case (comparing. 
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its 
decision was whether Wheeler's story made sense; since they had no 
alternative account of the situation, they could not compare that story 
with another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what 
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler's story was coherent, as it is, 
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been 
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new 
deliberation (comparing A to B, where A and B are two different 
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove 
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a 
failure to read the-briefs carefully. 
Point II and Point III 
Restricted cross-examination of Wheeler concerning search for a place to 
urinate 
Wheeler's violation of federal regulations M0-. 15-. and 70- hour rules) 
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment bv bad act 
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The 
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it 
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler's claim 
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this is a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and 
ility. The Court of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back 
e again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is 
ropriately excluded. There is no evidence that the Court of Appeals 
reciates this argument for the dual nature of the testimony. 
nt IV 
statements during closing defendant's closing statement 
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the issue 
s not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a driver might at some 
e run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have 
eseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his 
ck at just that time. 
[T]he foreseeability question is: How was Stan 
Wheeler expected to foresee that at that precise 
time, if as Mr. DeBry said, one in a billion chances 
that it would happen right at that particular t i m e -
q u o t e d in Opinion, p. 8). 
is clearly is not the standard to foreseeability; if it were, no one would 
er be able to foresee anything. 
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to 
'ect the juror's to their instructions. He did not rule on the objection, 
aarly leaving the misstatement uncorrected . In some cases this might 
ive caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it 
luses harm. The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to 
e instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear, 
)mplicated and difficult to understand. This will be discussed in more 
3tail under Point X below. 
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together 
ith Point V. The Court of Appeals notes that the jury was directed to its 
istructions, and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm, 
his decision and the reasoning behind it reflects the Court of Appeals' 
ailure to take the misstatement and its correction in context, viz. the 
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larger context of the legal issues involved in the jury's deliberations ant 
the fact that their instructions on these matters were unclear and 
confusing. 
Point V 
Who Pavs 
This is related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading 
statement made during closing. Here there is only an implication that th 
defendants would have to pay out of their own pockets; hence it is less 
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformatioi 
was clearly stated. The Court of Appeals' ruling on this point seems we 
taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with 
this, the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV. 
Point VII 
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares or 
t r i ang les 
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C. 
regulations requiring that they be set out were read to jury. 
Whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the shoulder of 
a highway from any cause other than necessary 
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible, 
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning 
devices [flares or reflective triangles] (I.C.C. rule, 
quoted in Appeal, p. 41). 
Therefore, it is clear that Wheeler had a duty to set out the 
devices. However, the jury was clearly instructed that this was not so. 
Instead they were told that the regulations required that the devices be 
set out only if the driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer o_r, if parkt 
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances. 
However if you find that defendant Wheeler was 
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to 
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determine whether or not Wheeler should 
nevertheless have set out the flares or triangles 
under the existing circumstances (appeal p. 42). 
This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the 
smergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the 
Iriver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even 
f substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relates only to 
legligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal. 
Ostler's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that 
ruckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g., 
Dutting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the 
udge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were 
:orrect (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to 
olace emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the 
actual rule clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler 
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary 
drivers. 
Further, it is not to the point to say that failure to set out warning 
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is 
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have 
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals' 
judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation 
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply 
left with two conflicting statements, both dealing with w highly relevant 
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict. 
Point IX 
Video taoe demonstration 
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide 
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause. Since 
these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the 
"cause" (Wheeler's truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not 
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth 
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of a counterfactual (a "contrary to the facts" or a "what if" case). The 
idea is to see what was contributed to the situation by the negligent act; 
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have transpired?" or 
"what if the truck hadn't been there; what would have happened then?" 
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see 
how a video showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have 
obtained at the time of the accident, but without the truck in the 
emergency lane, could have been anything but helpful. 
The trial court disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the 
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enactment; it was not simila 
enough to the incident to count as a re-enactment. Second, that it was 
just "speculation" ( Opinion, p. 5), and as such would not help the jury. 
The second is either misguided, or if not misguided then such as to 
call for a through-going revision of legal standards. In deciding these 
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the 
truck in fact not been there, there would be facts to consider, but then 
there would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing 
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be 
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the 
determination itself, not the video, that is confusing. 
Therefore, everything rests on the first ground; and this is in fact 
the ground most discussed by the Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues 
that the standard of similarity applies only to re-enactments, where an 
attempt is made to come as close as possible to duplicating the actual 
accident. In such, a case, similarity would be very relevant and should be 
taken very seriously. However, this was not the intention in this case. 
Here it is apparent and unargued that the video depicted a scene that coulc 
0J2i have occurred on the night father Ostler ran into Wheeler's truck; the 
point of the video is .illustrative, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on 
the issue of proximate cause. 
In ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong 
test: relevance, similarity and non-confusing. It decided that the video 
failed the first two. It then considered the argument that the video was 
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a re-enactment, but an illustration; and upheld the trial court's ruling 
the ground that Ostler did not show that disallowing it did any harm or 
t the trial court abused its discretion. 
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. The very nature 
decision of proximate cause and superseding intervening causes is by 
nature confusing. In view of the vast body of evidence already denied 
jury for its deliberations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim 
t showing them the video would be confusing. At this stage of the trial 
video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making the point that 
leeler's truck was not simply someth ing for father Ostler's truck to hit 
though he would have hit something else or rolled over if it hadn't been 
re), but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident 
the sort that occurred. The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries 
) not causally overdetermined,6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary 
jsal factor. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see 
s point. 
int X 
mrt's instructions on intervening causes was incorrect. 
Ostler objected on several points: 
1. "Intervening independent cause" was undefined. 
2. Foreseeabihty was not the only test of causation 
3. Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to 
be the standard of foreseeability. 
4 The instructions were confusing. 
If something is causally overdetermined. it will occur whether or not one of the causes 
curs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and after I take them you 
ally shoot me, we can say that my death was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting 
nstant. even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot 
J, I die. 
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the 
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as 
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were 
therefore harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof 
that the instructions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion. 
This decision one again fails to take account of dual nature of son: 
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in whit 
the instructions were given and the evidence available to the jury. The 
jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear 
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I). Taken in this context, Ostler's 
case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision 
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instruction 
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals' reasoning indicates. 
Point XI 
Directed verdict on causation 
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked 
deliberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were 
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the 
judge were unclear and confusing. In view of this it seems at least 
unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however 
the case at hand the error runs even deeper. 
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds th. 
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a similar 
verdict on causation. The defendant's response claims that if this were 
allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and 
causation; this is simply not so. Ostler argues only that in this case is 
there an implication from negligence to causation; this does not imply 
that there is such an implication in every case. 
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild 
animals in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running int 
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked 
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lext to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any 
ase. The case at hand is not of this sort. Here the negligence implies 
:ausation. This is shown by asking what it was that made the act of 
)arking in the emergency lane negligent. The answer is two-fold: 1) risk 
o a class of persons which included Ostler and 2) subjecting Ostler to 
he hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60). 
Thus, causation is implied by negligence. 
The realization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's 
jriving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the 
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that injury. The standards cited 
Dy Ostler clearly support this contention.7 
Ostler goes on to argue that in this case the 'standard for a directed 
/erdict is met: reasonable minds cannot disagree. They cannot disagree 
oecause the answer follows by definition from the earlier verdict. In the 
Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 62, Ostler makes this clear: " The fact 
that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated 
by the following question: What risks of harm (other than accidents with 
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are 
apparent." Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree; 
otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic. If we 
are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even 
though we are reasonable 
The present case is of this unfortunate sort. The jurors were led to 
draw the wrong conclusion not because it was an open question, but 
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw 
the correct conclusion. They were neither allowed to judge the issue of 
causation as a simple matter of fact, because they were denied access the 
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III, VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to 
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed. 
The illustrative cases in Restatement of Torts. 2d, 442 A and B. 447 and 449 are especially 
clear and illuminating on the issue at hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44.) 
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for their decision to reject the appeal 
are confusing. First it is stated that generally proximate causation is 
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be 
true in general; but Ostler has argued that it is not true in this case. 
Moreover, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to 
relevant evidence and could not make the determination. The Court of 
Appeals' decision does not address this argument. 
Second the Court of Appeals states that "'proximate cause' is one of 
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Opinion, p. 10). This 
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence. 
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason 
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals 
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally 
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contradicts any of 
Ostler's arguments or contentions. In short, the entire section on p. 10 
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning. 
Conclusions 
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion 
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude that in 
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account 
many important aspects of the arguments made in the appeal; at several 
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fails to 
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fail to grasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals could all have made the same errors 
in analysis. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
single judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and required. 
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EXHIBIT C 
The Court's Instruction No. 27 reads as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27. If an injury arises 
from two distinct causes, consideration 
then must be given to the question 
whether the causal connection between the 
conduct of the party responsible for the 
first cause and the injury was broken by 
the intervention of a new, independent 
cause• 
If so, the person responsible for 
the first cause would not be liable for 
the injury. If, however, the intervening 
cause or the likelihood of an occurrence 
of the same general nature was foreseen 
or should reasonably have been foreseen 
by the person responsible for the first 
cause, then such person's conduct would 
be the proximate cause of the injury, 
notwithstanding the intervening cause, 
and he would be liable therefor. 
Thus, if you find the collision of 
the vehicle driven by Stephen Ostler with 
a tractor-trailer of Albina Transfer 
Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of 
the highway, or the likelihood of an 
occurrence of the same general nature, 
was within the natural and continuous 
sequence of events which might reasonably 
be foreseen to follow the actions of 
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that 
the actions of Stanley wheeler were a 
concurring proximate cause of the 
collision, even thought the later 
negligent act of Stephen Ostler co-
operated to cause the accident. 
But if the actions of Stephen Ostler 
in causing the collision were of such 
character as not reasonably to be 
foreseen in the natural and continuous 
sequence of events started by Stanley 
Wheeler, then the acts of Stephen Ostler 
are the independent intervening cause 
and, therefore, the sole proximate cause 
of the injury. 
EXHIBIT D 
The major flaw in Instruction No. 27 is that the 
r m intervening independent cause (as introduced in the 
rst paragraph of Instruction No. 25) is not defined for th< 
ry. The Restatement Torts,2d includes 13 sections defining 
at concept. (See Restatement §440-453.) Of course, all of 
ose sections are not relevant to this case; however, §447 
relevant. (For complete discussion of §447, see pages 13-
, above.) Other sections are also relevant. (See Point 
, below.) In the absence of a fair definition, the jury 
s left to flounder. 
Second, Instruction No. 25 assumes that "foreseea-
lity" is the only test which is important in determining 
usation in this case. That is simply wrong. A textual 
scription would be as follows: 
The Restatement, Torts,2d contains a 
detailed, definitional discussion of an 
intervening force—which by its active 
operation, may or may not prevent an 
actor's antecedent negligence from being 
a "legal" cause in bringing about harm to 
another person. . .The Restatement, 
Torts,2d, stresses some six elements as 
the important considerations in determin-
ing whether an intervening force is a 
superceding cause of harm to another, 
thus breaking the chain of causation. 
>eiser, The American Law of Torts, Vol. 3, §11.9 (1983) 
emphasis added). 
Third, the instruction says that, "if the actions 
: Stephen Ostler in causing the collision were. . .not 
>asonably to be foreseen. . .", the chain of causation was 
:oken. This is saying that the precise or specific manner 
: harm or accident ("the actions of Stephen Ostler") 
must be foreseeable. Instead, only a generalized risk of 
harm need be foreseeable; the specific sequence of events 
need not be foreseeable. Rees v. Albertsons, supra ; 
Restatement of Torts,2d §435, 'Foreseeability of Harm or Its 
Manner of Occurrence. 
Finally, Instruction No. 25 is hopelessly confus-
ing. It is likely that the judges of this Court will have to 
read that instruction two, three or four times to understand 
it. It is simply impossible for a lay person without three 
years of law school to have any idea of the meaning of that 
language. 
The object of jury instructions is to 
enlighten the jury on their probLems. 
Instructions should fit the facts shown, 
making them as clear in meaning and 
concise as possible in lay people's 
language without belaboring definitions. 
Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Ut.2d 186, 398 P.2d 24 
(1965). When instructions tend to confuse the jury, reversal 
is proper. Burton v. Fisher Controls, 713 P.2d 1137, on 
rehearing 723 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1986). 
EXHIBIT E 
OK - i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Regular October Term, 1989 November 29, 1989 
Jane Doe, 
v. 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
Shirlene Hafen, as personal 
representative ad litem of 
the Estate of Melvin Reeves, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 890331 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been considered, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered 
that a petition for Writ of Certiorari be, and the same is, granted as 
prayed. 
EXHIBIT F 
(Article Amicus Curiae Committee) 
Amicus Curiae Committee 
Insurance Advertising: Need to Protect 
Constitutional Right to Conduct Voir Dire 
You've seen them. They disgrace the 
pages of Tune, Newsweek, and other 
national publications. They are the 
"Lawsuit Crisis" ads invented by the 
Insurance Information Institute. A 
dejected high-school football player, a 
worried clergyman, or a polio victim 
stares at the reader. The text in these and 
other ads in the series claims that schools 
are canceling sports programs, doctors 
are refusing to deliver babies, cities are 
cutting services, and the clergy are re-
luctant to counsel their congregations. 
All because of the "Lawsuit Crisis." 
One purpose of this expensive public 
relations campaign is, of course, to drum 
up support for various tort reform pro-
posals in legislatures. But another ob-
jective is what former ATLA president 
Eugene Pavalon has deftly described as 
"poisoning the well." [See Advocate, 
Nov. 1989.] The ads reach potential 
jurors in personal injury cases and create 
the notion that by awarding large damage 
verdicts, even if supported by the 
evidence, the jurors are contributing to 
a public crisis. 
Efforts to block publication of this 
type of advertising have met with little 
success. In the view of most courts, the 
ads are noncommercial speech, entitled 
to the full protection of the first amend-
ment. See, e.g., New York Public Interest 
Research Group, Inc. v. Insurance Infor-
mation Institute, 531 N.Y.S.2d 1002 
(Sup. Ct. 1988). 
One safeguard in the hands of plain-
tiffs' attorneys is the right to voir dire 
potential jurors concerning their ex-
posure to such advertising and its effect 
on their ability to render a fair verdict. 
It is not a wholly satisfactory remedy, 
but it may be counsel's only opportunity 
to uncover and counteract poisoning the 
well. 
This was the position of attorney 
Glenn Beustring of Tulsa, Oklahoma, as 
his trial date approached in federal dis-
trict court. Beustring represented the 
widow of a police officer who was killed 
when the transmission of his cruiser slip-
ped out of park. Prior to trial of his prod-
ucts liability action against Ford Motor 
Co., Beustring moved to voir dire the 
panel concerning the "Lawsuit Crisis" 
ads. The trial judge refused, and the jury 
came back with a defense verdict. 
ATLA filed an amicus brief in the 
Tenth Circuit. 
ATLA's brief opens with a look at the 
origins of the advertisements in question. 
Plummeting interest rates in the mid-
1980s, following years of pathological 
price wars and abusive cash-flow under-
writing, caused panicked carriers to hike 
premiums and cancel coverage in a suc-
cessful effort to protect their balance 
sheets at the expense of policyholders. 
The Insurance Information Institute an-
nounced a $6.5 million advertising cam-
paign to "change the widely held percep-
tion of an insurance crisis to a perception 
of a lawsuit crisis." Journal of Com-
merce, Mar. 19, 1986. 
The ads are false and misleading. Ob-
jective studies confirm that there is no 
evidence of the litigation "explosion" 
that the ads decry. Moreover, as a 60 
Minutes investigation reported in a 
program that aired on Jan. 10, 1989, 
allegations of a crisis in obstetrical 
services, school sports, city services, 
and clergy malpractice have no basis in 
fact. 
Nevertheless, the ads are very effec-
tive. Dr. Elizabeth Loftus conducted 
empirical studies of the impact of a simi-
lar type of advertisement in the 1970s. 
She found that even a single exposure to 
the advertisements resulted in jurors' 
giving a substantially lower verdict in 
test cases. Loftus, Insurance Advertis-
ing and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68 
(Jan. 1979). 
ATLA argues that the right to uncover 
such a prejudical influence on the minds 
of jurors flows directly from the Okla-
homa constitutional guarantee of trial by 
jury. As a leading federal court explains, 
voir dire plays a critical role in securing 
the constitutional right to an impartial 
jury. Only by probing the attitudes of 
prospective jurors can counsel intelli-
gently exercise the right to challenge for 
cause or the right to peremptory chal-
lenges. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
As the Montana Supreme Court dis-
cerned a decade ago: 
When insurance companies inject the 
issue of insurance into the con-
sciousness of every potential juror 
through a high-priced advertising 
campaign, as has been illustrated in 
this case, they threaten every plaintiffs 
right to an impartial jury. In such 
cases, it is only fair that attorneys have 
some means to secure this right for 
their clients. Liberal voir dire is the 
best means to this end. 
Boroski v. Yost, 594 R2d 688, 694 
(Mont. 1979). See also King v. Westlake, 
572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978) (upholding 
voir dire concerning exposure to in-
surance industry ads). 
More recently, the Texas Supreme 
Court held that the right to trial by a fair 
and impartial jury guaranteed by the 
state constitution entitled plaintiff to voir 
dire concerning "Lawsuit Crisis" ads. 
Babcock v. Northwest Mem. Hosp., 767 
S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989). 
ATLA urges the Tenth Circuit to adopt 
this highly persuasive reasoning and 
hold that the district judge's refusal to 
conduct voir dire on potential jurors as 
requested was unconstitutional and 
reversible error. • 
Jeffrey Robert Wliite, ATLA assistant 
general counsel. 
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POINT FOUR 
WHEELER'S BRIEF FAILS TO EXPLAIN 
WHY THE "MOTH PHENOMENON" EVIDENCE 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY 
As explained in Points One, Two and Three, testimony on 
the "moth phenomenon" was not received during Ostler's case-in-
chief. The court reasoned that the "moth phenomenon" only works 
if the driver is awake to see the lights of the parked truck. 
The judge further ruled there was no showing that father Ostler 
was awake: 
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis for 
a determination on his part that there was a 
man that was either, that was not asleep or 
that the was merely Somewhat impaired in his 
appreciation of things around him. 
(R. 2226,) 
However, the defense offered several photographs into 
evidence showing how a parked truck would have appeared to father 
Ostler at various distances. (Exs. 53 through 68.) Ostler's 
brief explained that those photographs rest on exactly the same 
v 
factual basis as the "moth phenomenon." Specifically, the 
photographs of the parked truck are not material if father 
Ostler's eyes were not open to see the truck. (See Brief of 
Appellant, at p. 19.) But likewise, testimony on the "moth 
phenomenon" is not material if father Ostler's eyes were not 
open to "lure" him toward the lights. 
In short, the trial court should have admitted both 
defendants' nighttime photos of the truck and Ostler's rebuttal 
testimony on the "moth phenomenon"; or the trial court should 
have rejected both pieces of testimony. However, it was 
logically inconsistent to receive Wheeler's evidence (nighttime 
phenomenon." Both pieces of evidence were based on the 
foundation that father Ostler's eyes were open to see the parked 
truck. . 
Again, Oatlcr's brief was entirely silent on this 
critical issue! 
EXHIBIT H 
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Ra i Ostler's experts testif J that father 
Ostler was not asleep; but rather in a reduced state of 
awareness (sometimes called highway hypnosis). The basis for 
that testimony was as follows: First, Wheeler testified, by 
offer of proof, that father Ostler appeared as if he were 
awake: 
MR. WHEELER: "Well, it appeared to me as 
if the guy was driving in a daze. He 
cut over like he went, opps(sic), I'm off 
the road, and cut over figuring this 
truck was on the road, and just pulled 
right directly in behind me. And there 
was nothing I could do, just sit there 
and hold on.M 
QUESTION: "Was it a sudden cut or did he 
sort of gradually veer off?" 
ANSWER: "No, it was like he was changing 
lanes, like you change lanes going down 
the freeway." 
QUESTION: "Now prior to the time he made 
this fairly sudden lane change, what lane 
had he been in?" 
ANSWER: "I couldn't tell you that. I 
really couldn't. It looked, I just don't 
know, but you know it was very apparent 
that he was pulling, trying to get in 
behind me, that's the way I'm looking at 
it any way. It looked like he thought to 
himself, 'I'm off the road and that 
truck's on the road, and I'd better get 
in behind him. ' " -* 
(Tr. 256.) 
Second, the shallow angle of impact indicates to a 
reconstructionist that the driver was awake. If a driver 
fell asleep, the car would probably make a more sudden turn. 
(Tr. 249-250.) Ostler's expert was able to monitor this 
phenomenon in his sleep laboratory. (Tr. 251.) 
Jwheeler's observations were made through his rear view 
mirror. However, Ostler's expert has done special research 
with respect to mirrors on trucks. (Tr. 253.\ 
Thijuu, there was testimony that father Ostler had 
stated he was not tired at the previous road stop. (Tr. 
250. ) 
Fourth, there was a curve in the roadway just prior 
to thfe accident scene. If father Ostler had been asleep, he 
would have run straight off the road at the curve. (Tr. 
252* ) 
Fifth, there was testimony that a sleeping truck 
driver would relax to such an extent that he would not keep 
his foot on the gas. (Tr. 283.) In this case, the Ostler 
vehicle was travelling at approximately 48 miles per hour at 
impact. (R. 1029.) The inference is that father Ostler was 
not asleep or the Ostler vehicle would have slowed down more. 
(Tr. 2 8 3.) 
The court rejected all of this evidence. Thus, the 
court stated: 
I've heard nothing to indicate any basis 
for a determination on his part that 
there was a man that was either, that was 
not asleep, or that he was merely 
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of 
things around him. 
(Tr. 245-) 
This issue is controlled by Rule 104(b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
Preliminary Questions. When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, 
the introduction of evidence sufficient 
to support a finding of the fulfillment 
of the condition. 
EXHIBIT I 
YOU Pay for Plaintiffs' Lawyers 
I laintiffs1 attorneys, who file 
lawsuits on behalf of injured 
persons, often call the contingency 
fee they charge the key to the 
courthouse door. A contingency 
fee is an amount of money a 
person agrees to pay an attorney 
for services in conducting a 
lawsuit and is usually a percentage of the amount 
recovered. Plaintiffs' attorneys say the contingency fee 
allows everyone access to the courts—no matter how 
poor they are—because the plaintiff does not need 
money to file a suit. The fee is based on an attorney 
winning an award for the ciicnL If the client loses, the 
attorney receives no pay. 
Contigency system-spawns suits — 
Now with plaintiffs' attorneys claiming up to one-half 
of the damages awarded to their clients, the 
contingency fee is under attack. Many believe the 
contingency fee system is a prime reason for the 
increase in both the size and number of lawsuits filed 
in recent years. Tney claim it is in the lawyer's own 
interest to build the case to gain the biggest possible 
settlement. Others say the victim gets too little of the 
award money. 
The attorney's fee is only one deduction from the 
money awarded to the victim. Also taken out are the 
expenses of the lawsuit itself. When the two items are 
added together, you can understand why so many 
victims complained when they received less of the 
award than their attorneys. 
The money received by plaintiffs involved in asbestos 
injury lawsuits in the last 10 years provides an example 
of the problems associated with contingency fees. Of 
each dollar of damages awarded, 41 cents typically 
went to attorneys for their fees or expenses. 
Who really pays the fees? 
Who pays the planuffs' attorneys' contingency fees? It 
would be easy to say it is insurance companies and 
leave it at that. But ultimate!v it's vou—the 
consumer—who pays. It's your insurance premiums 
that are the source of the payments to these attorneys. 
Thus, these attorneys' fees cost you money daily. 
Some states have acted to correct the situation by 
putting a cap or maximum limit on the fee that a 
plaintiffs attorney can charge an accident victim. In 
other states, attorneys are required to file detailed 
statements showing how their settlements are spent— 
how much is needed to cover necessary expenses, how 
much to pay the attorney's fee, and how much to 
satisfy the victim's damages. 
Many state legislatures are considering other 
alternatives, as welL One such alternative is a siiding 
fee scale, with the percentage of the settlement that 
goes to the victim increasing as the settlement itself 
increases. Another idea is to make sure that customers 
of legal scr/iccs have adequate information available tc 
them when they shop for lawyers. For example, 
lawyers might be required to use a standard form 
itemizing the fee agreement. 
More ideas to consider 
Other measures deserving consideration include fines 
for filing frivolous lawsuits that are costly to defend, 
clog the courts, and require taxpayers to foot the bill 
for additional courtrooms, judges, and support 
personnel. Another possibility is awards for defense 
costs to people who successfully defend themselves anc 
prevail in suits, so they and their insurance companies 
don't have to pay for being proved innocent. 
We commend all efforts to bring legal costs into 
line and believe that it will serve ail aspects of the 
public to do so. 
Leo E. Denlea Jr. 
Chairman of the Board and 
Chief Executive Officer 
Farmers Group, Inc. 
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VIII. FACTS 
As Stephen Ostler was driving on return from 
California, towing another vehicle on a "dolly" behind a small 
pickup truck, his son, Ralph, plaintiff, was sleeping in the 
back of the pickup. At about 3:00 a.m. Ostler's compact pick-
up left the lane of traffic and struck the rear of the defen-
dants' truck parked on the shoulder of 1-15. The driver, 
Stephen Ostler, was killed instantly. Ralph Ostler, the 
plaintiff, was thrown onto the road and severely injured. 
Ralph Ostler sued the driver of the parked truck, the owner of 
the truck, and the employer of the driver. 
During trial, plaintiff conceded that his father, the 
driver of the small truck, was negligent and partially at 
fault in causing the accident. During the trial, the trial 
court directed a verdict against the trucker for negligence. 
The central issue at trial was proximate cause. 
The jury returned a verdict for defendant finding 
that Stephen Oslter's negligence (the driver of plaintiff's 
vehicle) was the intervening and sole proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed Ostler v. 
Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989). 
XI. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CERTIORARI IS IMPROPER, THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED 
APPROPRIATELY UPON THE CASE AND CONTROVERSY 
Plaintiff's counsel states that Certiorari is proper 
because the Court of Appeals " . . . departed from the accept-
ed and usual course of judicial proceedings. . . " R. Utah 
S.Ct. 43(3) (1989). Yet Plaintiff fails to state what consti-
tutes the facts specifying the "so called" departure from the 
accepted and usual course of proceedings. 
Plaintiff cites an affidavit of Ms. Hannah, a philo-
sophy teacher at the University of Utah. He claims the affi-
davit is a part of the Utah Court of Appeals record. The 
affidavit was filed with the Petition for Rehearing filed by 
the Plaintiff. Filing a paper, not part of the record on 
appeal, as an attached exhibit does not make the attachment a 
part of the official record, as set forth in Rule 11(d)(2)(B) 
of the Rules of Utah Supreme Court or Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. Therefore the affidavit 
of Patricia Hannah is not a part of the record and the state-
ments made by her are of no consequence to the issue of Cer-
tiorari for claimed unusual judicial proceedings. 
Although the affidavit is not part of the record and 
thus not to be considered by the Court or the decision making 
process, some of the statements of Ms. Hannah should be 
Ms. Hannah also concludes that "the Court of Appeals 
failed to take into account many important aspects of the 
argumentation made in the appeal." Id. at 6. The appeals 
courts have discretion in those issues to be addressed in the 
opinion. They are not required to address each and every 
issue on appeal. As stated in State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 
(1989) : 
this Court need not analyze and 
address in writing each and every argument, 
issue, or claim raised and properly before 
us on appeal. Rather, it is a maxim of 
appellate review that the nature and extent 
of an opinion rendered by an appellate court 
is largely descretionary with that court. 
In applying this principle to cases before 
us, we have, after fully considering the 
substance of particular claims raised on 
appeal, summarily (and often without written 
analysis) dismissed the same as meritless or 
of no effect. (Emphasis added) 
State v. Carter. 776 P.2d at 888-89 (Footnotes omitted). 
Without qualifying Ms. Hannah as an expert in legal 
analysis and the common law of Utah, it is ludicrous to con-
clude that since the Court failed to address every issue, 
there has been a break down of the judicial process and that 
the Supreme Court should grant Certiorari because the Judges 
of the Court of Appeals can not write a passing paper. 
The next to the last sentence in the opinion states, 
"We have reviewed other issues raised by plaintiff and find 
them to be without merit." Ostler, 781 P.2d at 451. The 
In the present case, the trial court followed the 
very authorities cited by the plaintiff and did apply the 
appropriate law of proximate cause and did submit the issue of 
proximate cause to the jury. 
Early in the trial, the trial court determined that 
Wheeler, the driver of the truck parked on the shoulder of the 
highway, was per se negligent and directed a verdict of negli-
gence against him based on Wheeler's violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-103(i)(1988). Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 
P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989). However, the Court of Appeals 
stated that the trial court, 
reserved the issue of whether Wheeler's 
negligence was "proximate cause" of the 
accident. The jury eventually concluded 
that Stephen Ostler's negligence was the 
"intervening and sole proximate cause" of 
the plaintiff's injuries, and rendered a 
special verdict for defendants. 
Id. at 446-447. 
Plaintiff claims the Court of Appeals erred by its 
affirmance of the trial court's submission to the jury. 
Plaintiff contends that solely because defendant violated the 
statute, defendant is both negligent and the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injuries. (Substitute Petition for Certiorari 
at 7). 
However, under established Utah law as cited by 
Plaintiff's counsel, the question of proximate cause is an 
issue for the jury. And, 
in Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d at 450-451, the 
Court of Appeals clearly addresses more than jury-instruction 
confusion. The Court of Appeals says the challenged instruc-
tion 
must also be considered in the context of 
the instructions as a whole . . . Other 
instructions propose plaintiffs1 theory of 
the case, i.e., "concurrent negligence," and 
add meaning to the instruction at issue. 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. at 451 (Citations omitted). 
The Court of Appeals found the jury instructions as a 
whole satisfy necessary legal requisites. It is a general 
rule that jury instructions should be considered as a whole 
when determining whether issues have been adequately covered. 
Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). The 
Court in Godesky states, 
The Court cannot be said to have failed to 
properly instruct the jury when requested 
instructions are fully covered in other 
instructions given. 
Id. at 545 (Citations omitted). 
Notwithstanding the correctness of the jury instruc-
tions as a whole. Instruction No. 27, itself, includes the 
elements of law plaintiff's counsel contends it lacks. See, 
Plaintiff's Substitute Petition for Certiorari at 10 (Plain-
tiff's listing of supposed deficiencies in Instruction No. 
27). Instruction No. 27 defines independent intervening cause 
in the totality of its language. The instruction as a whole 
to look at the Instructions. They set forth 
the law in that regard. Statement of coun-
sel is to be disregarded except as it is 
accurate. See. Hall v. Blackham. 18 Utah 2d 
164. 417 P.2d 664. 666 (1966) (no prejudi-
cial error shown where court admonishes jury 
following remarks during closing argument). 
Ostler. 781 P.2d at 450 (emphasis added). 
Also. Plaintiffs citation and interpretation of 
State v, Shickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). misconstrues the 
requirements upon the trial court to dispel mistakes of coun-
sel. In Shickles a prosecutor misstated the law twice during 
his closing argument and misled the jujry as to the effect of a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Shickles, 760 
P.2d at 298. The Shickles court found fault with the trial 
court because "the trial judge did nothing to dispel the er-
roneous impression created; indeed the trial judge did not 
even rule on the objection." Shickles. 760 P.2d at 299. The 
Shickles court finds that the criminal defendant. 
through an appropriate channel, such as a 
curative instruction or statement by the 
judge, will be entitled to inform this jury 
of such procedures. [quoting Dipert v. 
State. 259 Ind. 260. 262. 286 N.E. 2d 405 
(1972)] 
Shickles. 760 P.2d at 300 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, even though the alleged mis-
statement is disputed, the trial judge did give a curative 
statement. And. according to the Shickles court, all that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to is to have the "jury rule 
criteria for granting certiorari as specified in the Rule. 
Although one issue is similar in the two cases they are not 
identical. 
In Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1989), the 
issue briefed for appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals regarded 
plaintiff's counsel's specific guestions in an attempt to bias 
the jury. Plaintiff's counsel claimed he wanted to discover 
potential jurors interest in insurance companies which would 
inject the concept of insurance into the lawsuit. Doe also 
contained the so called "tort reform11 propaganda of the in-
surance companies. 
In contrast, in the present case, the voir dire issue 
is that of the "tort reform," not a specific question to in-
ject insurance. Thus, Plaintiff's counsel would like to grant 
certiorari in a case that has only a sub-issue which is simi-
lar to Doe v. Hafen. The Doe case contained other issues that 
are not in the case at bar. Some of the other issues are: 
Should the Court have allowed Reeve's widow 
to sit at counsel table during voir dire? 
Did the Court properly admit evidence of 
plaintiff's miscarriage and voluntary ster-
ilization? Did the court award prejudgment 
interest as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§28-27-44 (1987). 
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457. 
This case has many complex issues, such as the exclu-
sion of testimony of the "moth phenomenon" or lure effect, 
federal regulations, exclusion of a video tape that purported 
to reconstruct the accident, impeachment of a witness, pur-
to post warning devices was negligence and caused plaintiff's 
injury. But. such a theory is not an independent alternative 
basis of liability, but rather a redundant portion of plain-
tiff's "first" theory of negligence -- the drivers negligence 
in parking in the emergency lane. 
Plaintiff's alternative theory is not an independent 
basis of liability itself. Obviously, the truck driver would 
not be neligent if he did not park along the freeway and did 
not post the warning devices. The basis of the truck driver's 
liability is his parking the truck. Because the truck 
driver's negligence had already been determined by the Court 
as a matter of law. no additional issue of negligence was 
required to be submitted to the jury 
There is no alternative chain of causation as Plain-
tiff claims, rather there are circumstances which tend to show 
the trucker was negligent, such as the length of time he was 
parked, in what position he was parked, and whether flares 
were displayed where he was parked. Since the negligence had 
been determined, the trial court properly submitted only the 
issue of proximate cause to the jury. 
POINT VII 
CERTIORARI IS IMPROPER BECAUSE CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF 
COUNSELS ASSERTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ADEQUATELY 
CONSIDERED THE ISSUE OF EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY BY 
OSTLER'S EXPERTS 
Plaintiff's counsel contends that if he had been 
allowed to offer foundational proof of whether Stephen Ostler 
Certainly, these are reasoned explanations given by 
the Court of Appeals as to why the evidence should not have 
been allowed. 
Even if the preliminary question of fact (whether 
Father Ostler was awake) was the sole basis for the Court of 
Appeals1 determination, to exclude the evidence of the expert 
witness, such exclusion does not beg the question. As the 
United States Supreme Court stated in Huddleston. 
the court simply examines all the evidence 
in the case and decides whether the jury 
could reasonably find this conditional] 
fact . . . by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 
Huddleston v. United States. 485 U.S. at . 99 
L.Ed. 2d 771. 782-83 (1988)(emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals in essence states that no jury 
could reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance 
of the evidence. The Court of Appeals says. "Even Plaintiff's 
own experts admitted that there was no conclusive way to de-
termine Stephen Ostlers state of consciousness prior to the 
accident." Ostler. 781 P.2d at 448. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
ruling that the jury could not reasonably find that Father 
Ostler was awake or asleep by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and affirms the trial court's exclusion of the expert's testi-
mony. Such action of the Court of Appeal was appropriate 
considering Huddleston. and the Utah Rules of Evidence. This 
exclusion of evidence was within the broad discretion of the 
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Injured automobile passenger brought 
4<iion against driver and owner of other 
chicle to recover for injuries The Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Cullcn Y 
'hnstensen J entered indtrmpnt nn mrv 
1 Jur> €^UltK) 
Voir din* in automobile accident ca~se 
sufficient!) addressed plaintiff's concerns 
of potential bias against large monetarv 
awards where court, in lieu of plaintiffs 
proposed questions asked juror* if the) 
would object to awarding amount of dam 
ages being asked for and whether the\ 
were capable of rendering fair and true 
verdict ba.sed on evidence 
2 Kvidence <s=>99 
Probative value of evidence is deter 
mined on basis of need and its ability to 
make existence of consequential fact more 
or less probable Rules of Evid , Rule 403 
3. Evidence <s=>555.8(l) 
Expert testimony regarding "moth 
phenomenon," offered in injured passen-
ger's suit to explain why dnver veered off 
highway and struck parked truck, was 
properly excluded for lack of foundation, 
there was no evidence that dnver was 
awake prior to night-time accident or that 
parked truck had lights on which would 
"lure" dnver 
4. Evidence «=»359(6) 
Videotape of vehicle dnving off road 
way at actual accident location, purporting 
to show that no mishap would have oe 
curred had truck not been parked on road 
shoulder, was properly excluded from in 
jured passenger's negligence suit, video 
tape differed from actual accident in that it 
was produced dunng daylight conditions 
and employed alert, professional stunt dnv 
er Rules of Evid , Rules 401, 403 
5. Appeal and Error e=M056.1(3) 
Even if exclusion of federal motor 
earner regulations and road safety and de 
sign evidence was error, in injured passen 
4 4 6 Uuh 781 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
and prejudicial, court had already ruled 
that parking of truck v,as negligence as 
matU r of 11\* and jur\ *a,s as capabk a> 
ix|Krt in making determination of fori see 
ahilit) Rules of Evid Rule 402 
6 Automobiles «=»243<3) 
Question of how long truck had boon 
parked on shoulder of highway prior to 
accident was properly excluded as irrele-
vant, evidence would have gone to issue of 
truck driver's negligence, which issue had 
already been resolved by directed verdict 
7 Appeal and Error «=1060 1(8). 1060 6 
Negligence defendant's closing argu 
ment, reflecting fact that judgment could 
be entered against defendants but not indi 
eating source of funds to pay such judg 
ment, was not unfairly prejudicial defen 
dant did not improperly state that insur 
ance would or would not pay judgment and 
thus did not improperly elicit sympathy or 
temper size of any award Rules of Evid , 
Rule 411 
8. Trial <s=>133 6<4) 
Any harm in negligence defendant's 
closing argument's misstatement of law of 
foreseeability was negated by court's ad 
monishment to disregard statements of 
counsel as to law, and look only to court s 
instructions 
9. Trial <3=>261 
Court properly rejected negligence 
plaintiffs suggested expansion of causa 
tion instruction, any expansion of given 
instruction would likely have impaired, 
rather than enhanced, jury's comprehen 
sion of issue 
10 Automobiles <3=3245<50) 
Issue of proximate cause in automobile 
accident was for jury, evidence tended to 
establish that proximate cause was not 
only in substantial dispute but was very 
essence of controversy between parties 
Robert J DeBry, Daniel F BerUh War 
ren W Dnggs, and Dale F Gardiner (ar 
M Daylc J«.ffs (argued) and Robert L 
Jeffs Provo, for defendants third partv 
plaintiffs drid respondents 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
JACKSON, JJ 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge 
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict 
against him in a negligence action We 
affirm 
On the night of April 18, 1984, plaintiff 
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father 
Stephen home to Utah from a business tnp 
to California At approximate^ 3 00 am 
the Ostler's compact pickup was north 
bound on Interstate 15, a few miles south 
of Payson, Utah Stephen Ostler was dnv 
mg For unknown reasons, the pickup left 
the lane of traffic and struck the rear of a 
truck and semitrailer unit parked on the 
paved shoulder of the roadway Stephen 
Ostler was killed instantly Plaintiff, who 
had been sleeping on the bed of the pickup 
was thrown onto the roadway and critically 
injured 
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist 
down as a result of his injuries He 
brought a personal injury action in the 
district court against the driver of the 
semitrailer (defendant Stanley E Wheeler), 
the driver's employer (defendant AJbma 
Transfer Co, Inc), and the semitrailer 
owner (defendant F & R Roe, Inc ) Din-
ing the five-day trial, plaintiff conceded 
that Stephen Ostler was negligent and par 
tially at fault for the accident Early in the 
trial the court determined that Wheeler 
was also negligent and directed a verdict of 
negligence against him The basis for this 
ruling was that Wheeler had parked hiir 
semitrailer on the shoulder of a controlled 
access highway in violation of Utah Cod* 
Ann § 41-6-lOJOXi) (1988) The court n 
served the issue of whether Wheeler's ne^ 
hgence was a proximate cause" of th* 
accident The jury eventually conclude*: 
that Stephen Ostler's negligence was th< 
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verdict for defendants Plaintiff appeals 
from the \crdict, alleging numerous errors 
(!) 
VOIR DIRK 
We first address plaintiffs claim 
that jury voir dire was inadequate to reveal 
bias related to a "tort reform" advertising 
campaign conducted by a national msur 
ance company It is obvious from the trial 
transcript that the gust of plaintiffs ques 
tions went to the issue of potential juror 
bias against large monetary awards 
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires the court to permit the 
parties to supplement voir dire with ques-
tions that are material and proper How-
ever, the court has considerable discretion 
to "contain voir dire within reasonable lim-
its." Hornsby v Corporation of the Pre-
siding Bishop, 758 P 2d 929, 932-33 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) Whether that discretion has 
been abused is determined from the totality 
of the questioning. Doe v. Ha/en, 772 P.2d 
456, 457-58 (Utah CtApp 1989). 
In heu of plaintiffs proposed questions, 
the judge informed the venire that plain-
t i ffs claim may exceed a million dollars 
and asked if any would object to an award 
of that magnitude. None did. The judge 
also asked if any of the prospective jurors 
believed that people should not resort to 
the courts to settle disputes or recover 
damages for injuries. Again, none did. 
The judge followed with a question asking 
whether any believed they were incapable 
of rendering a fair and true verdict based 
on the evidence. None responded affirma-
tively. In their totality, and in context 
with the remainder of voir dire, these ques-
tions are substantively responsive to plain-
t i ffs concerns and appear sufficient to re-
veal " tor t reform" bias in the manner dis-
cussed in Doe, 772 P.2d at 458-59. Plain-
tiff, therefore, has not shown an abuse of 
discretion in the court's voir dire of pro-
spective jurors. 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
of proffered testimony from two experts 
The excluded evidence covered a variety of 
topics, including a scientific theory referred 
to as the "moth phenomenon," certain fed 
eral motor earner regulations, road safety 
and design, and a videotape prepared for 
plaintiff that purported to show what 
would have happened if the semitrailer had 
not bevn unlawfully parked 
12] The general rule regarding the ad 
mission or exclusion of evidence is that the 
trial court's decision will not be overturned 
in the absence of an abuse of discretion 
Pearce v Wistisen, 701 P 2d 489, 491 (Utah 
1985) Witnesses qualified as experts may 
testify if "scientific, technical, or other spe 
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to deter 
mine a fact in issue " Utah R.Evid 702 
However, "(ijt is within the discretion of 
the trial court to determine the suitability 
of expert testimony in a case and the quali-
fications of the proposed e x p e r t " State v 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982) 
(decided under former rule) Although 
such testimony may be relevant, it may be 
excluded if the court determines "its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence." Utah R Evid 403. The 
probative value of evidence is determined 
on the basis of need and "its ability to 
make the existence of a consequential fact 
either more or less probable " State v 
Johnson, 115 Utah Adv Rep 6, 8, — P 2d 
, (1989) (quoting State v 
Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1989)) 
13) We have examined the record and 
can find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's decision to exclude the testimony of 
two of plaintiffs seven experts It is quite 
clear that the reason or reasons why Ste-
phen Ostler's vehicle slammed into the rear 
of Wheeler's semitrailer could not h*» AOHK 
D i - : - i . / / 
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I vni if sii<.n i tlu or\ i^  a inussibh un It r 
th< thn hold rciniin nunl of uilu n nl it lia 
biht\ s<< .V<i/< i I\im?it(u>ch 77r> I 'Ai 
{s.h HS MM (l)Uh T)h()) the tlxorv is 
pri HUM o on the fait that a driver must lx 
«iu ik( in ordt r to IK SO lured Plain 
tiffs own <\ptr t idmitted that there was 
no IOIHIIMV( wa\ to determine Stephen 
OstU r s sUU of cons< lousness prior to the 
ioci<1t nt Nor does the theory nece'ssanlv 
esUhhsh causation because plaintiffs ex 
j>ert conceded that there wa.s no evidence 
of tiie factors triggering the moth phenom 
enon Without this foundation, the court 
determined that the expert testimonv on 
the moth phenomenon would not be helpful 
to the jury, and furthermore, that it would 
be prejudicial to present an opinion based 
on such pure conjecture 
This is consistent with the principle that 
"anv expert evidence scientifically based 
or otherwise" must, on balance, "be helpful 
to the trier of fact " Id at 398 n 8 Such 
evidence must be scrutinized carefully to 
avoid the 'tendency of the finder of fact to 
abandon its responsibility to decide the cn t 
ical issues and simply adopt the judgment 
of the expert despite an inability to accu 
rately appraise the validity of the underly 
ing sc ience" Id at 396 Whether the 
probative value of evidence is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect is a 
determination within the sound discretion 
of the trial court State v Johnson, 115 
Utah Adv Rep at 9, — P 2d at Un 
der rules 403 and 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence we conclude that the trial judge 
was within his discretion to exclude the 
testimonv 
(4) Similarly, the trial court concluded 
that plaintiffs videoUped demonstration 
wis more apt to be confusing to the jury 
than helpful The videotape depicted a 
compact pickup truck driving off the road 
way at the actual accident location It 
purported to show that no mishap would 
have occurred had Wheeler's truck not 
been parked on the road shoulder Plain 
tiff first AnruoH that the videoUoe was for 
other eases It is obvious however th it 
tlu film did not illustrate the accident but 
r i ther [Kirtraud pi unUffs prediction of 
events under i different set of facts \^ 
sm h the potential for unfair prejudice is 
illustrative evidence* v\as signific mt md 
the trial court was within its discretion to 
exc hide it 
Pluntiff alternaUveU argues that the 
videoUpe wa>> admissible as evidence 
Plaintiff cites LhRo^ano i Hawns 196 
fai App id 1224, 242 Cal Rptr 423 (19b7) 
for the projjosition that expenmenUl evi 
dencc is admissible provided it is conducted 
under subsUntially similar conditions as 
that of the actual incident "The standard 
that must be met in determining whether 
the proponent of the experiment has met 
the burden of proof of establishing the 
preliminary fact essential to the admissibih 
t) of the experimental evidence is whether 
the conditions were substantially identical, 
not absolutely identical " Id. 242 Cal Rptr 
at 426 (quoting Culpepper v Volkswagen 
of America Inc, 33 Cal App 3d 510, 521, 
109 Cal Rptr 110 (1973)) DiRosano lm 
poses two other requirements—that the ex-
perimental evidence be relevant and not 
consume undue time, confuse the issues, or 
mislead the jury IdL 242 Cal Rptr at 426 
In Whitehead v American Motors Sales 
Corp, 101 Utah Adv Rep 27, — P 2d 
(1989), the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
the Culpepper three-prong test in deter-
mining the admissibility of motor vehicle 
crash test films The court upheld the 
admission of the films into evidence and 
held that certain discrepancies between the 
films and the actual accident went to 
weight, rather than admissibility The cir 
cumstances of the accident were known 
and the films were offered to show the 
handling characteristics of similar vehicles 
In this case, application of the White-
head test supports exclusion of the evi-
dence Plaintiff admits that the videoUpe 
differed from the actual accident in that 
the videoUpe was produced during day-
light conditions and employed an alert, pro-
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II appears however thai the u>nditions of 
the films production *ere fir from similar 
to the actual auident The differences in 
lighting and driver .il« rtness and skill \MTe 
crucial The literal tontroversv, of this law 
suit is the inexplicable departure of a \ e 
hide from the lane of traffic The video 
tape does not and cannot depict the condi 
Uons that iaused thai departure An> oth 
er depiction is as the trial court concluded, 
not reconstruction but speculation In 
contrast to Whitehead, the circumstances 
of this accident are not known and there is 
no indication that the design characteristics 
of vehicles were responsible The discrep-
ancies between the film and plaintiffs acci 
dent seem to go l>eyond weight Since the 
film would not "make the existence of an) 
fact of consequence more probable 
than not" under Utah R Evid 401, we are 
not convinced plaintiff has satisfied the 
first two prongs of similarity and relevance 
under the Whitehead test 
Even giving plaintiff the benefit of our 
doubt as to the film's relevance and similar 
lty, we conclude that, m any event, the trial 
court properly excluded the videotape as 
substantive evidence on the grounds of po-
tential confusion See Utah R Evid 403 
Under Whitehead's third prong, such evi 
dence may be excluded in the court's dis 
cretion even if it is relevant, when a deter 
mination is made that it may confuse or 
mislead 101 Utah Adv Rep at 31, — 
P 2d at (trial court upheld although 
unclear whether court excluded evidence 
under rule 401 or 403, either theory of 
exclusion being proper) Since plaintiff has 
not demonstrated that the finding of poten 
tial confusion was an abuse of the court's 
discretion, we hold that the videotape was 
properly excluded 
[5] We last address plaintiffs claim of 
error regarding the exclusion of evidence 
on federal motor carrier regulations and 
road safety and design Plaintiff argues 
that this evidence was relevant to the issue 
of foreseeabihty under his theorv of con 
(Utah Apr 1**9) 
The lavs does not iu < ess ml \ retognpt 
onl\ one proximate < iuse of an mjur\ 
consisting of onl\ one fai tor one act or 
the conduct of onl\ one person To tlu 
contrary the acts md omissions of two 
or more persons m i\ work concurrent^ 
as the efficient cause of m mjurv and in 
such a case each of the participating 
acts or omissions is regarded in lav. as a 
proximate cause and both mav be held 
responsible 
We have examined the record and agree 
that some of this evidence ma> be relevant 
to the issue of foreseeabihtv Other e\i 
dence goes to the issue of Wheeler's negh 
gence, a matter previously decided b> di 
rected verdict, and may be excluded as 
irrelevant See Utah R Evid 402 ("Evi 
dence which is not relevant is not admissi 
ble") The court excluded the relevant 
portions of the expert's proffered testimo-
ny on the grounds that such evidence 
would not be particularly helpful to the 
jury The court believed that the jury was 
as capable as the expert to make the deter 
mination of foreseeability In any event, 
plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of 
showing that the claimed error was sub-
stantial and prejudicial See Ashton v 
Ashton, 733 P 2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987), 
Utah R Civ P 61 In the absence of such a 
showing, we consider plaintiffs claim to be 
without merit 
IMPEACHMENT 
(6] Plaintiff argues that the court's re 
fusal to permit him to show that Wheeler 
may have been parked on the shoulder oi 
the highway for as long as thirty minute* 
unduly restricted cross-examination Al 
though plaintiff concedes that the tna 
judge has broad discretion in regulating 
the scope of such testimony, see, c g 
Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv Rep at 28, — 
P 2d at , he claims that the cour 
abused its discretion by misapplying th< 
law Plaintiff claims that he was attempt 
4f)fl Utah 781 PACIFIC RKPORTKK, 2d SKKIKS 
It is unnecessary to resolve this argu 
ment when the alternate basis for the 
court's ruling is considered, namely, that 
the question of how long Wheeler had been 
parked ultimately went to the issue of 
Wheeler's negligence. Since that issue had 
been resolved by directed verdict, the e\ 
eluded testimony was irrelevant Similar 
ly, plaintiff claims that he was not permit 
ted to imi>each Wheeler with Wheeler's 
"pnor bad acts," specifically, Wheeler's vi-
olation of federal motor earner regulations 
These acts also concerned the issue of 
Wheeler's negligence and were properly ex-
cluded 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
[7] Plaintiff complains of statements 
made by defense counsel during closing 
a rgumen t Defense Counsel made the fol-
lowing remark: 
This case is to decide whether Wheeler, 
. . . F & R Roe and Albina are to pay for 
the injuries to Ralph, when Wheeler's 
actions were not the cause of the acci-
d e n t 
Plaintiff timely reserved an objection out 
of the presence of the jury. He now ar-
gues that the statement was improper, 
prejudicial, and untrue for the reason that 
"any recovery would come from the insur-
ance carrier," and that the remark unfairly 
implies that defendants would personally 
pay any damage award. 
We are not convinced that there is any 
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it 
reflects the fact that judgment would be 
rendered against the various defendants 
under joint and several liability, and does 
not indicate the source of funds to pay such 
a judgment. It does not inappropriately 
state that insurance would or would not 
pay any judgment, see Utah R.Evid 411, 
thus improperly eliciting sympathy or tem-
pering the size of any award Cf. Pnel v. 
R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N D.1986) 
("We are talking about money that my 
[H] Plaintiff also objected to th- folio* 
mg portion of defendants' closing argu 
ment 
|T]he foreseeabihty question is How 
uds S u n Wheeler expected to foresee 
that at that precise time if, as Mr PeBry 
said, one in a billion chances that it 
uould happen right at that particular 
tune— 
Plaintiff argues that this was a misstate-
ment of the lav* because "foreseeabihty 
relates to whether accidents of this general 
nature might happen " He further asserts 
that the statement was prejudicial and that 
"[t)he only explanation for [the] verdict is 
that the jury was confused by (defense 
counsel's] misstatements of the law " 
We disagree. Even if counsel's remarks 
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact 
appears to be negated by the court's ad-
monishment: 
The Jury is directed to look at the In-
structions. They set forth the law m 
that regard. Statement of counsel is to 
be disregarded except as it is accurate. 
See Hall v. Blackkam, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error 
shown where court admonished jury follow-
ing remarks dunng closing argument). 
When considered in the context of the en-
tire closing argument, plaintiffs objection, 
and the court's admonition, we conclude 
there was no unfair prejudice. See gener-
ally Halford v. Yandell, 558 S W 2d 400, 
411-12 (Mo.Ct.App.1977). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiff further assigns as error two 
jury instructions The first instruction in-
volved the placement of emergenc\ warn-
ing devices behind Wheeler's parked truck. 
We agree that the given instruction signifi-
cantly differed from plaintiffs requested 
instruction However, the instruction con 
cerned the issue of Wheeler's negligence 
We have already established that this issue 
had been taken from the jury Any error 
could not have affected the substantial 
rights of plaintiff, and was, therefore, 
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tion, claiming that the language is confus-
ing and incomplete. Plaintiff sought to 
further define and expand the given in-
struction. While it is true, as plaintiff ar-
gues, that jury instructions should be 
"clear in meaning and concise as possible in 
lay people's language without belaboring 
definitions," Johnson v. ComuKill Ware-
house Co.. 1G Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25 
(1965), the adoption of plaintiffs sugges-
tions would have run counter to this rule. 
Although we cannot ascertain from the 
record the rationale behind the trial court's 
overruling of plaintiffs objections, any ex-
pansion of the given instruction would have 
likely hindered, rather than enhanced, the 
jury's comprehension of the issue. 
The challenged instruction must also be 
considered in the context of the instruc-
tions as a whole. Madsen v. Broum, 701 
P.2d 1086, 1092 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah 1981). 
Other instructions propose plaintiffs theo-
ry of the case, i.e., "concurrent negli-
gence," and add meaning to the instruction 
at issue. Although plaintiff contends that 
the jury believed that causation meant 
"fault," he fails to support this supposition. 
We cannot delve into the jury's reasoning 
process, and cannot speculate what 
"cause" the jury assigned to the accident 
However, it is just as reasonable to pre 
sume, as in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 
455, 458 (Utah 1981), that the jury deter-
mined that the degree of Stephen Ostler's 
inattentivene8S was not foreseeable. Thus, 
"he failed to observe the situation he 
should have . . . [and] this later negligent 
act became the sole proximate cause of the 
collision." Id. Since plaintiff has failed to 
show that any alleged confusion was sub-
stantial and prejudicial, we reject plaintiffs 
claim of error. 
DIRECTED VERDICT ON CAUSATION 
We last address plaintiffs argument that 
the trial court erred in not directing a ver-
dict of proximate cause as a matter of law. 
O u r rov i^u/ n f n nYinWanem */\ •k.o ^nnlnl *C _ 
A motion for a directed verdict requires 
the trial court to consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party 
against whom it is directed. The case 
should not l>e taken from the jury where 
there is substantial dispute in the evi-
dence . . . On ap|>eal, this Court applies 
the same rules. 
(Citation omitted.) See also Cook Assocs., 
Inc. v. Warnick 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 
1983). 
The trial court reserved the issue of 
"proximate cause" after directing a verdict 
that Wheeler was negligent. "Proximate 
cause" is one of the essential elements of a 
negligence action, see Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985), and is specif-
ically "that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, (unbroken by an effi-
cient intervening cause), produces the inju-
ry and without which the result would not 
have occurred." Mitchell v. Pearson En-
ters., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). Proxi-
mate causation is generally a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury. Wat-
ters, 626 P.2d at 457-58. 
[10] The trial court denied plaintiffs 
motions for a directed verdict on the issue 
of causation. Under the applicable stan-
dard of review, we are required to view the 
evidence in defendants' favor. That evi-
dence, tending to establish that proximate 
cause was not only in substantial dispute, 
but was the very essence of the controver-
sy between the parties, indicates that the 
trial court properly declined to remove the 
issue from the jury. We find no error in 
the ruling below. 
In conclusion, none of plaintiffs claims 
constitute reversible error. We have re-
viewed other issues raised by plaintiff and 
find them to be without merit. The judg-
ment is affirmed. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
^ \ 
A P P E N D I X B 
Rule 43- Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a pane! of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A COMPARISON OF INSTRUCTION NO. 27 AND THE 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS DEMONSTRATES THE ERROR 
Plaintiff argues that the jury was not adequately 
instructed on the law of independent intervening cause. 
(Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari at p. 10.) 
Defendant responds with generalities. Defendant argues 
that: 
It is a general rule that jury instructions 
should be considered as a whole. . .Instruct-
ion No. 27 defines independent intervening 
cause in the totality of the language. The 
instruction as a whole satisfies the elements 
of law of proximate cause as stated in Re-
statement § 447. 
(Brief in Opposition to Substitute Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at p. 9-10.) 
Aside from these glittering generalities, defendant no 
where shows how or why or where Instruction No. 27 explains all 
of the elements of independent intervening cause. 
Unfortunately, there is no short-cut. In order to 
resolve this issue, this court must laboriously compare 
Instruction No. 27 (Exhibit A) with Restatement of Torts § 442, 
442A, 442B 447 & 449 (Exhibit B) . Such a comparison will show 
that the court's Instructions No. 27 does not even come close to 
a full explanation of independent intervening cause. 
Unfortunately, there is no easy short-cut. In order to 
resolve this issue,, the court should compare the Court of 
Appeals opinion on expert testimony (quoted above) with the 
expert's actual testimony (see Exhibit D attached). 
In effect, plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional 
right to have a jury decide facts. It has been held that 
certiorari is appropriate where lower courts deprive a litigant 
of his right to a jury determination. Rogers v. Missouri P.R. 
Co., 352 U.S. 500, 1 L.E.2d 493, 77 S.Ct. 443 (1957). 
DATED this rC?5 day of January, 1990. 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO SUBSTITUTE PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI (Ostler v. Albina, et al. ) was mailed, U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, this day of January, 1990, to the 
following: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
0566-131\jn 
EXHIBIT B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
If an injury arises from two distinct causes, 
consideration then must be given to the question whether the 
causal connection between the conduct of the party responsible 
for the first cause and the injury was broken by the inter-
vention of a new, independent cause. 
If so, the person responsible for the first cause 
would not be liable for the injury. If, however, the inter-
vening cause or the likelihood of an occurrence of the same 
general nature was foreseen or should reasonably have been 
foreseen by the person responsible for the first cause, then 
such person's conduct would be the proximate cause of the 
Injury, notwithstanding the intervening cause, and he would 
be liable therefor. 
Thus, if you find the collision of the vehicle 
driven by Stephen Ostler with the tractor-trailer of Albina 
Transfer Company, Inc., parked on the shoulder of the highway, 
or the likelihood of an occurrence of the same general nature, 
was within the natural and continuous sequence of events 
which might reasonably be foreseen to follow the actions of 
Stanley Wheeler, then you must find that Che actions of 
Stanley Wheeler were a concurring proximate cause of the 
collision, even though the later negligent act of Stephen 
Oscler cooperated Co cause Che'accident. 
^ Buc if Che actions of Stephen Ostler in causing 
the collision were of such character as not reasonably to 
be foreseen in che nacural and concinuous sequence of 
evencs started by Stanley Wheeler, then the acts of Steven 
Ostler are the independent intervening cause and, therefore, 
the sole proximate cause of the injury. 
EXHIBIT t! 
§ 4 4 2 . Considerations Important in Determining Whether an 
Intervening Force is a Superseding Cause 
The following considerations are of importance in deter-
mining whether an intervening force is a superseding 
cause of harm to another: 
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm 
different in kind from that which would otherwise have 
resulted from the actor's negligence; 
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences 
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather 
than norjnal in view of the circumstances existing at the 
time of its operation; 
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating 
independently of any situation created by the actor's 
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal 
result of such a situation; 
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening 
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to 
act; 
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an 
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the 
other and as such subjects the third person to liability 
to him; 
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a 
third person which sets the intervening force in motion. 
Comment on Clause (a): 
a. As to the statement in Clause (a), see § 45L 
Comment on Clause (b): 
6. As to the statement in Clause (b), see § 435 (2) and 
Comments c and d. 
Comment on Clause (c): 
c. As to the statement in Clause (c), see §§ 443-449. 
d. The words "situation created by the actor's negligence" 
are used to denote the fact that the actor'a-iiegligent conduct 
is a substantial factor in bringing about the situation and that, 
therefore, the actor would be liable for creating the situation 
if the situation were in itself a legal injury. 
Comment on Clause (d): 
e. As to the statement in Clause (d), see §452, 
Comment on Clause (e): 
/• As to the statement in Clause (e), see §§447-449, 
Comment on Clause (f): 
g. As to the statement in Clause (f), compare § 447 with 
§§ 448 and 449, 
§ 442 B 
4. The same facts as in Illustration 3, except that the 
pole is knocked over by a cow's bumping into i t The same 
result 
5. A negligently leaves an excavation in a public side-
walk, creating the risk that a traveler on the sidewalk will 
fall into it. B, passing C on the sidewalk, negligently bumps 
into him, and knocks him into the excavation. A is subject 
to liability to C. 
6. The A Railroad negligently derails a tank car full 
of gasoline and damages it, so that gasoline runs into the 
public street. The risk is thus created that persons using 
the street will be injured by fire or explosion. B, a bystander, 
negligently strikes a match to light his cigar. The gasoline 
vapor is ignited, and the resulting flash of fire injures C, a 
pedestrian on the sidewalk. A Railroad is subject to lia-
bility to C. 
e. Intentionally tortious or criminal acts. The rule stated 
in this Section does not apply where the harm of which the risk 
has been created or increased by the actor's conduct is brought 
about by the intervening act of a third person which is inten-
tionally tortious or criminal, and is not within the scope of the 
risk created by the original negligence. Such tortious or criminal 
acts may in themselves be foreseeable,' and so within the scope 
of the created risk, in which case the actor may still be liable 
for the harm, under the rules stated in §§ 448 and 449. But if 
they are not, the actor is relieved of responsibility by the inter-
vention of the third person. The reason usually given by the 
courts is that in such a case the third person has deliberately 
assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the 
consequences of his act is shifted to him. (Compare § 452 (2).) 
Illustrations: 
7. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that B 
deliberately kicks C into the excavation. A is not liable to 
C. 
8. The same facts as in Illustration 6, except that B 
deliberately sets fire to the gasoline to see what will happen. 
A Railroad is not liable to C. 
9. The employees of the A Theatre Company negli-
gently leave a chair on the railing of the balcony, creating 
the risk that it may accidentally or negligently be knocked 
§ 4 4 7 . Negligence of Intervening Acts 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is 
negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does 
not make it a superseding cause of harm to another 
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct 
should have realized that a third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing 
when the act of the third person was done would not re-
gard it as highly extraordinary that the third person 
had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a 
situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner 
in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment on Clause (a): 
a. The statement in Clause (a) applies where there is a 
realizable likelihood of such an act but the likelihood is not 
enough in itself to make the actor's conduct negligent, the con-
duct being negligent because of other and greater risks which 
it entails. If the realizable likelihood that a third person will 
act in the negligent manner in which a particular third person 
acts is so great as to be the risk or even one of the risks which 
make the actor's conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore 
negligent, the case is governed by the rule stated in § 449. 
Illustration: 
1. A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight jolt 
might cause its heavy contents to fall from it. He parks 
it in a street where to his knowledge small boys congregate 
for play, B, one of these boys, tries to climb on the truck. 
In so doing he so disturbs the load as to cause a heavy article 
to fall upon and hurt C, a comrade standing close by. B's 
act is not a superseding cause of C's harm. 
Comment on Clause (b): 
6. The actor at the time of his negligence may have no 
reason to realize that a third person might act in the particular 
negligent manner in which the particular third person acts, 
because his mind is not centered upon the sequence of events 
which may result from his act and therefore he has no reason 
to realize that it will create the situation which the third person's 
intervening act makes harmful. However, when the situation 
is known to exist, the likelihood that some negligent act may 
make it dangerous may be easily realizable or even obvious. 
Illustration: 
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A 
does not intentionally park his car in the street frequented 
by the boys, but his car through no fault of his is blocked 
in a traffic congestion at this point. B's act in meddling 
with the truck is not a superseding cause of C's harm. 
§ 4 4 9 . Tortious or Criminal Acts the Probability of Which 
Makes Actor's Conduct Negligent 
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a par-
ticular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which 
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, 
negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not 
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused 
4
 hereby. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. This Section should be read together with § 302 B, and 
•che Comments to that Section, which deal with the foreseeable 
likelihood of the intentional or even criminal misconduct of a 
third person as a hazard which makes the actor's conduct negli-
gent. As is there stated, the mere possibility or even likelihood 
that there may be such misconduct is not in all cases sufficient 
to characterize the actor's conduct as negligence. It is only where 
the actor is under a duty to the other, because of some relation 
between them, to protect him against such misconduct, or where 
the actor has undertaken the obligation of doing so, or his conduct 
has created or increased the risk of harm through the mis-
conduct, that he becomes negligent. 
6. The happening of the very event the likelihood of which 
makes the actor's conduct negligent and so subjects the actor 
to liability cannot relieve him from liability. The duty to re-
frain from the act committed or to do the act omitted is imposed 
to protect the other from this very danger. To deny recovery 
because the other's exposure to the very risk from which it 
was the purpose of the duty to protect him resulted in harm 
to him, would be to deprive the other of all protection and to 
make the duty a nullity. 
Illustrations: 
1. A is traveling on the train of the B Railway Com-
pany. Her ticket entitles her to ride only to Station X, 
but she intentionally stays on the train after it has passed 
that station. When she arrives at Station Y the conductor 
puts her off the train. This occurs late at night after the 
station has been closed and the attendants have departed. 
The station is situated in a lonely district, and the only 
way in which she can reach the neighboring town is by pass-
ing a place where to the knowledge of the conductor there 
is a construction camp. The construction crew is known to 
contain many persons of vicious character. While attempt-
ing to pass by this camp, A is attacked and ravished by 
some of the construction crew. The B Railway Company 
is subject to liability to A. 
EXHIBIT C 
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 211 Lines 14-24 
Q I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt. Have you 
had any special experience or any special study in driver 
alertness or falling asleep at the wheel, any laboratory 
work? 
A Yes. 
Q And would you describe that for the Court? 
A Well, in one of my first research activities in 
1948-f49 was a study of why, how come so many California 
motorists are running off the road over New Mexico Highways. 
This was kind of an armchair study that we were told to do 
by the State of California. 
***** 
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 212 Lines 10-19 
Now, I was 
able to do this safely by utilizing my driving simulation 
laboratory. This is like a flight simulator, where an 
actual vehicle is operated on steel rollers in a laboratory, 
the driver controls the engine speed and steering. And what 
happens in response to his speed and steering maneuvers is 
the change in the wide-screen, deeply curved, specially 
designed motion picture system that was developed with some 
of the faculty at UCLA at the time. Later it has been used 
and is still being used in the motion picture industry. 
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 225 Lines 2-25 
Q Okay. Now I'm going to give you a hypothetical 
question. And in my hypothetical I want you to assume the 
following: That the date is April 19, 1984. Itfs approxi-
mately 3:00 a.m. It's a dark cloudy night. And that a 
truck is parked, a 16-wheel truck is parked, about three 
miles south of Payson, exactly at the area you examined, you 
explained to the judge you examined it, and that that semi 
truck is parked on the paved shoulder with its right hand 
wheels approximately three feet into the dirt, or it's left 
wheels approximately four feet of the right solid line. I 
want you to further assume that the semi truck has blinking 
lights. I want you to further assume that an automobile 
approaches from the rear and crashes into the semi truck 
in approximately the position indicated on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 12. And I want you to further assume that there 
are no skid marks. 
And my question is: As a human factors scientist, 
based on those facts, can you form an opinion whether the 
driver was asleep or awake? 
MR. JEFFS: Objection. No foundation 
laid as to what he predicates it on. 
THE COURT: Well, he can answer the 
question "Yes" or "No." 
A Yes. 
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 227 Lines 1-25 
than the fully conscious areas of the brain. And it is a 
monotonous task, a lonely open road, particularly. And because 
of our sleep-wake patterns we are subject to those difficul-
ties in the night hours when we usually are asleep, and our 
performance degrades. 
The degrading aspect is that we, less participation 
by our upper-brain area, our fully conscious decision-making 
brain areas, in a sense fail us. And it leaves us with this, 
just this rudimentary control ability. Now, we are not 
asleep, but we are certainly not fully awake and conscious 
as we would like to be. And this happens, unfortunately, 
all the time in the driving scene. 
Q And is there a relationship between that, that half-
way state or semi-state and the lights, the blinking lights 
ahead? 
A Well, yes, there is. What happens, what likely 
happens, as best we can understand, is that in this reduced 
state of awareness, the image of a vehicle's tail light ahead 
of us, in the night, is not an unusual thing. It's not 
unusual. In fact most of the time there's some kind of 
traffic ahead of us. 
The ability to distinguish between those tail 
lights, as on a moving vehicle, as opposed to a stationary 
vehicle, is very difficult without the aid of some, something 
that's right on the ground. It1* t-^ ~o~ i.-^t.^  
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 229 Lines 1-25 
is required by law to activate their flashing lights. 
So, it's not that unusual to, in fact we encounter-
ed one coming down this morning, a slow-moving vehicle in 
the travel lane with the flashers. So it doesn't neces-
sarily mean that that's a stopped vehicle. 
So this is, these are the explanations that occur. 
There's one other, and that is, if a vehicle operator is in 
a sense lured over towards a set of flashing lights, and 
that happens all too often, not only with flashing lights 
on stopped vehicles but with flashers on these barricades, 
flashing lights are not allowed on barricades that delineate, 
they must be steady-burn, they are allowed to try to get 
attention, but if you are going to delineate the path with a 
roll of barrels or barricades with flashing lights on them, 
I mean, not flashing, they must be steady-burn, and they have 
a little switch. And I've gone into that for the barricade 
industry and a lot of work in that field. So it's, if a 
flashing light does attract the attention of a motorist, 
they would be somewhat off to the side from straight ahead. 
I'm assuming a flashing light on a stopped vehicle on the 
shoulder, such as police vehicles when they are dealing with 
motorists. That flashing stimulus is very likely to attract 
our attention. And when we are attracted visually to some-
thing off the side, there's an almost irresistible, what we 
call, "orienting response." 
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 249 Lines 8-25: 
BY MR. DEBRY: 
Q Dr. Hulbert, I want to just be clear in this 
record, and the Court has expressed some concern, that when 
you testified that this man, in your opinion, was awake as 
opposed to asleep, what factors did you take into considera-
tion when you said in your opinion he was awake? What --
A The police report indicating a rather shallow 
angle of impact, as opposed to say a more abrupt angle off 
the road. And the observation of Mr. Wheeler, the big rig 
driver, in his mirror of the manner or the path that the 
striking vehicle took prior to impact. I've taken those 
two elements into acocunt. 
Q Now explain why the angle of impact would assist 
you in forming an opinion that he was awake? 
A Well, in many such events that I have had occasion 
to analyze, with the help of reconstructionists, if the 
angle is a relatively sharp angle of impact, it would indicate 
a more of a sudden and complete loss of consciousness or 
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 251 Lines 1-25 
MR, DEBRY: Well, it isn't leading, 
the Jury is not here. 
THE COURT: Well, I want him to, I'm 
going to ask him the same question, so he may answer. 
A Well, when the, when the eyes closed, and I was 
able to minotor their facial aspects, when the lids actually 
closed, then there would be a more abrupt. 
Now, see, we had, they had to steer, to stay on 
the road, we had a signal in the simulator device, so that 
if they didn't steer then they would go off the road. So, 
and when the eyes closed there was a more abrupt, because, 
occasionally, also, there would be a falling, a nodding of 
the head and some movement of the hands on the steering wheel. 
So, when the eyes close and when the head drops, 
then there is a more abrupt transition. Before that the eyes 
are open, they are just, and they are staying on the road, 
and then there comes a time when their eyes are open and they 
are drifting off the road. 
Q I think we've got it, but compare the actions of 
Mr. Ostler, the Ostler vehicle, as it was described by 
Wheeler, as Wheeler described it, with what you've seen in 
your laboratory when people go to sleep; compare the two? 
A Well, that's essentially what I did in carrying out 
my analysis, that Mr. Wheeler's description of his observation 
of the path that the striking vehicle followed --
Trial Transcript Volume II Page 245 Lines 12-25: 
Page 246 Lines 1-7 
THE COURT: Counsel, I don't have any 
question the expertise of the doctor in several fields. But 
I'm not persuaded that in this case the testimony is going to 
be helpful to the Jury, I've heard nothing to indicate any 
basis for a determination on his part that there was a man 
that was either, that was not asleep, or that he was merely 
somewhat impaired in his appreciation of the things around 
him. 
It seems to me that that's something that the Jury 
can, just as well as anyone else, can infer and can determine 
from their own experience in this type of circumstance, 
and that it can be argued by counsel, I don't see that it's 
going to be helpful from that standpoint. And I do think it 
may be prejudicial to have an opinion that's based on nothing 
more than likelihood or a possibility, pure speculation. 
The facts are that the man ran off and hit into the 
back of the truck. There is nothing that's been shown or 
indicated that that is consistent with being asleep, any 
less than being with, consistent with being inattentative. 
So that the Court is going to sustain the objection 
to the testimony of the doctor on that basis. 
• • * • • 
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M. DAYLE JEFFS. #G16 5 5 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law. P.C. 
Attorneys jor Defendant 
90 North lO'O East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH OSTLER. 
Plaintiff. 
vs . 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO.. INC.. 
F & R ROE. INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
PATRICIA HANNA 
CASE NO. 890529 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 
880-0229-CA 
/ 
COME NOW the Defendants and pursuant to Rule 23 of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, moves the Court to strike 
the affidavit of Patricia Hanna in support of the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. The affidavit is not a part of the record 
as specified in Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court as is more fully set forth in the Memorandum 
attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 '— day of January. 
1990. 
M. Dayle Je 
M. DAYLE JEFFS. ttG165S 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys Tor Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH OSTLER. 
Plaintiff. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF THE MOTION TO 
vs. STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF PATRICIA HANNA 
ALB1NA TRANSFER CO.. INC.. 
F & R ROE. INC.. and CASE NO. 890529 
STANLEY E. WHEELER. COURT OF APPEALS NO.: 
880-0228-CA 
Defendants. 
/ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 8. 1989 the Utah Court of Appeals 
rendered its decision in the above entitled case. 
Plaintiff's counsel filed a Petition for Reconsid-
eration on September 21. 1989. Attached to the Motion was the 
affidavit of Patricia Hanna. On October 18. 1989 the Court of 
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 
Plaintiff, next filed a Petition for Writ of Certior-
ari on December 15. 1989. Attached as part of the Petition, 
was the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna. 
POINT I 
The Court Should Strike The Affidavit of Patricia Hanna 
Since It Is Not A Part Of The Official Record On Appeal. 
Rule 11(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
Composition of the record on appeal. The 
original papers and exhibits filed in the 
district court, the transcript of proceedings, 
if any, and the index prepared by the clerk of 
the district court shall constitute the record 
on appeal in all cases. However with respect 
to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed 
under Paragraph (d) of this rule shall be 
transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
Utah. 11(a) (as amended. 1987). 
Paragraph (d)(2)(B) of Rule 11 gives a list of the 
items to be included in the transmittal to the Supreme Court. 
The list does not contain any Affidavits outside of the record. 
. Only those designated papers and the 
following, to the extent applicable, shall 
be transmitted to the clerk of the Supreme 
Court by the clerk of the district court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 
7(a). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or 
interlocutory order from which the 
appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be re-
viewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings 
of fact or conclusions of law filed or 
delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion. response, and ac-
companying memoranda upon which the 
court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interroga-
tories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal. 
Utah. 1 K 2 H B ) fas amended. 1987K 
The affidavit of Patricia Hanna was first filed in 
the Plaintiff's Petition for Reconsideration. The rales of 
the Utah Court of Appeals does not provide for a Petition for 
Reconsideration, but does provide for a Petition for Rehearing 
under Rule 35. The affidavit does not become a part of the 
official record simply because it was filed in the action in 
support of the Petition for Reconsideration. Patricia Hanna's 
affidavit should be stricken from the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Plaintiff's counsel did not follow the procedure of 
Rule 11(b) to supplement the record. That Rule states: 
If anything material to either party is 
omitted from the record by error or accident or 
is misstated therein, the parties by stipula-
tion, or the district court or the Supreme 
Court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted to the Supreme Court, on proper 
suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct 
that the omission or misstatement be corrected, 
and if necessary that a supplemental record be 
certified and transmitted. The moving party, or 
the court if it is acting on its own initiative, 
shall serve on the parties a statement of the 
proposed changes. Within 10 days after service 
any party may serve objections to the proposed 
changes. . . 
Utah, 11(b) (as amended, 1987). 
If a party wants to supplement the record on appeal. 
they are to notify the Supreme Court and the opposing party is 
given the opportunity to file objections to the proposed 
changes or supplementation. This procedure was not followed, 
therefore the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna should be stricken 
from the Petition. In fact, the record cannot be supplemented 
by an affidavit commenting on the thought processes of the 
Judges of the Court of Appeals. 
POINT II 
The Affidavit Of Patricia Hanna Should Be Stricken Since 
She Has Not Been Trained In Law Or A Legal Authority. 
The Affidavit of Patricia Hanna is a criticism of the 
opinion written by the Utah Court of Appeals. She states that 
she would give the opinion a "D" if it were written by one of 
her undergraduate students. 
Ms. Hanna does not have the legal training to inter-
pret the opinion of the Court. An opinion of the Court is to 
decide the case and controversy. It is not to be a creative 
writing assignment for the benefit of society. 
Even if the affiant were trained in legal reasoning 
and writing. it is not appropriate to file and affidavit 
challenging the thought processes of the judges. In this case 
the Court affirmed the Juries verdict and findings of the 
district court. 
The legal reasoning of the Court of Appeals and the 
findings of the Jury do not necessarily fit into the reasoning 
of a philosopher untrained in legal theory. The affidavit is 
a criticism of the Court and the judicial system. That does 
not give the affidavit an evidentiary basis to be attached to 
the Petitfon for Writ of Certiorari. The affidavit should be 
stricken from the Petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
6> ZK 
this / day of January, 
1990 
f/ 
M. Dayle ^ ffs / / 
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STATE OF UTAH 
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Motion to Strike Affidavit is granted-
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STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH OSTLER 
Plaintiff and 
Petitloneif 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFFP 
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mind, the potential for this kind of a collateral attack on 
the inherent logic of an appellate court opinion. 
MR. DeBRY: It does boggle the mind, and that's why 
I say it's once-in-a-1ifetime, but look at the reverse side of 
the coin. What if it's true? The Affidavit — 
THE COURT: Then you take your appeal and get a 
reversal. There's already a remedy provided for your 
situation, Mr. DeBry, and it is not to bad mouth the Court 
that's rendered the opinion that you don't like. 
MR. DeBRY: Well, we don't — 
JUSTICE DURHAM: We're equally competent to make the 
analysis Miss Hanna makes. In fact, we are more competent to 
make the analysis that Miss Hanna makes. 
MR. DeBRY: Yes, you are. 
JUSTICE DURHAM: And why — you know, without 
qualifying her as an expert, without any kind of an 
evidentiary hearing, why ought we to look at her particular 
critique? All the cases and precedents you cite to us have to 
do with independent, autonomous, general bodies of social 
science literature, not a specific critique and attack upon 
the work of an appellate court. I don't see any analgy there. 
MR. DeBRY: First of all, the problem is we don't 
have an automatic right to an appeal. If we had an automatic 
right to appeal, I would never have put her Affidavit in. To 
grant certiorari is discretionary. Professor Hanna does not 
10 
comment on whether -- she specifically states she does not 
comment on whether or not the opinion is true or accurate or 
correct. Like I said, she doesn't comment on whether or not 
the opinion is correct. Her comment is on whether or not the 
process was followed. 
Now, I'd like to follow with Justice Stewart's 
question, because you're looking at me very sternly, when I 
say this is a once-in-a-lifetime motion and you say it borders 
on contempt. But I say what if it's true? Suppose we had an 
opinion written by three •— just three judges of the Court of 
Appeals. Suppose the opinion came out something like this: 
One page opinion that says, "You lose," and the first judge to 
sign it signs the opinion. The second judge to sign it signs 
off and says, "I didn't read the briefs, but nevertheless it 
sounds okay to me. I concur." Now, what if the third judge 
said, "I didn't read the briefs, but it sounds okay to me and 
I concur." Obviously, this Court would have little trouble 
finding that there's serious problems about the administration 
of justice and due process and you'd take corrective steps. 
The problem is, judges don't sign that way. They don't sign, 
"I read the briefs" or "I didn't read the briefs," and I can't 
ask them. 
JUSTICE DURHAM: But you could come up on your 
Petition to Cert, to us and say, "The briefs say X, the 
opinion says Y. The judges couldn't have read the briefs, 
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we're entitled to Cert." What's the difference? 
MR. DeBRY: Well, the difference is it's really hard 
to get a Petition for Certiorari granted and there are a lot 
of reasons to grant it and a lot of reasons not to grant it. 
JUSTICE DURHAM: Sure, but your Petition, your 
Affidavit isn't going to make it any easier. 
MR. DeBRY: If her Affidavit is true, I suggest that 
it's not contempt, I suggest that it's a matter of utmost 
gravity that judges in inferior courts are not reading briefs, 
or not reading briefs carefully, and that's an issue that 
infects not only this case, that's an issue that could infect 
many other cases, and this court in its supervisory capacity 
should take that into consideration in whether or not to grant 
Cert, because whether or not you grant Cert., one issue you 
make take into consideration is whether or not you're 
answering a question in this case or whether or not you're 
answering a question in a much broader context. 
Although this is a controversial Affidavit, and I 
filed the Affidavit knowing that and with much reluctance, I 
think if it's true, is a matter of utmost gravity. Nobody 
will ever know it's true unless you grant Cert, and review the 
case on the merits. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Jeffs, anything else? 
MR. JEFFS: I would only say that when Counsel says 
that she drafted the Affidavit, the many pages, 20, nearly 19 
12 
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pages of a detailed analysis of the opinion, does not appear 
to be anything except an attack on the Court and we renew our 
motion. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The Court will take the 
motion under advisement. 
(Court adjourned.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
ss . 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that LANETTE SHINDURLING, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby 
certify: 
That this transcript is full, true and correct and 
contains all of the evidence, all of the objections of counsel 
and rulings of the court and all matters to which the same 
relate which were audible through the said tape recording* 
I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to said cause of action, 
and that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record and, therefore, the name associated with the statement 
may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 27th day of February, 1990. 
1ANETTE SHINdURLING, C.S.R. 
Utah License No. 122 
- R.P, 
Exhibit K 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
March 6, 1990 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq, 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Ralph Ostler, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. No. 890529 
Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 
F & R Roe, Inc., and 
Stanley E. Wheeler, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
This day Petition for Writ of Certiorari having been 
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is ordered that the same be, and hereby is, denied, 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Exhibit L 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH OSTLER 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 840467408 
vs. RULING 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO INC et al 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on 
the motion of Defs seeking sanctions against counsel for PI under 
the provision of Rule 11 URCP andf Sec 78-27-56 UCA. The Court 
has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, no 
oral argument being requested, and upon being advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Said motion is denied. 
The Court is of the opinion that since the alleged 
scurrilous matter was presented to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
such Court should make the determination as to whether or not 
sanctions should be imposed. 
In the event the Utah Court of appeals should 
determine that sanctions are appropriate, that Court may then 
choose to remand the matter to this Court to make a factual 
determination as to the amount of such sanctions to be imposed 
(Porco vs Porco 752 P2d 365). 
Dated this J2/ day of February, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
^uT^^ufU 
CULLEN CHRISTEN 
cc: Robert J. Debry, Esq, 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
KfedHVED 
Exhibit M 
M. Dayle Jeffs, #G1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & RROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR SANCTIONS 
AGAINST ROBERT J. DEBRY 
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNSEL 
FOR PLAINTIFF, 
RALPH OSTLER 
Court of Appeals No.: 
COMES NOW the defendants/respondents, Albina Transfer Co., Inc., F & R 
Roe, Inc., and Stanley E. Wheeler, and hereby ask the court to impose sanctions against Robert 
J. DeBry in his capacity as attorney for plaintiff/appellant, Ralph Ostler, Court of Appeals #880-
0228 CA, for all pleadings filed after the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court 
decision. Such sanctions are appropriate pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 
(1989). 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. A jury found for defendants and an appeal was taken. There is no dispute that 
plaintiff had the right to pursue the appeal. Defendants do not assert that the initial appeal was 
not made in good faith, although later filings described herein cast some doubt on such good 
faith. 
2. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court on 
September 8, 1989. (Exhibit A, Attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof). 
3. Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for Reconsideration of the Appeal on September 
21, 1989. Attached to the Petition for Reconsideration was the affidavit of Patricia Hanna 
(Exhibit B, attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. The Court of Appeals denied 
the Petition for Reconsideration on October 18, 1989. 
4. Mr. DeBry filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 15, 1989. See 
Exhibit D, attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
5. Seven days later, Mr. DeBry filed a Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
See Exhibit E attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
6. Defendants filed a Brief in Opposition to the Substitute Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari on January 15, 1990. See Exhibit F attached hereto and by reference made a part 
hereof. 7. Mr. DeBry filed a Reply to Brief in Opposition to Substitute Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari on January 25, 1990 (incorrectly denominated Brief in Opposition to Substitute 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari). See Exhibit G ( attached hereto and by reference made a part 
hereof. 
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8. Included in the Petition and Substitute Petition for Writ of Certiorari was the 
same affidavit of Patricia Hanna, Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University 
of Utah, which had been attached to the Peition for Rehearing (Exhibit B). The thesis of this 
affidavit was that the Opinion of the Court of Appeals "reflects a breakdown in the decision 
making process". See paragraph 6, page 2 of the affidavit. Ms. Hanna also said that the 
Opinion was the equivalent of "failing graduate work". See paragraph 6, page 2 of affidavit. 
9. Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the above-mentioned affidavit and 
presented oral argument to do so before the Utah Supreme Court on February 5, 1990. (See 
Exhibit H, Motion to Strike the Affiavit of Patricia Hanna, attached hereto and by reference 
made a part hereof. 
10. The Utah Supreme Court granted the Motion to Strike the affidavit of Patricia 
Hanna on February 5, 1990. See Exhibit I attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
Attached as Exhibit J is a certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit. 
11. The Utah Supreme court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on March 
6, 1990. See Exhibit K attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
12. Defendants/respondents apply to the Court to impose sanctions on Mr. 
DeBry, pursuant Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-37-56(1989) of attorneys fees and costs and any 
additional amount the Court finds appropriate and within its discretion to impose. 
13. Defendants, through counsel, filed a Motion to Impose Sanctions with the 
Trial Court on January 4, 1991. 
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14. On February 21, 1991, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen issued an Order indicating that such 
sanctions should be addressed to this court and allowing defendants/respondents to file a Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 33 Motion to Impose Sanctions (Order of the Honorable 
Cullen Christensen, dated February 21, 1991, is attached hereto as Exhibit L). 
POINT I 
Sanctions are appropriate pursuant to 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Generally, attorney's fees may be recovered in Utah if provided for by statute 
or contract. Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, attorney and/or double costs are 
awarded in cases of frivolous appeals. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in relevant part, "if the 
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award . . . single or double costs. . . and/or reasonable attorneys fees to the 
prevailing party." Sanctions for frivolous appeals have only been applied in egregious cases, 
such as when an appeal was filed in order to "take unconscionable advantage" of the other party 
and therefore failing to meet the standards of good faith. Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Egregious cases may include those obviously without merit, with no 
reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment." (emphasis 
4 
added) Maughan, 770 P.2d at 162. See also, Porco v. Porco. 759 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (Appeal filed to harass defendant). 
Moreover, sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate when a pleading or motion 
is filed without reasonable inquiry as to whether it is "well grounded in fact" or "warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law," and is brought for "any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay 
or needless increase in the cost of litigation." (emphasis added) See, Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor. 770 P.2d at 171, 172 (Utah App. 1989). 
The standard to be employed under Rule 11 is an objective one: did the attorney 
act reasonable under the circumstances. See, Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 
App. 1989). The Court said in Taylor that this objective standard "allows sanctions to be 
imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the pre-amendment, subjective 'bad faith' 
standard." Id. at 170. The Court also stated that whether specific conduct violates Rule 11 is 
a question of law. If this rule is violated, based on an objective standard, it is mandatory to 
impose sanctions. It is within the Court's discretion to tailor the sanction to the circumstance 
but usually is based on costs and attorneys fees. 
An examination of the affidavit of Patricia Hanna clearly demonstrates that it is 
nothing more than a criticism of the court and judges of the court "with no reasonable likelihood 
of success." 
Attached as Exhibit J is a certified transcript of the oral argument of the Motion 
to Strike the affidavit before the Supreme Court. On page 8, line 6, Justice Stewart suggests 
that the affidavit "borders on contempt." Justice Durham states, beginning line 25 of page 8: 
6 
"It boggles the mind, the potential for this kind of a collateral attack on the inherent logic of an 
appellate court." 
The affidavit was not part of the record on appeal and was an attempted criticism 
of the thought processes of the appellate panel to pursuade them, first, to reconsider the appeal 
and, secondly, to provide that as a basis for the requested Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Counsel for the appellant in arguing the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia 
Hanna characterized it as a "once in a lifetime motion". Exhibit J, page 7, lines 14-17. Justice 
Durham readily saw that allowing an affidavit outside the record as a basis for a Petition for 
Certiorari could be abused and would be a whole new concept in an attack on a lost appeal 
(Transcript Exhibit J, page 8, lines 170-25). Justice Durham also characterized this particular 
affidavit as a "specific critique and attack upon the work of an appellate court". Transcript 
Exhibit J. page 9, lines 20 and 21. 
There can be little doubt that the Justices of the Supreme Court hearing this 
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna were exercised at the audacity of plaintiffs 
counsel in submitting such an attack on the court as a basis for a Writ of Certiorari. Such 
recognition by plaintiffs counsel was shown by his own statement on page 10 of the transcript, 
Exhibit J. wherein Mr. DeBry said "Now I'd like to follow with Justice Stewart's question, 
because you're looking at me very sternly, when I say this is a once-in-a-lifetime motion and 
you say it borders on contempt". 
While counsel tried to urge the court that it was a matter of the gravest concern, 
an examination of the affidavit itself shows how direct the attack was on the logic and analysis 
6 
process of the Court of Appeals. Referring the court directly to the parts of the affidavit, Page 
2, paragraph 6: 
In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a breakdown in the decision 
making process. If this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course, I would have 
given it a grade of 'D;' from a graduate student, it would have 
counted as failing work. 
The last sentence of paragraph 7: 
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single 
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis 
which they deserved and required. 
The first two sentences of the last paragraph on page 3: 
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment 
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the 
interrelated nature of the arguments in the appeal; . . . 
The third sentence of the last paragraph on page 3: 
Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no appreciation of 
the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a bearing on 
more than one aspect of the case. 
The last sentence of the top paragraph on page 4: 
I can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a 
serious breakdown in the present case. 
The middle of the first paragraph on page 4: 
. . . indicate how and where the Court of Appeals' decision to 
reject the appeal fails to take account of or to address the points 
raised by Ostler's counsel. 
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The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 6: 
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic 
of Ostler's point here in denying the appeal. In its decision the 
Court of Appeals gives little attention to this part of the appeal. 
The next to the last sentence on page 9: 
The Court of Appeals' decision shows absolutely no appreciation 
of this fact, and in no sense addresses it. 
The last sentence on page 11: 
. . . this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler's case 
it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to 
comprehend the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did 
to Ostler's case. 
The last sentence under point 1 on page 12: 
Therefore, the Court of Appeal's decision that Ostler does not 
prove a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to 
me to show a failure to read the briefs carefully. 
The last sentence on age 13: 
The Court of Appeals . . . says that taken in context, the remark 
caused no harm. This decision and the reasoning behind it reflects 
the Court of Appeal's failure to take the misstatement and its 
correction in context, viz. the larger context of the legal issues 
involved in the jury's deliberations and the fact that their 
instructions on these matters were unclear and confusing. 
The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 15: 
Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal. 
The first sentence in the first paragraph on page 17: 
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the point. 
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The first sentence on page 20: 
The Court of Appeal's grounds for their decision to reject the 
appeal are confusing. 
The last sentence in the second paragraph on page 20: 
In short, the entire section on p. 10 stands as an enigma in the 
Court of Appeals' reasoning. 
The conclusion of the affiant, Ms. Hanna shows the thrust of the affidavit: 
As already stated, it is difficult to understand how this Opinion 
could have been endorsed by three judges. I can only conclude 
that in reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take 
into account many important aspects of the arguments made in the 
appeal; at several points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is 
beside the point and fails to address the arguments made in the 
appeal. Due to time pressures or misunderstandings, a single 
individual might fail to grasp the points at issue and the structure 
of the plaintiffs arguments; however, it seems highly unlikely that 
three individuals could all have made the same errors in analysis. 
I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a single 
judge (Bench), and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis 
which they deserved and required. 
In the present case, the pleadings filed by Mr. DeBry after the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court jury verdict are predicated upon an affidavit outside the record which is 
an attack on the fundamental process of judicial review and is a challenge to the integrity of the 
judges who sat in review of the trial court. As such, it created a "needless increase in the cost 
of litigation." 
Every motion filed by Mr. DeBry after the appellate decision came down was 
denied. The affidavit of Patricia Hanna, attached as Exhibit B, was improperly submitted to the 
Court and had no basis for admittance under existing law. 
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Appellant's counsel did not present any valid argument why the law should be 
extended to allow the filing of such a disparaging affidavit. Certiorari was denied Mr. DeBry 
after a Petition and a Substitute Petition to the Utah Supreme Court. Clearly, after the Court 
of Appeals affirmed, the subsequent pleadings were "without merit." Utah Courts have 
interpreted "without merit" to mean an appeal "without a reasonable legal or factual basis." 
O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306, 309, (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, subjective good faith is not a defense to Rule 11 or Rule 33 sanctions. 
Even if pleadings are filed in good faith, if they are not well-grounded in fact, nor warranted 
by existing law or create needless litigation, a sanction is mandatory under Rule 11. Burkhart 
v. Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1986); Tavlor. Supra. 
Mr. DeBry, not his client Ralph Ostler, should be sanctioned. "If there is a 
frivolous appeal and the fault lies with the attorney, that is where the sanction will lie." Braley 
v. Campbell. 832 F.2d 1504, 1442 (10th Cir. 1984), Cert, denied 471 U.S. 1014 (1985). 
POINi il 
Sanctions are Appropriate Pursuant to I'tab ( \n\v \tnt 
§78-27-56(1989) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56(1989), a trial court "may award 
reasonable attorney's fees" if the court finds that the action or defense is without merit and "not 
brought or asserted in good faith." Therefore, it is within the court's discretion to award 
attorneys fees and costs. The trial court has the authority to award to the defendant "costs and 
fees on appeal as it deems appropriate." Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). 
10 
This statute is the exception to the American Rule for attorney's fees: 
1) In civil actions, the courts shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit or not brought or asserted 
in good faith, except under subsection 2. 
2) The court, in its discretion, may award fees or a limited fee 
against a party under subsection 12, but only if the court: 
a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in 
the action before the court; or 
b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of subsection 1. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1989). 
In order to recover fees under § 78-27-56, the court "must make findings that 1) 
the claim or claims were "without merit", and 2) the party's conduct was lacking in good faith". 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 966 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Ostlber v. Albina Transfer Co.. Appellate #880-0228-CA, the answer to every 
pleading filed after the appellate decision was in keeping with the trial court's and Court of 
Appeal's decision. Mr. DeBry filed Petitions for Certiorari that were supported by an affidavit 
he himself saw as a "once-in-a-lifetime shot." See Exhibit J. page 7, line 23. The Court stated 
it shouldn't even happen "once-in-a-lifetime." 
The affidavit of defendant's counsel sets forth the costs & attorney's fees incurred 
for services rendered after the decision in favor of the defendants by the Utah Court of Appeals 
as a result of the meritless and improper filing by plaintiffs counsel. Post-appeal fees and costs 
equal $3,646.28, plus the research and preparation and hearing of this motion in the amount of 
$1348.88 and $2SS 00 foi preparation for and oral argument, if argument is so required. 
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Defendant's counsel attests that these fees are reasonable. (Affidavit ol M. Dayle Jeffs, attached 
hereto as Exhibit M and by reference made a part hereof). 
Defendants hereby pray that the Court find Mr. DeBry's post-appeal pleadings 
without merit and thus warranting an award to defendants of reasonable attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Sanctions should be imposed on Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as attorney for 
plaintiff/appellant Ralph Ostler. Sanctions are proper pursuant to Rule 11, as Mr. DeBry created 
needless litigation, Rule 33 of the Utah Rules ot Appellate Proceduie and Rule I 1 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1989) as Mr. DeBry's 
pleadings were without merit and were not brought in good faith as to their merits based on the 
objective standard. Defendants hereby pray for sanctions in the amount of $5,249.28 as 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs, and any additional amount the Court deems appropriate. 
Dated and signed this day of April, 1991. 
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M. Dayle Jeffs, #G1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THF UTAH COURT (>I APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, j MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Plaintiff, j 
v. | 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. j 
F & R ROE, INC., and Court of Appeals No.: 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, j 
Defendants j 
I hereby certify that the original and 4 copies of Petition for Sanctions against 
Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as Counsel for Ralph Ostler was hand delivered to the Clerk of 
the Court, Utah Court of Appeals and a copy to the below named party by hand delivery, this 
date, May 3, 1991, to the following address: 
Robert J. DeBry 
DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Exhibit N 
w 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF .APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Appellant, 
MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE 
AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION; 
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
vs, 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Respondents. 
rasp No: 8 8 ()?,.'8 ~(?A 
Appellant, Ralph Ostler, respectfully moves this court to 
recall the mandate and to correct its p n o i u^ . : > -.-•••>>. 
(781 P.2d 445). 
Appellant further moves to consolidate this motion with 
the Petition for Sanctions Against Robert J. DeBry in his Capacity 
as Counsel for Plaintiff Ralph Ostler (Case No. 910246-CA) filed on 
May 3, 1991. 
DATED this day of June, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROBERT J . 
i k giimr % j# **** H *»' "** , : fc-*jr 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that J true and correct copy of the 
foreqoifiq MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION 
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE (Ostler v. Albina, et al.) was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this ^ - 2 / day oi June, 1991, to the following: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
0566-157\jn 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (8 01) 2 62-8915 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Appe1 lant , 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE 
AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION; 
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
Case No: 880228-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
Recalling * " e mandate is an unusual and drastic 
procedure. There s- two aspects to any such motion: first, can 
the court recan * * ^indate; and second, should the court recall 
the mandate. 
In this memorandum, appellant win -i . * * 
issue (i.e can ti le coin t . . . the mandate). The latter issue 
(i.e., should the court recall the mandate) is briefed more fully 
in the Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Sanctions Against 
Robert J. DeBrv in his Capacity as Counsel for Plaintiff Ralph 
Ostler Case No. 91024 6-CA which is incorporated hereat.1 
Appellant has moved to consolidate Case No. S^^^^^d^-Gase 
No. 9102 4 6 on the grounds that the issues in thCli^^-fe:t#ers 
overlap, 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT HAS POWER TO RECALL THE MANDATE 
Appe 11 at«.: v/uur t. s havc i nherettt ,Jut hor 11y I" -1 reca I I the 
mandate to prevent injustice. Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC. 463 
F.2d 268 (CA DC 1971) . The doctrine is equally applicable in state 
appellate courts, A careful explanation of the doctrine is found 
tne case - Lindus v. Northern Insurance Co, of New York, 438 
The propriety of recalling a mandate once 
it has issued has caused considerable con-
fusion among the various courts. See e.g., 
Slappy v Georgia Power Co., 109 Ga.App. 850, 
137 S.E.2d 537; Southwestern Corp. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623, 241 P.2d 985. We 
believe, however, that the proper criterion to 
be considered in determining whether to recall 
a mandate was succinctly expressed by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in United 
States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 99, 77 
S.Ct. 652, 653, 1 L«Ed.2d 683, where it is 
stated: 
"* * * the interest in finality of liti-
gation must yield where the interests of 
justice would make unfair the strict 
application of our rules," 
Faced with the same problem that we now have 
before us the United States Supreme Court in 
Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 
382 U.S. 25, 86 S.Ct. 153, 15 L.Ed.2d 21, in 
order to prevent injustice, granted a second 
petition for rehearing three years after the 
mandate has issued. See also Cahill v. New 
York, N.H.& H.R. Co., 351 U.S. 183, 76 S.Ct. 
758, 100 L.Ed. 1075; Chapman v. St. Stephens 
Protestant Episcopal Church, 105 Fla. 683, 136 
So. 238, 138 So. 630, 139 So. 188, 145 So. 
757, 84 A.L.R. 566. 
2 
A decision to recall a mandate must of 
necessity include a balancing of competing 
interests* Where the interests of justice 
outweigh the interest in bringing litigation 
to an end the court should recall the mandate. 
See also: Boudar v. E.G. & G,, Inc.. 742 P.2d 491, 493 (N.M. 1987) 
(••Our decisions must be final because they are rightf and not right 
because they are f i na1. . . .,f dazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944) (" where enforcement of 
a judgment is 'manifestly unconscionabl e1. . . they have wielded 
tne power |io recall the mandate] without hesitation,"); Coleman v. 
Turpen, 827 F.2d 667, 671 (10th Cir. 1987) (». . . an appellate 
court has powe lme a mandate . , to prevent 
an injustice. . . ,f) 
DATED this day of June, 1991. 
ROBERT 3. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney fQB Appellant 
n 
By: ICfi;Ur / ^ L 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
*s 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy o£ the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE AND 
TO CORRECT THE OPINION; AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE (Ostler v. 
Albina, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, this <^A day of 
June, 1991, to the Iollowing: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84 603 
0566-158\jn 
w/rnsA 
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Exhibit 0 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, CARL S. HAWKINS 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and Case No. 910246-CA 
STANLEY E. WHEELER 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
UTAH COUNTY ) 
My name is Carl S. Hawkins. I make the following statements 
under oath: 
1. I am a Professor of Law and former Dean of the J. Reuben 
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I have taught Torts 
for the last eighteen years at B.Y.U. and for sixteen years before 
that at the University of Michigan Law School. I am a co-author of 
three editions of nationally-published casebooks on Torts and 
Advanced Torts, and I have published articles on Torts in several 
professional journals. I am a member of the bar of the District of 
Columbia, and of the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Utah 
(inactive status). 
2. At the request of Robert J. DeBry, I have read the opinion 
of the Utah Court of Appeals in the above case, and I have also 
read the briefs of the parties in order to form an opinion as to 
the nature of the Torts issues involved in this case as it stood 
when Plaintiff filed his Petition for Rehearing with the Court of 
Appeals. 
3. This case involves, among other issues, fundamental 
questions of negligence theory, including the question of whether 
the scope of liability for violation of a particular legal rule 
should be determined by the court as a matter of legal policy, or 
whether that issue should be given to the jury, as if it were an 
issue of fact, under a "proximate cause" instruction. The Fourth 
District Court in this case did the latter. The opinion of the 
Court of Appeals obscures this basic legal question as to the scope 
of liability by addressing it in terms of whether there was 
intrinsic error in the trial court's instruction to the jury on 
independent, intervening cause (Instruction No. 27). 
4. There is substantial judicial and scholarly authority which 
holds that, before factual issues of causation are given to the 
jury in negligence cases, the court must determine as a matter of 
law whether the defendant owes a duty of reasonable care to the 
plaintiff, and whether the particular rule which defendant 
allegedly violated was meant to guard against the particular risk 
of injury that plaintiff incurred. See, for example, DfAmbra v. 
United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); Hill v. Lundin & 
Associates, Inc., 256 So.2d 620 (La. 1972); Laird v. Travelers 
Insurance Co., 267 So.2d 714 (La. 1972); Stoneburner v. Greyhound 
Corp., 375 P.2d 812 (Or. 1962) concurring opinion of Goodwin, J.; 
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk versus Proximate Cause, and the 
Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah 
L.Rev. 1; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 
Mich. L.Rev. 543 (1962) ; Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 
61 Col. L.Rev. 1401 (1961). Under this analytical method, the 
issues in this case could be set forth in the following way: 
(1) Does the driver of a truck and semitrailer on an 
Interstate highway owe a duty of reasonable care to other 
persons using the highway? 
(2) If so, does that duty require compliance with Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 41-6-103, which prohibits the stopping of a vehicle 
on a controlled access highway — that is, was this statutory 
provision meant to guard against the risk of injury to a 
passenger in another vehicle that inadvertently ran into the 
rear of the parked vehicle? 
(3) Did defendant violate that duty? 
(4) Was there a substantial causal connection between 
defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury? 
(5) What damages resulted from plaintiff's injury and what 
proportion thereof was attributable to defendant's 
comparative negligence? 
5. Under this analytical method, questions (1) and (2) would 
be questions of law for the court in deciding the scope of 
defendant's legal duty and whether the rule invoked by the 
plaintiff provides protection against the kind of injury that 
occurred. This approach would not necessarily result in a decision 
in favor of the plaintiff. Even though the court would undoubtedly 
answer question (1) in the affirmative, it could conceivably make 
a negative decision on question (2), taking responsibility for a 
clear legal decision that the statutory rule against stopping on a 
contr2olled access highway was not meant to protect passengers in 
another vehicle that ran into the rear of the parked truck. But 
when the issue is put in this way, the court might very well decide 
that the duty should cover such risks, in order to deter such 
collisions. Unless the following vehicle is intentionally or 
recklessly driven into the parked vehicle, the most effective way 
to reduce the incidence of such rear-end shoulder collisions would 
be to deter conscious decisions to park on the shoulder rather than 
trying to control the wider range of variables, both mechanical and 
human, that may cause other vehicles to drift inadvertently onto 
the shoulder. Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing (pp.6-7), in 
effect, asked for such a legal determination by reference to 
Restatement of Torts (Second), Sections 442-447. 
6. Question (3), the breach of duty or negligence issue, would 
usually be a fact issue for the jury, but in this case it was 
undisputed that defendant trucker had violated the statutory 
provision that prohibits stopping on the controlled access highway• 
Once this provision is construed as intended to prevent this kind 
of rear-end collision, it follows that defendant's violation of the 
statute was negligence, as a matter of law. Restatement of Torts 
(Second), Section 286. The trial judge recognized this by 
directing a verdict against defendant on the negligence issue. 
7. Question (4), as to the causal connection between 
defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, might also be a fact 
issue for the jury, but in this case it was undisputed that 
plaintiff's injuries resulted from the collision with the 
semitrailer unit that defendant had parked in the "recovery lane" 
of the highway. Once the court has decided that the statutory rule 
which defendant violated was meant to guard against this kind of 
injury, the jury should not be invited to nullify that legal 
determination by importing questions of "proximate cause" and 
"intervening cause" into a causal relation instruction, when, in 
fact, the causal connection between defendant's negligent conduct 
and plaintiff's injury was beyond dispute. Thus, by this line of 
analysis, the trial court should have directed a verdict for 
plaintiff on the issue of causation as well as on the issue of 
defendant's negligence, as argued in Appellant's Substitute Brief, 
pp. 59-65. The only issues left for jury submission would be 
disputed factual questions as to plaintiffs' damages and the 
proportionate amount attributable to the truck driver's comparative 
negligence. 
8. The suggestion, that the jury could have found that Stephen 
Ostler's inattentiveness "became the sole proximate cause of the 
collision" (781 P. 2d at 451), would have no place under the 
analytical approach outlined above. It is undisputed that the 
physical obstacle against which plaintiff's vehicle collided was 
placed where it was by defendant's negligent conduct. The notion 
that something else could be the "sole proximate cause" may be 
understood only in the context of an approach that asks the jury to 
decide, under the name of "proximate cause," the ultimate policy 
question as to the scope of legal liability for violation of the 
statute, even though defendant's negligent conduct was a cause of 
plaintiff's injury. 
9. For the purpose of the pending Petition For Sanctions, I 
assume it is not necessary to decide whether the trial court should 
have determined the scope of liability as suggested above, instead 
of giving that issue to the jury under an "intervening cause" 
instruction, nor whether the case would have been decided 
differently if it had. It should only be necessary to determine 
whether there was arguable merit in these Tort issues that 
Plaintiff's lawyer was trying to raise by his Petition For 
Rehearing and whether such issues were raised by appropriate means. 
In my opinion, this case did raise fundamental questions of Tort 
law which the Petition For Rehearing was trying to bring to the 
Court of Appeals' attention. 
10. I am familiar with the affidavit by Samuel D. Thurman in 
which he gives his opinion (as an expert on legal ethics) , 
including the following statement: 
"Even if Dr. Hanna's affidavit is deemed more critical than 
those customarily seen in legal proceedings, Mr. DeBry had an 
affirmative duty to zealously pursue his client's objectives 
Especially in a Petition for Rehearing, where the chances 
of success are usually remote, the attorney should be at 
liberty to utilize more imaginative procedures and advance 
more ingenious theories to justify reconsideration." 
Mr. DeBry may have felt it necessary to resort to the "imaginative 
procedure" of filing Dr. Hanna's affidavit with his Petition for 
Reconsideration, because of the way in which the Court of Appeals' 
opinion (781 P.2d at 450-451) had obscured the basic scope of 
liability issues which he had tried to raise on appeal. In my 
opinion, Dr. Hanna's criticism of the Court's analytical method 
tries to address, in non-legal terms, issues that would be 
recognized by respected legal authorities as serious questions of 
Tort law implicated in the Court's decision. 
Carl S. Hawkins 
Subscribed and sworn to before me the M 
My commission e x p i r e s 
day of J u n e , 1991, 
Notary P u b l i c 
Residing in : ^frfr I**- -k 
JASON LAWRENCE 
4320 S«A 700 East «3 
Salt lake City. Utah 84107 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
RECEIVED 
OUD 81991 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL GOLDSMITH 
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
SANCTIONS AGAINST ROBERT J. 
DEBRY IN HIS CAPACITY AS 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF, RALPH 
OSTLER 
Case No: 910246-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Michael Goldsmith. I give the following 
testimony under oath: 
Introduction 
1. I am a professor of law at the J. Rueben Clark Law 
School, Brigham Young University. 
2. At the request of Robert J. DeBry, I have reviewed 
various materials concerning the motion for sanctions presently 
pending before this court. 
3. My opinion, based both on these materials and 
governing legal principles, is that the motion for sanctions is 
unwarranted. 
4. For the convenience of the court, this affidavit is 
organized into six parts. Part I submits for your consideration my 
qualifications as an expert witness. Part II explains my approach 
to the issues raised by this case. Part III reviews admissibility 
principles governing expert testimony. Part IV considers the 
exclusion of expert testimony on foreseeability. Part V discusses 
the exclusion of expert testimony on the so-called "moth 
phenomenom." Finally, Part VI addresses whether sanctions are 
warranted in this case. 
I 
General Qualifications 
5. I have taught evidence at B.Y.U. since 1985. Before 
then, I taught evidence at Vanderbilt Law School in Nashville, 
Tennessee. 
6. In 1984, I co-authored with Irving Younger a case-
book entitled Principles of Evidence. The book has been adopted by 
numerous professors at other schools, and will soon be published in 
its second edition. 
7. I have lectured on evidence law to students and 
practitioners throughout the country. 
8. Because evidence law interfaces with civil litiga-
tion generally, I am also familiar with Rule 11 principles. 
Indeed, I have published on this subject, and called for more 
aggressive application of sanctions to curtail abusive litigation. 
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See Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in 
Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 55, 92-97 (1986); Goldsmith, Civil 
RICO Reform: The Basis For Compromise, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 827, 881-82 
(1987). Within the context of the general debate over civil RICO 
reform, I have also testified about this subject before the United 
States Congress. RICO Reform, Hearings before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House of Representa-
tives, 99th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. Part 2, Serial 140, at 1261 
(1986). 
9. My curriculum vita is attached as exhibit 1. 
II 
Analytical Approach 
10. I have reviewed the following materials in connec-
tion with this case: a) all appellate briefs submitted by counsel 
through conclusion of the appellate process; b) Professor Hannafs 
affidavit; c) the motion for sanctions and accompanying memorandum; 
d) pertinent portions of the record; e) the opinion rendered by the 
Court of Appeals; and f) the affidavits submitted by Dean Sam 
Thurmond and Dean Carl Hawkins. 
11. Given the numerous evidentiary issues raised on 
appeal, I have confined my analysis to those matters deemed most 
critical to the outcome of the case. Therefore, I did not consider 
every evidentiary point of conflict. 
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12 . Furthermore, although objectively reasonable grounds 
support numerous issues raised in the petition for reconsideration, 
Mr. DeBry has requested that I confine my analysis to those 
evidentiary issues that clearly resulted in error by the Court of 
Appeals. 
13. Before presenting this analysis, I wish to state 
that my remarks reflect neither disrespect for the Court nor an 
intent to embarrass any of its members.1 If anything, I find the 
motion for sanctions, filed more than a year after conclusion of 
the case, exceedingly peculiar. The thrust of the motion 
apparently seeks to protect this Court from criticism. The Utah 
Court of Appeals, however, is a well respected institution, and 
hardly needs motions of this kind to protect its reputation. 
14. Furthermore, I undertook my analysis with the belief 
that outstanding jurists both welcome constructive criticism and, 
not infrequently, take action to rectify previous mistakes. 
Justice Jackson, for example, once observed: 
But if I have agreed to any prior decision which 
forecloses what now seems to be a sensible construction 
of this Act, I must frankly admit that I was unaware of 
it. . . . Under these circumstances, except for any 
personal humiliation involved in admitting that I do not 
always understand the opinions of this Court, I see no 
]Mr. Debry also assures me that he will file a motion to seal 
the affidavits submitted by the experts supporting his position. 
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reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I 
was unconsciously wrong yesterday.2 
15. Keeping within the spirit of Justice Jackson's 
remarks, I believe that the published opinion committed serious 
error in at least two critical respects: a) the exclusion of expert 
testimony concerning the foreseeability of collisions in the 
emergency lane; and b) the exclusion of expert testimony concerning 
the so-called "moth phenomenon." To appreciate the basis for my 
conclusion, the evidentiary principles governing expert testimony 
must be briefly reviewed. 
Ill 
Admissibility Principles Governing Expert Testimony 
16. The Rules of Evidence modify common law doctrine by 
liberalizing the admissibility of expert testimony. Before the 
enactment of Rule 702, "courts frequently asserted that there was 
no need for expert testimony unless the issue to which the 
Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639-40 (1948) 
(Jackson, J.). On another occasion, Justice Jackson stated: 
Precedent, however, is nor lacking for ways by which 
a judge may recede from a prior opinion that has proven 
untenable . . . . Bur an escape less self-depreciating 
was taken by Lord Westbury, who, it is said rebuffed a 
barrister's reliance upon an earlier opinion of his 
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed that a man of 
my intelligence should have been guilty of giving such an 
opinion." If there are other ways of gracefully and good 
naturedly surrendering former views to a better 
considered position, I invoke them all. 
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1950) (Jackson, J.,). 
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testimony would be directed is Nnot within the common knowledge of 
the average layman.fM 3 Weinsteinfs Evidence sec. 702[02], at 702-
9 (1990). This standard no longer governs. As Weinstein observes: 
Must a court exclude expert testimony if the subject 
is within the comprehension of the average juror? Such 
a test is incompatible with the standard of helpfulness 
expressed in Rule 702. First, it assumes wrongly that 
there is a bright line separating issues within the 
comprehension of jurors from those that are not. 
Secondly, even when jurors are well equipped to make 
judgments on the basis of their common knowledge and 
experience, experts may have specialized knowledge to 
bring to bear on the same issue which would be helpful. 
Id. at 702-15 (emphasis added); see D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 3 
Federal Evidence sec. 380, at 633 (1979). 
17. Given this liberalized standard, "doubts about 
whether an expert's testimony will be useful should generally be 
resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors 
such as time or surprise favoring exclusion." 3 Weinstein!s 
Evidence sec. 702 [02], at 702-30. This approach is warranted 
because "[t]he jury is intelligent enough, aided by counsel, to 
ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations." Id. 
18. The trial judge's ruling, however, ordinarily is 
reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, and is rarely 
disturbed on appeal. Ici. at 702-22 & 26. The abuse of discretion 
standard, however, does not apply if the trial court "rests its 
decision on a misstatement of law." Roe v. Deere and Co. , 855 F.2d 
151, 155 (3rd Cir. 1988). Under such circumstances, the ruling must 
be examined for "legal error." Id. 
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19. Based on these principles, I believe that the trial 
judge clearly abused his discretion in declining to admit expert 
testimony concerning the foreseeability of a collision in the 
emergency lane. In addition, the trial judge's decision excluding 
expert testimony on the "moth phenomenon11 was both an abuse of 
discretion and based on an incorrect legal standard. These rulings 
are discussed separately below. 
IV 
The Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Foreseeability 
20. To establish proximate cause and foreseeability, 
Appellant sought to introduce expert testimony concerning the 
following factors: a) the purpose of the emergency lane; b) the 
fact that road designers recognize that vehicles will sometimes 
drive into the emergency lane; c) that emergency lanes are designed 
to provide a recovery zone for errant vehicles; and d) that truck 
drivers are trained to know that errant vehicles may drive into an 
emergency lane, and, thus, are instructed not to park in such 
lanes. 
21. The trial court rejected this evidence because it 
would not be "helpful" to the jury. Transcript, at 245, 254, & 293. 
22. In my judgment, the excluded evidence would have 
been very helpful to the jury. For example, most people probably 
assume that emergency lanes are intended to provide an area to make 
emergency repairs or to leave a car temporarily pending repairs. 
7 
Few of us know that such lanes are also designed to provide a 
recovery zone for errant vehicles, much less that truckers receive 
specific training on the need to keep such lanes open. Expert 
testimony ordinarily would be necessary to make this point. 
Indeed, I believe that such testimony would have been admissible 
under the more stringent pre-Rules "necessity" standard applied by 
many courts. 
23. The Court of Appeals, however, never addressed the 
issue of helpfulness. The opinion states that some of this 
evidence pertained only to the question of negligence. As the 
trial judge had directed a verdict on the negligence issue, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that such evidence was properly rejected 
as irrelevant. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
24. As to the evidence bearing on foreseeability, the 
Court of Appeals merely noted that the trial judge had rejected 
this testimony because it "would not be particularly helpful to the 
jury. The [trial] court believed that the jury was as capable as 
the expert to make the determination of foreseeability." Id. 
Rather than review this issue, however, the Court of Appeals 
rejected the appeal because "plaintiff has failed to carry his 
burden of showing that the claimed error was substantial and 
prejudicial." Id. 
25. By taking this approach, the Court of Appeals made 
two fundamental mistakes. First, the Court failed to recognize 
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that all of this evidence pertained to foreseeability. The fact 
that such evidence also bore upon negligence did not preclude its 
relevance to foreseeability, which constitutes a separate element 
of a tort claim. See, e.g. , Sheehan v. City of New York, 354 
N.E.2d 832, 834 (N.Y. 1976) ("negligence and proximate cause 
frequently overlap in the proof and theory which support each of 
them"); c£. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) 
("proof used to establish . . . separate elements may in particular 
cases coalesce"). 
26. Second, the Court failed to recognize that excluding 
this evidence was inherently prejudicial because it prevented 
appellant from presenting the only available evidence on a critical 
element of its case. "[W]hen the erroneously excluded evidence 
would have been the only or primary evidence in support of . . . a 
claim , the error is generally found prejudicial." 1 
Weinstein's Evidence sec. 103[06], at 103-70 (1990) (citing 
extensive authority). See also Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. , 
722 F.2d 1134, 1140 (3d Cir. 1983) (expert testimony "crucial;" 
"[w]ithout it, plaintiffs could not establish causation.") ; Shad v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(exclusion of expert testimony prejudicial, as plaintiffs 
"prevented . . . from presenting their case to a jury") ; Linkstrom 
v. Golden T. Farms, 883 F.2d 269, 271-272 (3d Cir. 1989) (exclusion 
of expert testimony on causation deemed prejudicial). 
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27. Under such circumstances, there is a "reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
Slusher v. Osoital by Ospital. 777 P.2d 437, 444 (Utah 1989) 
(setting forth the general standard) .3 Indeed, it makes no sense 
to reject evidence as unhelpful to the jury and then to deem the 
exclusion non-prejudicial when the jury returns a verdict directly 
at odds with the proffered evidence. 
V 
The Exclusion of Expert Testimony on the Moth Phenomenon 
28. Appellant sought to introduce evidence of the so-
called "moth phenomenon" to explain how a drowsy driver could have 
been lured by flashing taillights to crash into appellees1 truck. 
Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 2-3. The trial rejected this 
Significantly, the "reasonable likelihood" standard does not 
require proof of a probability. State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913, 920 
(Utah 1987) ("[Tjhoughtful reflection suggests that confidence in 
the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short of 
the 'more probable than not1 portion of the spectrum"). 
In the present case, the significance of the error was 
compounded by the following improper statement, made by defense 
counsel, during closing argument: 
[T]he foreseeability question is: How was Stan Wheeler 
expected to foresee that at that precise time if, as Mr. 
Debry said, one in a billon chances that it would happen 
right at that particular time— 
117 Utah Adv. Rep., at 17. The Court of Appeals did not view this 
remark as prejudicial, within the total context, because of the 
trial judge's neutral admonishment to the jury. Id. The excluded 
expert testimony, however, would have explained to the jury why 
such accidents are foreseeable generally and why truckers, in 
particular, know to expect them. 
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evidence as unhelpful, lacking factual foundation, and prejudicial. 
117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
29. The Court of Appeals did not address separately the 
question of helpfulness under Rule 702. Instead, the opinion 
implies that the trial judge merged this issue into his analysis of 
foundation and prejudice. Id. According to the opinion, the trial 
judge reasoned that absent foundation, such testimony would be 
unhelpful and prejudicial. Id[. The Court of Appeals then 
sustained the trial judge's ruling simply by finding no abuse of 
discretion under Rule 403. Id. 
30. The trial court, however, did not merge his analysis 
of helpfulness and foundation. Transcript, at 245, 254, & 293. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have treated these issues 
separately. As few jurors would be familiar with the "moth 
phenomenon," such expert testimony would obviously help explain why 
an awake drive would drive straight into the rear-end of a truck 
that is flashing its taillights. Indeed, this testimony also would 
have qualified under the pre-Rules "necessity" standard governing 
expert: proof. Thus, the trial court's rejection of this proof as 
unhelpful constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
31. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the factual 
foundation supporting this testimony is also problematic. The 
Court stated: 
[T]he theory is premised on the fact that a driver must 
be awake in order to be so "lured." Plaintiff's own 
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expert admitted that there was no conclusive way to 
determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior 
to the accident. Nor does the theory necessarily 
establish causation because plaintiff's expert conceded 
there was no evidence of the factors triggering the moth 
phenomenon. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
32. This analysis commits two mistakes. First, plain-
tiff was not required to establish Steven Ostler's state of 
consciousness "conclusive[ly]." As the relevance of the proffered 
testimony was conditional upon proof of Ostler's consciousness, the 
trial judge's preliminary factual determination was governed by 
Rule 104(b). Under that provision, a proponent need only establish 
a prima facie case with respect to the underlying fact at issue 
(e.g. Ostler's state of consciousness). Rule 104(b) is designed to 
protect against judges removing a matter from the jury's domain 
whenever the court is not personally persuaded of the existence of 
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certain facts.4 In the present case, however, that is precisely 
what occurred, 
33, Furthermore, the Court of Appeals mistakenly emphasized the 
apparent concession by appellant's expert. In so doing, the Court 
overlooked the fact that appellant cited other portions of the 
expertfs testimony supporting application of the moth phenomenon to 
this case. Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 4-5. In addition, 
another expert also testified that the foundational factors 
40f course, courts routinely preclude evidence from jury 
consideration when making competency determinations under Rule 
104(a). Thus, for example, witness competency is governed by Rule 
104(a). But the question of witness competency remains distinct 
from the relevance of his testimony, which is determined by Rule 
104(b). 
Though courts rarely mention Rule 104(b) in resolving factual 
questions involving expert testimony, the approach outlined above 
best reflects the theory underlying Rule 702: weaknesses in an 
expert's position are to be developed on cross-examination. Cf. 
Coleman v. De Minico, 730 F.2d 42, 45-47 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(sustaining admissibility of expert testimony based on incomplete 
factual record and noting that facts at issue "do not lend 
themselves to precise quantification") ; Singer v. E.I du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433, (8th Cir. 1978) (court rejected attack 
on expert testimony as speculative; this "attack must be viewed in 
light of the new Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert 
testimony. . . . While an opinion still ^rises no higher than the 
level of evidence and the logic upon which it is predicated, ' it is 
now for the jury, with the assistance of vigorous cross-
examination, to measure the worth of the opinion"); Hurst v. United 
States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1989) ("A trial court should 
exclude expert testimony only if it is so fundamentally unsupported 
that it cannot help the factfinder") ; Snvder v. Whitt'aker Corp. , 
839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988) ("that these facts [supporting 
expert testimony] were thin" could be attacked on cross-
examination) ; United States v. 478.34 Acres of Land, 578 F.2d 156, 
159-160 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Rule 104(b) to expert testimony). 
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supporting this theory were present. Transcript, at 278-281. In 
my judgment, the moth phenomenon is supported by prima facie 
evidence. 
34. Although the Court of Appeals may not have been made 
fully aware of the complete factual record,5 the commission of 
error is further indicated by the Court's affirmance of the trial 
judge notwithstanding appellees having opened the door to such 
proof by their own trial tactics. 
35. After rejecting appellant's evidence on the moth 
phenomenon, the trial judge allowed defendant-appellees to 
introduce extensive proof concerning the ability of an awake driver 
to stop before hitting a truck parked in the emergency lane. 
Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 19-20; Appellant's Reply Brief, at 
10-12. As this evidence necessarily assumed an awake driver, the 
trial court should have permitted plaintiff to introduce the "moth 
phenomenon" in rebuttal. Failure to do so gave the jury only one 
side of the picture. Thus, prejudicial error occurred. Cf. 
Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1140-41 (3rd Cir. 
1983) (in reversing for failure to admir expert testimony, Court 
characterized evidence as "crucial" because of the need to rebut 
Appellant's briefs summarized the evidence supporting Ostler's 
awakeness, but did not specify that two experts testified to the 
adequacy of the factual foundation. The appellate opinion, 
however, recognizes that testimony from two experts was excluded. 
117 Utah Adv. Rep., at 15. In addition, appellant's references to 
the record included pages containing "moth phenomenon" testimony 
from both experts. Appellant's Substitute Brief, at 3-5. 
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opponent's proof); Murphy v. Magnolia Electric Power Association, 
639 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1981) ("exclusion of [rebuttal] 
evidence struck at the heart of appellants1 case"); Fox v. 
Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990) (exclusion of 
expert testimony constitutes reversible error, "especially . . . in 
light of the district court's subsequent admission" of expert 
evidence to the contrary). See generally McCormick on Evidence 
147-148 (1984). The Court of Appeals opinion, however, never even 
addresses this issue. 
VI 
The Sanctions Issue 
36. Given the preceding analysis, I do not believe that 
sanctions are warranted in this case. Objectively reasonable 
grounds supported Mr. DeBry's decision to ask the Court of Appeals 
to reconsider its ruling. 
37. Admittedly, Mr. DeBry chose an unorthodox method to 
petition the Court for reconsideration. However, given the failure 
of his initial appeal, he obviously felt the need to do something 
thar would get the Court's attention. The Hanna affidavit achieved 
that function. In addition, as a motion for rehearing ordinarily 
does not afford counsel the opportunity to address numerous issues, 
the Hanna affidavit gave Mr. DeBry a vehicle for presenting a wide 
variety of evidentiary issues. These issues, in my judgment, were 
not frivolous. 
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38. Moreover, I agree with the views expressed by Dean 
Thurmond in his affidavit. Given both the seriousness of the 
issues at hand and the extent of injuries incurred by his client, 
it was not unprofessional for Mr. DeBry to take the extreme measure 
of filing an extra-record affidavit. Rule 11 and its various 
counterparts were not intended to chill creative advocacy. 
39. For more than a decade, I have stressed to my 
students the need to become "can do" lawyers. Too many attorneys 
approach the law in a wooden and mechanical manner. The quality of 
legal representation — and ultimately the quality of justice — 
suffer as a result. See A. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His 
Times 243 (1978) (recounting an incident in which Kennedy 
criticized the "can't do" lawyers on his staff). 
40. Whether the Court agrees with his tactics, Mr. 
DeBry1s submission of the Hanna affidavit is an effort at "can do" 
lawyering. Unorthodox methods do not always succeed but, so long 
as they are supported by objectively reasonable grounds, sanctions 
should not be imposed for such advocacy. 
DATED this £ day of July, 1991. 
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
tf&wia/ 
Noom* 
the C o * 
Uteh Court of Applets 
Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 
F & R Roe, Inc., and Stanley E. 
Wheeler, 
Petitioners, 
Robert J. DeBry, In His 
Capacity as Counsel for Ralph 
Ostler, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910246-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 5, 1991) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Petitioners 
Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Russon (Law and Motion). 
Petitioners1 filed a petition in this court seeking 
sanctions against Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as counsel 
for Ralph Ostler in an earlier appeal. That appeal culminated 
in the opinion reported at 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989), cert 
denied, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah 1990). Respondent Robert 
J. DeBry filed a response to the petition and the following 
motions: 
Motion To Recall The 
Correct The Opinion; 
Consolidate 
Mandate and To 
and Motion To 
Motion To Seal The Record 
1. Petitioners used the caption (I-MH t-jie original appeal, 
filed by Ralph Ostler, as the caption Cor then pleadings. 
That appeal was culminated over a year before the present 
petition was filed. The petition is, accordingly, considered 
as an original proceeding filed in this court and the caption 
has been adjusted to reflect that fact. 
3. Motion To File Supplemental Affidavit In 
Support of Memorandum In Opposition To 
Petition For Sanctions Against Robert J. 
DeBry As Counsel For Plaintiff Ralph 
Ostler 
This court's initial inquiry must be whether there is a 
basis for jurisdiction to determine the petition for 
sanctions. The appellate process, including action on the 
petition for writ of certiorari, has been concluded for over a 
year. Accordingly, we consider the petition as an original 
proceeding in this court. The petition does not contain a 
jurisdictional statement and purportedly relies upon Rule 33 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1991 
Supp.) as the basis for the claim. While those provisions 
pertain to the substantive claim, they do not state a basis for 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(1990) describes this court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. Subsection (1) describes this 
court's original, as opposed to appellate, jurisdiction.^ The 
petitioners have not cited any provision of section 78-2a-3(l) 
as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the petition 
for sanctions. Similarly, they have not conformed their 
petition to the pleading requirements of Utah R. App. P. 19 
pertaining to petitions for extraordinary writs, nor do they 
characterize the petition as being filed under that rule. 
The request for sanctions should have been made while 
the appeal was pending. Petitioners argue, however, that the 
acts complained of occurred after this court's opinion issued, 
in connection with the petition for rehearing and petition for 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l) provides: "The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all writs and process 
necessary: (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and 
decrees; or (b) in aid of its jurisdiction." 
3. The procedure for seeking sanctions on appeal was clarified 
in amendments to Utah R. App. P. 33, and Utah R. App. P. 40 
that became effective in April of 1990. Rule 33(c)(1) 
provides, in part, "A party moy * onno^+- finni^ ies under this rule 
only as part of the appellee's ip^ tivn OJI summary disposition 
under Rule 10, as part of the Rppellee"^ brief, or as part of a 
party's response to a motion or other paper." Rule 40 
incorporates the procedures of Rule 33 by reference. 
writ of certiorari. This court did not call for a response to 
the petition for rehearing. Petitioners, however, filed 
responses to the petition for writ of certiorari on January 15 
and January 25, 1990. Neither response included a request for 
sanctions. Petitioners filed a motion to strike the Hanna 
affidavit in February, 1990, and again did not request 
sanctions, although they were successful in obtaining a ruling 
by the Utah Supreme Court striking the affidavit. A petition 
for sanctions was filed in the trial court ten months after the 
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari. The claim for 
sanctions was ripe, at the very least, during proceedings in 
the Utah Supreme Court. Issuance of the remittitur ended this 
court's jurisdiction to consider the claim for sanctions on 
appea1. 
We dismiss the petition for sanctions for lack of 
jurisdiction. On the same basis, we deny the motions to recall 
mandate, to consolidate the present petition with the original 
appeal, and to supplement the response to the petition. We 
further deny the motion to seal the records of this court in 
the original appeal and in the proceedings on this petition. 
ALL^CONCUR: 
rn- 3U^^ 
. Garff , J u d g e / / 
/ / 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RALPH OSTLER, ) 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ; 
HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE | 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS1 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
) Case No: 
Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Ralph Ostler petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ 
of Mandamus directing the Utah Court of Appeals to exercise 
jurisdiction over Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate filed with 
the Court of Appeals. 
1
 Ostler has also filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
in this case. The issues in both petitions overlap. 
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III. 
ALL PERSONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE INTEREST MIGHT 
BE SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED 
Albina Transfer Co., Inc., F & R Roe, Inc., Stanley E. 
Wheeler, and the Utah Court of Appeals including panel members 
Judith M. Billings, Regnel W. Garff, Leonard H. Russon are persons 
or entities whose interests might be affected by this petition. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The issue in this petition is whether a writ of mandamus 
should issue to compel the Utah Court of Appeals to exercise its 
jurisdiction to decide the merits of a Motion to Recall the Mandate 
filed by Ostler. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PETITION 
This litigation arose out of a collision between a pickup 
driven by Ostler's father and a truck parked in the highway 
emergency lane. Ostler was a passenger in the pickup Ostler's 
father was the driver. Wheeler was the driver of the truck. 
Wheeler's employers are Albina Transfer Co., Inc. and F & R Roe, 
Inc. (The defendants, below, are hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Wheeler".) 
1 
As a result of the collision, Ostler's father was killed 
and Ostler suffered permanent and paralyzing injuries. Ostler does 
not walk. He is painfully confined to a wheel chair. 
At trial, the judge ruled that Wheeler negligently parked 
the truck in the emergency lane and directed a verdict against the 
respondents on the issue of negligence. However, Ostler lost at 
trial. The jury ruled that the truck driver's negligent conduct 
was not the proximate cause of Ostler's injuries. 
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. 
(Appendix 1). Subsequently, Ostler filed a petition for rehearing 
with the Court of Appeals (Appendix 2) , and thereafter a petition 
for certiorari with this Court. (Appendix 3) . In support of the 
petitions, Ostler filed the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna, 
chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of 
Utah ("Hanna affidavit") (Appendix 4). 
After both petitions were denied, Wheeler filed a Motion 
for Sanctions with the Utah Court of Appeals. The motion alleged 
that the petition for rehearing, the petition for certiorari and 
the Hanna affidavit were all filed in bad faith and contrary to 
U.R.C.P. 11. (Appendix 5). 
Ostler filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for 
Sanctions. (Appendix 6). Ostler's memorandum was supported by 
affidavits from the former Dean of the University of Utah College 
of Law (Thurman) , the former Dean of the Brigham Young University 
2 
College of Law (Hawkins), and a nationally known professor of 
Evidence (Goldsmith). (See Appendices 7, 8, 9). 
However, Ostler did more than simply defend against the 
Motions for Sanctions. Based upon the same affidavits, Ostler 
affirmatively filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate. (Appendix 10) . 
Faced with the affidavits of Thurman, Hawkins and 
Goldsmith, Wheeler elected not to file any memorandum in opposition 
to Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate. 
In a three page unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals 
denied Wheeler's Motion for Sanctions. The Court of Appeals also 
denied the Motion to Recall the Mandate. (Appendix 11). Only one 
sentence was devoted to Ostler's Motion To Recall the Mandate: 
[F]or lack of jurisdiction . . . we deny the 
motions to recall mandate and to supplement 
the response to the petition. 
Ostler timely petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a 
writ of mandamus. 
VI. 
WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE 
REMEDY EXISTS AND WHY THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not rule on the merits of 
Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate. Rather, the Court of 
Appeals ruled, without explanation, without analysis, and without 
citation of authority that it lacked jurisdiction to recall the 
mandate. The correct procedural device to challenge the ruling of 
the Court of Appeals is by mandamus. 
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When an inferior court or tribunal [Court of 
Appeals] having jurisdiction, erroneously 
rules it is without jurisdiction and for such 
reason refuses to hear or proceed with a cause 
and dismisses it, mandamus is the proper 
remedy to compel the court to reinstate the 
cause, assume jurisdiction and proceed with 
it. (Emphasis added). 
State el rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727, 729 (1982). 
Thus, no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists, 
mandamus is the proper remedy. 
VII. 
WHY IT IS IMPRACTICAL OR INAPPROPRIATE TO FILE 
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The district court is an inferior court to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Further, only this court has jurisdiction to issue a 
writ of mandamus directed to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
VIII. 
COPIES OF THE OPINION 
Copies of the Utah Court of Appeals opinion, and parts of 
the record which are essential to an understanding of the matters 
set forth in this petition are attached as Appendices 1-11. A 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of the petition for 
a writ of mandamus is included below. 
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IX, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF OSTLER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
It must be stressed that Ostler does not seek a writ 
compelling the Court of Appeals to grant the Motion to Recall the 
Mandate, Ostler simply seeks a writ compelling the Court of 
Appeals to exercise its jurisdiction to consider the Motion to 
Recall the Mandate on the merits. 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INHERENT POWER OR JURISDICTION 
TO CONSIDER A MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE 
Appellate courts have inherent power or jurisdiction to 
recall and review their own judgments, mandates, and orders. This 
is so even if the motion was filed after the time allowed for a 
petition for rehearing, or even if a petition for rehearing was 
denied. See Cahill v> N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 351 U.S. 183 
(1956); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet, 686 P.2d 954 
(N.M. 1984); Marshall v. Amos, 442 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1968); Reimers 
v. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co., 273 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1954); Lindus v. 
Northern Insurance Co. of N.Y., 438 P.2d 311 (Ariz. 1968); Chapman 
v. St. Stephen's Protestant Episcopal Church, 138 So. 630 (Fla. 
1932); Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25 
(1965). 
As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in 
Coleman v. Turpin, 827 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1987): 
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[A]n appellate court has power to set aside at 
any time a mandate to prevent an 
injustice or to preserve the integrity of the 
judicial process. 
Id. at 671. 
The appellate court's power or jurisdiction to recall its 
mandate and reconsider its decision exists regardless of whether 
there is a rule or statute specifically authorizing the court to do 
so. e.g. , Yonadi v. Homestead County Homes, 127 A.2d 198 (N.J. 
1956); see Boudar v. EG&G Inc. , 742 P. 2d 491 (N.M. 1987). The 
basis for this rule is that: 
[T]he interest in finality of litigation must 
yield where the interests of justice would 
make unfair the strict application of . . . 
rules. 
United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 100 (1957). 
An appellate court's inherent jurisdiction or power to 
recall the mandate springs from English equity common law juris-
prudence. The United States Supreme Court, in holding that a 
Circuit Court of Appeals had the jurisdiction, power, and duty to 
recall its mandate and vacate its earlier judgment explained: 
From the beginning there has existed . . . a 
rule of equity to the effect that under 
certain circumstances . . . relief will be 
granted against judgments regardless of the 
terms of their entry. Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 
U.S. 589. This equity rule, which was firmly 
established in English practice long before 
the foundation of our Republic . . . developed 
and fashioned to fulfill a universally 
recognized need for correcting injustices 
which, in certain instances, are deemed 
6 
sufficiently gross to demand a departure from 
rigid adherence to term rules. 
• * * 
It is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to 
relieve hardships which, from time to time, 
arise from a hard and fast adherence to 
another court-made rule, the general rule that 
judgments should not be disturbed after the 
term of their entry has expired. Created to 
avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this 
equitable procedure has always been character-
ized by flexibility which enables it to meet 
new situations which demand equitable inter-
vention, and to accord all the relief neces-
sary to correct particular injustices . . . . 
• * * 
We think that when this Court, a century ago, 
approved this practice and held that federal 
appellate courts have the power to pass upon, 
and hence to grant or deny, petitions for 
bills of review even though the petitions be 
presented long after the term of the 
challenged judgment has expired, it settled 
the procedural question here involved. 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co. , 322 U.S. 238, 
248-49 (1944). 
By statute, Utah adopted the Common Law of England: 
The Common Law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the 
constitution or laws of the United States, or 
the constitution or laws of this state, and so 
far only as it is consistent with and adopted 
to the natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessity of the people hereof, 
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953 as amended). 
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In this case, the Court of Appeals, in one sentence, 
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider Ostler's Motion to 
Recall the Mandate. That ruling implies that its prior defective 
decision must stand. However: 
[Appellate decisions] must be final because 
they are right, and not right because they are 
final, even if we must take the untoward 
action of acknowledging our incorrect limita-
tion of the issues presented to us on previous 
rehearing. 
Boudar, supra at 443. 
Applying statutory principles similar to the common law 
principles described above, the Utah Supreme Court in an 1885 
decision effectively granted a motion to recall the mandate 
(although without using the name) . Fenton v. Salt Lake Co. , 4 Utah 
116 (1885). 
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that a 
trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief from 
a judgment even after a notice of appeal is filed. Baker v. 
Western Surety Co. , 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988). The Baker 
decision is based on the idea that a trial court has jurisdiction 
to review, correct and amend its own judgments. see generally, 
Baker at 880-81; Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 463 
F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971). However, the Court of Appeals failed to 
recognize that it has the same inherent power to review its own 
decisions that the trial court had in Baker, supra. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS1 JURISDICTION TO RECALL 
THE MANDATE ALSO SPRINGS FROM UTAH STATUTE 
As set forth in Point I above, the Court of Appeals has 
inherent power and jurisdiction to consider Ostler's Motion to 
Recall the Mandate. However, the Utah Court of Appeals also has 
statutory power to consider Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate.2 
The Court of Appeals had original jurisdiction over the 
Ostler appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b), (cases 
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l) explicitly grants the Court 
of Appeals, "jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
judgments and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction." 
A motion to recall the mandate is in the nature of an 
extraordinary writ or proceeding necessary to effect its judgment 
orders and decrees, see generally, e.g., Greater Boston TV Corp., 
supra; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. , supra; Yonadi, supra; Coleman, supra. 
Thus, Utah appellate courts have specific statutory power 
or jurisdiction to consider motions to recall the mandate. 
2The rules of appellate procedure do not address the issue. 
However, whether a rule exists is not critical to the analysis 
because the rules of appellate procedure neither "extend or limit 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. . . ." 
(U.R.A.P. 1). 
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POINT III 
BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL PROCEDURAL CONTEXT OF THIS 
CASE, THE THREE EXPERT AFFIDAVITS ARE APPROPRIATE 
AND HELPFUL TO THIS COURT IN DECIDING WHETHER 
TO GRANT MANDAMUS 
The affidavits of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith 
(Appendices 7, 8, 9) show that there has been a grave miscarriage 
of justice in this case. According to Dean Samuel Thurman: "In 
Ostler proximate cause should have been directed by the trial 
court." (Appendix 7 at p. 4). According to Dean Hawkins: "The 
opinion of the Court of Appeals obscures the basic legal question 
as to the scope of liability. . . . " (Appendix 8 at para. 3) . 
Also, Dean Hawkins states: "Thus, by this line of analysis, the 
trial court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff on the 
issue of causation as well as on the issue of defendant's 
negligence." (Appendix 8 at para. 7). According to Professor 
Goldsmith: " . . . The published opinion committed serious error in 
at least two critical respects. . . . " (Appendix 9 at para. 15). 
Professor Goldsmith's affidavit also directs the court's attention 
to the following comments of Justice Jackson: 
But if I have agreed to any prior decision 
which forecloses what now seems to be a 
sensible construction of this Act, I must 
frankly admit that I was unaware of it. . . . 
Under these circumstances, except for any 
personal humiliation involved in admitting 
that I do not always understand the opinions 
of this Court, I see no reason why I should be 
10 
consciously wrong today because I was 
unconsciously wrong yesterday. 
Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639-40 (1948) 
(Jackson, J.). 
On another occasion, Justice Jackson stated: 
Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by 
which a judge may recede from a prior opinion 
that has proven untenable. . . . But an escape 
less self-depreciating was taken by Lord 
Westbury, who, it is said rebuffed a barris-
ter's reliance upon an earlier opinion of his 
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed 
that a man of my intelligence should have been 
guilty of giving such an opinion.11 If there 
are other ways of gracefully and good natured-
ly surrendering former views to a better 
considered position, I invoke them all. 
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1950) (Jackson, J.). 
However, a threshold issue may be whether such affidavits 
are appropriate. It is important to note that the expert affi-
davits came into this case as a defensive measure. After Wheeler 
won his case in the trial court and the appellate courts, he 
petitioned the Court of Appeals for sanctions. Specifically, 
Wheeler urged that Ostler's petition for certiorari and the Hanna 
affidavit were frivolous and in bad faith. 
The only way Ostler could show that the petition and 
affidavit were not frivolous was by obtaining affidavits from 
experts in torts (Hawkins); evidence (Goldsmith) and legal ethics 
(Thurman). Thus, Wheeler's motion for sanctions triggered the need 
for the expert affidavits. 
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The expert affidavits show that the motion for sanctions 
is without merit; however, at the same time, those same affidavits 
describe the egregious errors of the trial court and Court of 
Appeals. Or stated in other words, Ostler offered the affidavits 
of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith as a defensive measure; however, 
those same affidavits necessarily show that the mandate should be 
recalled. 
Therefore, granting mandamus will not open the floodgates 
for the use of such expert affidavits in other appellate pro-
ceedings. This case can only be cited to approve expert affidavits 
(commenting on a court's opinion) which are offered defensively. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider 
Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate, and Mandamus should be 
issued to the Court of Appeals directing it to consider the merits 
of Ostler's motion. 
DATED this ^7 day of ys
 rj7~ , 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Petitioner 
By: . O . v i ' ^ 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
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RALPH OSTLER, 
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ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Respondents. 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
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90 North 100 East 
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Case No: 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A08 4 9 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 2 62-8915 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC, 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Case No: 
Pursuant to Rules 4 6 and 4 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Ralph Ostler petitions the Utah Supreme Court 
for a Writ of Certiorari to review that portion of the unpublished 
Court of Appeals1 opinion entered on August 5, 1991, wherein the 
Court of Appeals ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate. 
1
 Ostler has also filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The 
issues in both petitions overlap. 
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III. 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The parties to this proceeding are petitioner Ralph 
Ostler, and respondents, Albina Transfer Co., Inc., F & R Roe, 
Inc., Stanley Wheeler. 
IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does an appellate court have jurisdiction to consider an 
uncontested Motion to Recall the Mandate, particularly when the 
motion is filed in response to a petition for sanctions? 
V. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The official unpublished opinion is attached in the 
Appendix. 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The date of the decision sought to be reviewed is August 
5, 1991. The statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on the 
Utah Supreme Court to review the decision are: 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, §§ 3 and 4. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2, (3)(a) and (5). 
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VII. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory provisions are U.R.A.P. 46, 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3, Utah Code Ann. . § 78-2-4. Copies 
attached in the Appendix. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This litigation arose out of a collision between a pickup 
driven by Ostler's father and a truck parked in the highway 
emergency lane. Ostler was a passenger in the pickup. Ostler's 
father was the driver. Respondent Wheeler was the driver of the 
truck. Wheeler's employers are respondents Albina Transfer Co., 
Inc. and F & R Roe, Inc. 
As a result of the collision, Ostler's father was killed 
and Ostler suffered permanent and paralyzing injuries. Ostler does 
not walk. He is painfully confined to a wheel chair. 
At trial, the judge ruled that Wheeler negligently parked 
the truck in the emergency lane and directed a verdict against the 
respondents on the issue of negligence. However, Ostler lost at 
trial. The jury ruled that the truck driver's negligent conduct 
was not the proximate cause of Ostler's injuries. 
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. 
(Appendix 1). Subsequently, Ostler filed a petition for rehearing 
2 
with the Court of Appeals (Appendix 2) and thereafter a petition 
for certiorari with this Court. (Appendix 3). In support of the 
petitions, Ostler filed the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna, 
chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of 
Utah ("Hanna affidavit11) (Appendix 4). 
After both petitions were denied, respondents filed a 
Motion for Sanctions with the Utah Court of Appeals. The motion 
alleged that the petition for rehearing, the petition for 
certiorari and the Hanna affidavit were all filed in bad faith and 
contrary to U.R.C.P. 11. (Appendix 5). 
Ostler filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for 
Sanctions. (Appendix 6). Ostler's memorandum was supported by 
affidavits from the former Dean of the University of Utah College 
of Law (Thurman), the former Dean of the Brigham Young University 
College of Law (Hawkins), and a nationally known professor of 
Evidence (Goldsmith). (See Appendices 7, 8, 9). 
However, Ostler did more than simply defend against the 
Motions for Sanctions. Based upon the same affidavits, Ostler 
affirmatively filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate. (Appendix 10) . 
Faced with the affidavits of Thurman, Hawkins and 
Goldsmith, the respondents elected not to file any memorandum in 
opposition to Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate. 
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Decisions of this Court. 
Without analysis or citation L * * • : 
,-.-.£ ,n ^ one sentence opinion >-
 4 . • : '..Q dtpe..,:8 . ,:\.s 
:.a\e ,^r 1 sri 1 rr. , J: *. r&c?.\ TT^-V^*"*- - dec <-*; ^ -
 x s 
r
 ' :^ [,6h~, ;. renter * e 't^h ^  ;prene Jr-urt eft^ct , <^y 
granted a iriotj.*" * • ~ - ^ I tne mr* * > . 
Th^ r _ , . , a, so contra: ^  • o Miller v. Southern Pacilic 
Co^ , 4 F./a -' '^ar !'-• 'n yiJAer. the i^ah ^T:r«'^- '" - *rt 
- * t " ' * . * . - • , ^ s 
issuea . ^ proper 1\ t • :• ;crrect <m irregularity or errci _n 
the issuance *u±. u 11 e 1 e 111 x 11 e r . '"'f 
^ • Ine L O U I '. JI appeals' K U ^ . jq Con1lie L b with Another Decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
- J-- *•• *^ ' Appeals ruleu t: <! ! r :^ ». r -
 :-
|ii i l^-'-j^r • '-nnsidei - - ' - • 1 ie±, ' ^ 
1 appeal ,.> . .^ - T h e Bakei jec.sicr 
cheated • t: *• • rcer* • :;at *_ne court n a~ juiisaxction tu ieview, 
5 
correct •'fc amend i t s )iidqment nr o r d e r a f t e r t h e c a s f In1'. In'^n 
„. ~ h -J ' i ' H"•' i i 1111 r t :^ee g e n e r a l l y
 ( « J i i . a t e r Bos ton T e l e -
v i s i o n C o r p , v . F . C C , , 4 6 3 , V 2 d 2 0 f' , 2 7 6 - 7 "' ( 0 C . V i < 1 y "M ) . 
'
Ph
*£ Baker c o u r t h e l l t h a t d c v n r f dops lh< i 'n I I n^pea l , in 
: ::.. : ;ase, h e l d t h a t . u>. ^ ^ i t i o r a r i s h o i h - : irr-.-- *o 
r e s o l v e t h e c o n f l i c t . 
D. Whether A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o R e c a l l a Mandate 
i s an I m p o r t a n t Q u e s t i o n of S t a t e Lav Which S h o u l d be S e t t l e d 
by t h e Supreme C o u r t . 
The Utah Supreme C o u r t I s c h a r q e d w i t h d e t e r m i n i n c t h e 
e x t e n t ::: f i t s DWIIIII iippi I L i t e jui i i . d i r l IUIII 11 n I LIIM a p p e l k i t t ; | u r i s -
d i c t i o n o f 11: t e Utah C o u r t r > I A p p e a l s . I t i s a l s o c h a r g e d w i t; h 
r o n s t r u ^ t i n q " "•* r - . ' t o o i ? . a p e l l a t e -•- . 
1
 • -
:
 " .ji-di: . i j a e A n n
 r «. .•>... c a s e p r e s e n t s * *ie c o u r t 
w i t h t-jie o p p o r t u n i t y t o c l a r i f y t h e law r e g a r d i n g m o t i o n s t o re- ;1 
t h e man '•-'•:*' *-
A p p e l l a t e c
 t,;t*.~ r - - - "nher^ i i t ; owei u r i s d , t ; : * :> 
r e c a ] , -ino r e v i e w +-& ^ *:rTr,^*~ *"" - - ; 
cti ^C. u , t * , ^ cil lowed 1 ?i a 
p e t i r if- : r : e r i e a r . r , « j e ^ i t i o n * o r r e n e j ~JJ wets 
d e n i * - - * . See C a h ^ _ _ * * ^ L — L ^ d _ ^ . ^ i _ : . „ ^=_^. 1 Q ? 
•'— - t c e n t r a l A d j u s t m e n t B u r e a u , I n c . v . T h e v e n e : , 68 6 ; 2 *• .; 
~
:
 -
:
 <" M*a?Lsha_l - " Amor * > s I
 S i , . •_; i2 
.:U .— -£.jir...^ ^ k.^-nr ... ^ IT. Pe r C o . , - . , L m d u s v . 
6 
Northern Insurance Co, of N.Y» , 4 3 8 F . 7: >3 * : . Ar
 t r * ; 9< c Chapman 
v. St. Stephen fs Protestant Ep i s cuy^: ±: .r. .. 
19V" •; ondec/s. „... ^ _£„^J_L,. ^ m^i IL U . . world A i r w a y s , Inc . , - b * S 25 
(1 9 6 ^») • 
* - lent • ,.-•-..-..- c^p^ined in 
Coleman v. :~~.
 r , n. 82~ . , •* > •• -.•"•*•:•, •: 
[A :; appellate court nas po**.- • \- t •.,- :de at 
an\ time a mandate . tc prevent \ -
injustice or to preserve uie ir.'^vt"^ .-.^  
judicial process. 
Id. at 671. 
r,,hr '•M-ellat- *. . "n recoil ' t? 
manda te r u . . v , ; S x a e i ir I*-^:^SI^P e x i s t r e g a r d l e s s of v h p t ^ e r 
t h e r e i s a r u l e or s t a t u t e s p ^ i f ;~-^ •• * * 
s o . &±a.\9 Voi'iddi v, Huniesueaa c o u n t y Horn . . 
1 9 5 6 ) ; s e e Boudar v . EG&G I n c . , "42 I . J - »-?^
 v ^ . n - 1 3 6 / j . 
b a s i s f o r t ^ ) * * . t 
[Tjne interest in linality of 1 itigation. must 
yield where the interests of vast ice would 
make unfair the strict application r.f . 
rules 
-. jnitea S t a t e s v . Ohio Power Co, , 3 53 U . S . '<8 , 1 00 ( 1 9 5 7 ) . 
An a p p e l 1 a t e c o u r t l r inhr: ir^nl ih r . t sd i i ' t nu 1 power t o 
•
ii
 • - * - ; . t n q . i sh e q u i t y common law ] u r i s -
f.rudei..;f- \ t i t e d r a t e s '--uprerne " c . " * , ±n nq 1 i\,ii 1 
<*ir.-*j - c o u r t ' - . - _ : _ : t . n.. power , and d u t y t o 
fc
-
j
 . w * t , mar -;^ J*_ , \ . i c a t e 1 r .-. e a r I 1 e r
 J udgment e x p l a i n e d : 
7 
From the beginning there has existed . . . <-. 
rule of equity tc the effect that under 
certain circumstances
 n relief will be 
granted against judgments regardless of the 
terms of their entry- Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Hodgson, 7 Cranch 3;2; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 
U.S. 589. This equity rule, which was firmly 
established i:, English practi^ long before 
the foundation ot our Republic developed 
and fashioned tc rulfijl ; universally 
recoqnized need f-?r correcting injustices 
! certai: instances are deemed 
^-.wiently gross to demand a departure from 
rigid adherence to term rules, 
* * * 
; * . : : ^ ud.-.'.ci, ] J'... \ ^  .tj remedy f a^i., jned to 
relieve hardships which, from time to time, 
arise from -i nxr-t ^nd fast adherence to 
another courts-made rule, the general rule that 
judgments should not be disturbed after the 
te^ ir -A their entry has expired. Created to 
avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this 
equitable procedure has always been character-
ized by flexibility which enables it to meet 
new situations which demand equitable inter-
vention, and to accord all the relief neces-
sary to correct particular injustices . , . , 
We think that when this Cour--, .•. century ago, 
approved this practice and held that federal 
appellate courts have the power to pass upon, 
and hence, to grant or deny, petitions for 
bills of review even tnouqr: t::r> petitions be 
presented long after the tern of the 
cha 1 lenged judgment, has exp ire,; , i t settled 
ths" rrocedar^' question her-: r solved, 
Ifazel-Atlas Glass Co» v. Hartford Em; . .. t 
248"--'- '^44' . 
By statute, Utah adopt-- : moi I,I„ " hughiud: 
8 
The Common Law ot England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the 
constitution -r laws of tr.e United States, or 
the constitution or laws of this state, and c--
far only as it is consistent with and adopted 
to the natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessity of the people hereof, 
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in a ^  courts p_f__. this state . 
(Emph as is a d ded) . 
Utah wOde Ann oo- j - i 
I - r^co •_..„._ . .
 : Appeals ' *-;»- sentence, 
ruled " nat ;r • : -r iur i sd ict ior- - - :-nns;-*ie~ Or* • in in 
Rac : - v ••- • .,..,... : ,„- f.: iu.: ae: ective 
dec is jn must s*, and. However: 
[Appellate decisri-vni ...^ .i ^ . jiai tt^dase 
*•, ir»r right, ana not right because they are 
final, even if we must take * ;r toward 
action cf acknowledging our inccirect limita-
tion of the issues presented to us on nr<-v P 
rehear i ng. 
Boudar, supra 
\ .: i orv rr * r"1 ^ *- ^iri 1 ir t ; * * *• » omr 
p r i n c i p l e s d e s c r i b e e an v e , i h«- "tar* ' u p 'irnp r-*urt -5 
r»p r i s i " e f f e c t i v e • - • . j ruunad*. e 
4.. ^ / . bnn t - ML.:.L. * . lirtitit' Fen ton v . S a l t Lake Co, , 4 Utah 
, e •; r-85). 
. Appooir. ^ a s r uied that a 
trial uurt r,a- ^'isd:* ' • --. t )nsla^- -i ^  * t : on for relief" f r mn 
- judgiuenu tven di* - < f i te.d, Baker v. 
9 
rves^ii. o.re.i, .. L C , , P. 2d 8n8 (Utah App, 1988} . The Baker 
decision is t^se-i en •:.<-* ;;j«-t * .*-•>*• •- • ~ • * court : .•-. -ar i sd i ct: i on 
to : -• • «• * lament?, see general lv, 
Baker nt. c8'."M; Greater Boston Tel• . ,_. . qn_.Corp, v . F . C, C. , 4 6 3 
f 2n 2 68 (J),C r \ r ] n " ^  n u w e w - - .- . >- a i 1 ed t O 
-e %- ,* * :..i -? pawo .jut.
 :; t pevwer • .. review Its own 
decisions that the trial ..j^it :^u ^i* Baker, sjpra, 
£ rhe Opinions of the Court ui Appeals /epajLk-L-i: :;,wii. .j-iic^  -^.^t^
 Med 
Course of Judicial Proceedings. 
The af f ida* . * .,.--: r i 
j. - M t i ..* ' i * ;i& teen a grave miscarriage 
of ' u s t i c e i* *r i- :. > xccordi^n 4- •* - v- Samuej • .- ^ i 
: s t : : • . r e c t e d ' : n,, 
court " -.[i^noix ' at According to Dean .Hawkins: "The 
or ir r : t * - i«.jrj"-jl question 
-1 ; » .,!,,* ".ppendj \ 8 at para. ( i 
Also, Dean H a w h m s st ^ P S * "T'^J-* • -. . 1 jujuly..i,» Iht-
L u a i c .r* • J J , . : iv.i plaint if! on "he 
issue o: causation a,- wei , .-is .---^  i^f^^dant's 
negligence." (Append * c - + : i lessor 
<"- - * !l * . * » , .. .
 A. :. ^  ,, .1-,, eun/nittea serious -rr r in 
at h is: * ;. riticai respects* rr^r.i ) . 
Professes " - : - . oL ^ : liC .^  t_ attention 
t. *. !.ii»A. j .-omineri:.s oi .Justice Jacks n; 
But i f 1 ha v er agreed to t.tJ t . v ±^i aeciciuii 
which forecloses what now seems tc be a 
sensible construction of th is Act, I .xist 
frankly admit that I was unaware of i t. . -
Under these circumstances, except for d:;, 
persona 1 h um i 1 i a t i on i n v o 1 v e d i n a d :m i 11 i n g 
that 1 do not always understand trie opinions 
cf '-his Court I see nc reason why I should be 
consciously wrc today b^. duse ' wds 
un^opsr i r%i • r ' v *~ -*s1 e r -i -i 
Massachusetts v^__ United States. - • ' _ , c „:?-«; ~
 v ^  -x b, 
(Jacysrn T 
^ h o r occasion, ^ust'c-- in *--- ^ y*at<--:: 
P r e v ^ a c t , ..-.*e-ti , . - jiot JLCI^K . ! g ;cr ways by 
which a judge .-nay recede from a prior opinion 
that has proven untenable ' ar. escape 
less self-deprec lat i r.q **a^ taken by ; cri 
Westbury, whT it ,F set id rebuffed a b a n i s -
ter's reliance upon <v r-arher >pinion of his 
Lordsnip: "I .'an only say that : «jr. amazea 
that a man cr T V intelligence shou.1 ' l < leer; 
guilt, r: Q,\A'IQ such an opinicr.' trer-
are other ways of gracefully and J >.,a p.^tured-
ly surrendering former views tc i Srettei 
considered posit i ^ T i r w r ^ c *--,?^  -; A 
McGra*::: : , L. aiuc- : , < (Jacks cr , "" % . 
However f\reshcl1 issue may be whether such affidavits 
are appropri^^ exp^^t 
a.:' 1 ..--.• i j_ , tc * ud.^ » * er* :*;s .',f measure 
Vvneeier r I " o'rf ~ * . *>-,-, -^  
he petitioned _, . *t-...,. 4tCii,ja,.; , 
kr.eeler urged v -.*. ustie: ':• t-t:tion f : «-rt iorari and the Hanna 
d f f. ida vi* were + K i vo 1:; • -
The i HI i y w,^ I istlei could show '-hat lhe pet it I T . : • •: 
affidavit wen-1 not frivolous * ••- by obtaining ifir.-'. ' 
experts in torts (Hawkins); evidence (Goldsmith) and legal ethics 
(Thurman). Thus, Wheelerfs motion for sanctions triggered the need 
for the expert affidavits. 
The expert affidavits show that the motion for sanctions 
is without merit; however, at the same time, those same affidavits 
describe the egregious errors of the trial court and Court of 
Appeals. Or stated in other words, Ostler offered the affidavits 
of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith as a defensive measure; however, 
those same affidavits necessarily show that the mandate should be 
recalled. 
Therefore, granting mandamus will not open the floodgates 
for the use of such expert affidavits in other appellate pro-
ceedings. This case can only be cited to approve expert affidavits 
(commenting on a court's opinion) which are offered defensively. 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Certiorari should be granted. 
DATED this "j^ day of J^V*^ , 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney/ftor Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI (Ostler v. Albina, et 
al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, this > day of St a^F" , 
1991 to the following: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
i /' 
0566-162.l\jn 
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Exhibits 
M. Dayle Jeffs, #1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RALPH OSTLER, | 
Plaintiff, | AFFIDAVIT OF M. DAYLE JEFFS 
Case No. 910404 
ALBINA TRANSFER COMPANY, INC. j 
F&R ROW INC., AND STANLEY E. 
WHEELER, | 
Court of Appeals No. 
Defendant. | 910246-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
COMES NOW M. Dayle Jeffs makes the following affidavit under oath: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. I have represented Albina Transfer Company, Inc., Stanley E. Wheeler, and 
F & R Roe In., in the above entitled case throughout the entire proceedings. 
3. My clients have incurred attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $13,398.51 
in representing the defendants subsequent to the ruling by the Court of Appeals affirming the 
trial verdict in accordance with the attached statements Exhibit A. 
4. My clients will have incurred $720.00 in additional attorneys fees through the 
filing of the Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
5. I believe my clients will incur attorneys fees in the amount of $360.00 in 
preparation and argument of the Petition for Writ of Mandamus on October 7, 1991. 
6. Total fees incurred by my clients as a result of the numerous filing by Plaintiff 
subsequent to the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court is $14,478.51. 
Dated and signed this->c/_ day of September, 1991. 
M. Dayle Jeifs /'' / ^ 
On this date, September 30,1991, personally appeared before me M. Dayle Jeffs, 
the owner of the above affidavit, who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the same. 
I^5tary'Public 
k ."-TZT-v NOTMPrPlBUC 
I /0$§\ NELENaBURK 
& I 
Prove, Utah 8460 
Fanners Insurance 
P« 0, Box 430 
Orem, Utah 84059-0430 
September 30*. 1991 
Page 1 
CI lents FI) 
Matters 1 
ers Ostler v Albina Transfer 
ALBINA TRANSFER 
79 N0302 00 17 " 
of Uccurrs 04/19/84 
ate Professional Services Rendered 
i v 
'91 
7 1 
'9.1 
-91 
10/91 
16/yi 
I)raf t inq Brief in 0pposi 11 on to Cer tior ar i,. PL.C 
Review decision by the Court of Appeals on MDJ 
Motion for Sanctions* 
Review Petitions sent by Robert DeBry, MDJ 
Examination of ruling of Court of Appeals on HI)J 
Motion to Recall Mandate,, 
Securing eniargment of time to file response MDJ 
to Mandamus for Supreme Court. 
Research •• res Petition for Writ of MDJ 
Mandamus,: Preparation of Mot ion to Enlarge 
T 3. me to R e s p o n d t o P e 13.11 o n for U r it of 
Mandamus, Telephone conference with Jon 
Topol« 
Letter to Jon Topol. Examination of new MDJ 
Petition for Certiorari and Petition for 
Mandamus« 
Examination of documents in Preparation for PLC 
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of 
Cert 1Dr a r i„ 
Researc:h - re: Br 1 ef 1 n 0ppos 1tion to 
Certiorari., 
Research and Review of documents for Brief 
in Opposition to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari , 
Research - res Motion to Recall the 
Mandate., 
Research - res Brief in Opposition to PLC 
Certiorari„ 
Research - res Brief in Opposition to uirit PLC 
of Mandamus. 
•-
!
 • - " cri,. Exam 1 na iiois of do c u m e n ts f or f:'LC 
*!' • •-• "5 1". O p p o s i t i o n to w r i t of M a n d a m u s -
"'» <." n:g and Rev i s i n g B r i e f in O p p o s 1 1 1 o n to PLC 
-i{ 5 ' «f M a n d a m u s . 
•" c ,••*-, 
"7 «.- -J\.f 
On 20 
0 a 30 
0,40 
3„00 
1,50 
I-DU 
PLC 3.50 
MTV. 
. „ 50 
v „ H O 
4 „ yu 
o.-, au 
Htiorne• 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Farmers Insurance 
P. 0„ Box 430 
Orem,, Utah 84059-0430 
September 3 0 ? 1991 
P a g e 2 
Clients FD 
II a t1 e r r; 1 
*r: Ostler v Albina Transfer 
ALBINA TRANSFER 
79 NO 302 00 17 
of 0ccurm 04/19/84 
H t P Professional Services Rendered A11 y Hou r s 
• 2 4 / 91 f•' r e p a r a t J. O n o f' 11 e ni o r a n o u ITS « 
'24/91 F i n a l i 2 a t i o n of Sup r e m e Court Brief and 
filing with the C o u r t . 
•'24/91 Draf tinq R e s p o n s e to Peti 11on for Handa*r»ys * 
•'24/9.1. Final i nation of Me m o r a n d u m Opposing Petition 
f o r bJ r 1t o f H a n d a m u s .. 
•'24/91 D r a f t i n g Petition for Writ of Mandamus,. 
/ 2 4 /91 D r a f t i n g and revising Brief in Opp o s i t i o n to 
(y r 11 o f M a n d a m u s., 
•• 24/91 P r e p a r a t i o n of E x h i b i t s for Brief in 
0 p p o s 111 o n t o P e t i t i o n f o r W r i t o f M a n d a m u s* 
'" 2 6 / 91 I) r a f t i r i g B r i e f i n 0 p p o s 111 o n t o C e r t i o r a r i.-, 
''27/91 Drafting Brief in Opp o s i t i o n to Petition for 
U) r 11 o f C e r t i o r a r i „ 
"' 2 7 / 9 i D r a f f i n g a n d R e v i s i n g B r i e f i P 0 p p n s i t ion t o 
C e r t i o r a ri„ 
ADJ 
ADJ 
!1DJ 
HDJ 
WMJ 
PLC 
PLC 
PLC 
wn.'i 
2 « 3 0 
2 „ 0 0 
2.00 
1 n 2 0 
A „ 7 S 
7,00 
4.50 
3.50 
2,20 
:
'LC 4.50 
T o t a 1 S e r v :i. c e s 
Hours Rate Amount 
P a r a 1 e q a 1 /!... a w C1 e r k 
r1« D a v i e J e f f s 
A, Dean Jeffs 
uii iliam M„ Jeffs 
53.. 30 40.00 2,132*00 
12.,90 90,00 1,161.00 
4.30 90:, 00 387.00 
u a j. a n c e cue 
A C C 0 U A G 1 H G 
jjver vo T .-. -J- •-1 
A11orne * - at ' A U , f- .'_ 
F .«! hi -' - JP 
f r'»v»j„ in ^ h b^.MO 
Farmers Insurance 
P. 0. Ho* 430 
0re.ru Ut*h 84^5v--0430 
May 31, 1991 
Paqe 1 
Client: FD 
Matter: 1 
Ostler v Albina Transfer 
-ed: ALB1NA TRANSFER 
:y «: 7* N0302 00 17 
o1 Uccurr: 04''19/84 
balance: 
•nts received: 
balance less credits: 
105.45 
105.45-
0.00 
te Professional Services Rendered Hours 
04/91 Research and Drafting of Motion and Memorandum in 0.50 
Support of Sanctions aqamst Robert DeBry and 
Affidavit of Dayle Jeffs for Attorneys fees. 
14/91 Research and Draftmq Sanctions aqamst DeBr/. 7.60 
15/Q] Drafting Rebuttal to DeBrv's response. 4.00 
3&/9I Preparation of Rebuttal Memorandum in Support of 0.40 
Motion to Impose Sanctions and Certificate of 
Mdilmq -
24/91 Telephone conference with Jon lopol - re: 0.30 
sanctions motion. 
04/93 Drafting Memorandum of Points and Authorities m 1.00 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 11 
against M. Dayle Jeffs. 
14/Q1 Review Reply Memorandum for sanctions aqamst 0.20 
Dayle. 
02/91 Correction of previous motion. Research of Rule 1.30 
33 related to case law. 
10/9J Sorted and made all copies for CO.A. Rule 33 1.30 
Sanctions. 
:*5/9l Letter to Robert DeBry. 0.30 
VC<'?J Drafting Motion for Sanctions in Court of 0.S0 
Appeals. 
Attorney Recap 
It. Daylv. Jeff? 
Total Services 
Hours Rate Amount 
3.20 80.00 256.00 
824.00 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law,, P.C, 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Farmers Insuran ce 
P. 0. Box 430 
Orem, Utah 84059-0430 
May 31, 1991 
Page 2 
Clients FD 
Hatter: 1 
ers Ostler v Albina Transfer 
t.) 
reds ALBINA TRANSFER 
cy »: 79 N0302 00 17 
of Occurr: 04/19/84 
Attorney Recap 
Paralegal/Law Clerk 
Hours Rate Amount 
14.20 40.00 568.00 
Balance due 824.00 
F , i l „ K M - . - " M 
Fnr Pier^  Insurance 
P. 0. Bo* 4o0 
Orefi i . U t a h 84»>5Q-O430 
ha- 1 4 . 1'^t 
P a G «-_* J 
Li lent: ( D 
+ er: Ostler v Alton a Truster 
urpci: ALblNA (RANsFFP 
icv tt: 79 No3o2 00 J 7 
e of Uccurr: 04/lV'84 
La 5 bur semen is 
l / u4 v i postaoe 
r e : M ^ i l m o Motion and he/oorandufli m 
suppor t o f 3ctctions a q a m s t Pebr-', 
A f f i d a v i t OT Da^le fo r h H o r n f ^ ' s 
f e e s . 
-» 03 gl Fi lino I-ees 
fp; Apneal„ 
l»)0.00 
Total Oisbursements 105-45 
Pal an re due 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Farmers Insurance 
P. 0. Box 430 
Ore.Ti. Utah 84059-0430 
December 31. 1990 
Page 1 
Client: FD 
Matter: 1 
?r; Ostler v Alhina Transfer 
-ed: ALBINA TRANSFER 
:y 8: 79 N0302 00 17 
of Occurr: 04/19/84 
<te Professional Services Rendered Hour* 
'15/90 Indexing retriver research file. 
'31/90 Research - re: sanctions. 
01/90 Research - re: sanctions. 
04/90 Research - re: Motion sanctions, 
05/90 Research. 
06/90 Research. 
26/90 Drafting Motion for Sanctions. 
'28/90 Research. Drafting Motion for Sanctions and 
Attorney 's fees. 
29/90 Drafting Motion for Sanctions. 
02/91 Preparation of Motion for Sanctions - re: 
Attorneys fees. Research. 
,00 
.20 
,70 
.00 
,50 
0.80 
0.70 
3.50 
0.70 
9.10 
Attorney Recap 
Paralegal/Law Clerk 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Paralegal/Law Clerk 
Total Services 1,348.00 
Hours Rate Amount 
532.00 
512.00 
304.00 
15.20 
6.40 
7.60 
35.00 
30.00 
40.00 
Balance due 1,343.00 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
farmers Insurance 
K 0. Box 480 
>rovo, Utah 84603 
March 14, 1990 
Client: FD 
Matter : 1 
latter: Ostler vs. Albina Transfer 
nsured: ALBINA TRANSFER 
•olicy «: 79 N0302 00 17 
>ate of Occur: 04/19/84 
Professional Services Rendered Date 
9/25/89 Analysis of Petition for re-hearing. Letter to 
Jon Topol. 
1/02/90 Research. Drafting law points on Memorandum in 
Opposition to Petition for Certiorari. Drafting 
Motion and Memorandum to Strike Affidavit of 
Patricia Hanna. 
1/03/90 Drafting of brief in Opposition to Certiorari. 
Research and drafting law points on Brief on 
Opposition to Petition for Certiorari. 
1/04/90 Revise brief in Opposition to Petition for 
Certiorari. Revise brief in Opposition to Petition 
Petition for Certiorari. Drafting parts of brief 
in Opposition to Certiorari. Revise brief. 
L/05/90 Revise Brief. Letter to Jon Topol. 
L/09/90 Preparation of Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Patricia Hanna. Editing and drafting Opposition 
to Petition for Certiorari. 
./11/90 Drafting Memorandum Opposing Certiorari. Edit 
brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari. 
./13/90 Research. Finalization of brief opposing Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
./15/90 Research and Finalization of Brief in Opposition 
to Petition for Certiorari. 
./31/90 Telephone conference with Court of Appeals. 
/31/90 Research and preparation of oral argument of 
Motion to Strike Affidavit in the Supreme Court. 
/05/90 Letter to Jon Topol - re: Supreme Court Hearing. 
Court Appearance in the Supreme Court - re: 
Hours 
2.20 
10.00 
11.50 
2.00 
3.80 
1.90 
3.50 
14.00 
.04 
3.50 
2.90 
02/06/90 
02/08/90 
02/13/90 
02/14/90 
02/20/90 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Patricia Hanna. 
Telephone conference with Supreme Court Clerk -
re: transcript of proceedings. Conference with 
Jon Topol - re: Supreme Court hearing. Telephone 
conference with Clerk of the Supreme Court - re: 
ruling. Telephone conference with Court reporter. 
Analysis of issues on Petition for rehearing in 
Court of Appeals following remand by the Supreme 
Court. 
Examination of Supreme Court transcripts. Letter 
Jon Topol. 
Review of Supreme Court tapes in Supreme Court. 
Letter to Jon Topol. 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Total Services 
01/15/90 Postage 7.83 
re: mailing appeal briefs. 
01/15/90 Costs Expended 42.00 
re: photocopying appeal 
briefs 
02/28/90 Costs Expended 36.70 
re: Transcript of hearing. 
Total Disbursements 
Balance Due: 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
A11 o r n e y s a t L. a w.-, F' „ 0« 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Farmers Insurance 
P. 0» Box 480 
Prove, Utah 84603 
March 6? 1990 
Page 1 
Clients FT) 
Hatter; 1 
rs Ostler v Albina Transfer 
eck ALBINA TRANSFER 
y tt: 79 N0302 00 17 
of Occurr: 04/19/84 
balances 
nts receiveds 
balance less credits,1; 
Disbursements 
28/90 Costs Expended 
res Transcript of Hearing, 
U>6 .: /U 
Total Disbursements 
v
^ ^ f : ' ^ ^ r 
,— I • 
Associated Professional Reporters 
10 West Broadway / Suite SOO / Cllft Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-3441 
M. DAYLE JEFFS, ESQ. 
JEFFS &. JEFFS 
P.O. BOX 888 
PROVO, UT 84601 
ATTN 
TO INSURE RECEIVING PROPER CREDIT 
PLEASE INDICATE OUR INVOiCE NUMBER 
WHEN REMITTING. 
TERMS: NET 30 DAYS 
RE: 
°* Service: 
Deposition of 
RALPH OSTLER VS. ALBINA TRANSFER CO., 
February 05 , 1990 Your File #: 89 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
REPORTER 
SHINDURLING 122 
INC 
529 
L F ^ o?J£L AM0"NT $ 36.70 LESS PAID TO DATP «
 Q ojj TO DATE $
Please Pay This Amount 3 6 . 7 0 
09395 
* ° T MADE AS SPECIFIED 
WILL BE CHARGED COLLECTION COSTS Alun D C A 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Farmers Insurance March 31, 1990 
P. 0. Box 480 Page 1 
Provo, Utah 84603 Client: FD 
Matter: 1 
r: Ostler v Albma Transfer 
ed: ALBINA TRANSFER 
y tt: 79 N0302 00 17 
of Occurr: 04/19/84 
balance: 831.20 
nts received: 831.20-
balance less credits: 0.00 
te Professional Services Rendered Hours 
)l/90 Examination of new transcript from the Supreme 0.50 
Court. Letter to Jon Topol. 
L2/90 Telephone conference with Jon Topol - re: ruling 0.40 
denying Certiori. 
3/90 Letter to Jon Topol. 0.30 
Total Services 96.00 
Attorney Recap Hours Rate Amount 
M. Dayle Jeffs 1.20 80.00 96.00 
Balance due 96.00 
Jeffs and Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law, P.C 
P.O. Box 868 
Provo, Utah 84603 
F a r m e r s I n s u r a n c e 
P. 0. Box 480 
Provo, Utah 84603 
February 28, 1990 
P a q e 1 
Clients FD 
hatter: 1 
iter: Ostler v Albina Transfer 
>ured: ALBINA TRANSFER 
icy tt: 79 N0302 00 17 
e of Occurr: 04/19/84 
or balance: 
ments received: 
or balance less credits: 
Date Professional Services Rendered 
2,788.35 
Hours 
L/05/90 Letter to Jon Topol. 
L/31/90__ Research and preparation of oral argun-ient of 
~ Hotion to Strike Affidavit in the Supreme Court. 
2/05/90 Letter to Jon Topol - re: Supreme Court Hearing. 
Court Appearance in the Supreme Court - re: 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Patricia Hanna. 
1/06/90 Telephone conference with Supreme Court Clerk -
res transcript of proceedings. Conference with 
Jon - res Suporeme Court hearing. Telephone 
conference with Clerk of the Supreme Court - re: 
ruling.. Telephone conference with Court 
reporter. 
/08/90 Anal/sis of issues on Petition for rehearing in 
Court of Appeals following remand by the Supreme 
Court * 
/13 / 9 0 E x a m i n a t i o n o f S u p i e m e C o u r t t r a n s r r i •:> t s „ L e 11 e r 
to Jon Topol. 
/14/90 Review of Suprefl'e Court tapes in Supreme Court. 
'20/90 Letter to Jon T Q O G I , 
0.50 
3.50 
2.90 
0.80 
0 . HO 
JU » si. \J 
0.50 
1o ta1 S e r vices 
\ 15". o r n e y \-,m Rat. Hmoun<; 
Roner t }_ » Jeffs 
F" a. r a 1 e g a 1 / L H. W C1 e r k 
rL Davie Jeffs 
30 .00 40,.00 
35.00 122.. a() 
80.00 6,52.00 
Jeffs-and Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law, F.C. 
P.O. Bo;; 888 
Provn, Utah 84607 
Farmer s Insurance 
P. 0. Bo;; 480 
Provo, Utah 84603 
January 31 , 1990 
Page 1 
Client: FD 
Matter: 1 
tter: Ostler v Albina Transfer 
sured: ALBINA TRANSFER 
Licy #: 79 N0302 00 17 
:e of Occurr: 04/19/84 
.or balance: 
'ments received: 
or balance less credits: 
49.8: 
49.8: 
Date Professional Services Rendered Hours 
1/02/90 Research. Drafting law points on Memorandum in 10.00 
Opposition to Petition for Certiorari a. Drafting 
Motion and Memorandum to Stril-e Affidavit of 
Patricia Hanna. 
1/03/90 Drafting part of brief in Opposition to 11.50 
Certioraria. Research and drafting law points on 
Brie?-f on Opposition to Petition for Certioraria. 
1/04/90 Revise brief in Oppostion to Petition for 4.25 
Certioraria. Revise brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Certiorari. Drafting parts of brief 
in opposition to Certioraria. Revise brief. 
L/05/90 Revise Brief. 1.50 
L'09/90 Preparation of Motion to Stril-e Affidavit of 3.80 
Patricia Hanna. Editing and drafting Opposition 
to Petition for Certioraria. 
./I 1/90 Drafting Memorandum opposing Certioraria. Edit 1.90 
brief in Opposition Petition for Certioraria. 
/13/90 Research. Fmalization brief opposing Petition 3.50 
for Writ of Certioraria. 
/15/90 Research and Fmalization of Brief in Opposition 14.00 
to Petition for Certioraria. 
/31/90 Telephone conference with Court of appeals. 0.40 
Total Services 
Attorney Recap Hour-: Rate Amount 
Jeffs and * Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law, P.C, 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Farmers Insurance 
P. 0. Box 480 
Provo, Utah 84603 
January 31, 1990 
Page 2 
Client: FD 
Matters 1 
ar: Qstler v Albina Transfer 
t.) 
-eds ALBINA TRANSFER 
:y #: 79 N0302 00 17 
of Occurr: 04/19/84 
Attorney Recap 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Hours Rate Amount 
21.90 80•00 1,752.00 
Balance due 
_Jtff fs and J e'f f s 
Attorneys art Law5.JE—.C-« 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Farmers Insurance 
P. 0- Box 480 
Provo, Utah 84603 
January 24, 1990 
Page i 
Client: FD 
Matter: 1 
rs Ostler v Albina Transfer 
3d: ALBINA TRANSFER 
/ #: 79 N0302 00 17 
:«f Occurr: 04/19/84 
Di sbu rsemen t s 
.5/90 postage 
re: Mailing appeal briefs. 
5/90 Costs Expended 
re: photocopying appeal briefs-
Total Disbursements 
7 - 83 
42.00 
49. s: 
B a 1 a n c e d u e 49.83 
